THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS AND OTHER ESSAYS

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THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS

AND OTHER ESSAYS

BY

THOMAS HUGHES, S.J.

COMPILED BY

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PREFACE

No apology is needed for the re-publication, in essay form, of the articles here collected. Several of them deal with the first stages of vital controversies, with the early tendency of opinions which have now, for good or for evil, come to their maturity, and with matters of fact necessary to the understanding of much that confronts us in the actual world. We cannot rightly estimate the present, except in the light of the past. But, besides this, the historical *dossier* of any important idea affords an extraordinary interest, and of such authentic *dossiers* the essays contain a precious store. Viewed in this light alone, there can be no doubt as to the permanent value of the articles on "Anthropology," "A Baby's Footprint" and "Freemasonry." In two others, "Missionary Countries" and "The Serio-Comic in the Vatican Archives," the learned author has drawn upon unpublished documents in famous libraries, and even the most august of Archives are found to furnish some of that strange material which has always moved man to laughter at himself. Lastly, the fine essays on the "Plurality of Worlds" and "Liberal Education" treat subjects which, because they involve deep-lying principles of metaphysics and psychology, must always be of the first importance.

The articles were written while the author was in

America, and were contributed to the *American Catholic Quarterly* and the *American Ecclesiastical Review*. In preparing them for re-publication I have omitted as far as possible, at his desire, any matter that seemed to be merely occasional, or proper only to the place and time of their first appearance.

THE COMPILER

ROME, FEAST OF ST. IGNATIUS LOYOLA
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I

THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS—*Quid est Homo?*[1]

In a learned article which has recently appeared[2] there is expounded a theory on the plurality of worlds. The theory is one which is favoured by not a few erudite persons; and in the article to which we refer the writer desires to rest it on a basis so trustworthy as the doctrine of St. Thomas. He wishes to show that no relevant objection can be made to revelation, and no slight can be put upon it, by the scientific hypothesis of a plurality of races inhabiting the stellar orbs; and should this unverified hypothesis be, at some future time, raised to the plane of certainty, revelation will remain intact in all its symmetry of form and proportion. Further, in this author's judgment, the outcome of such a scientific demonstration would be an extension of view in the matter of religion, and an increased grandeur of conception. We cannot but agree with him. Whatever God has done must result so, for us. But he proceeds farther, and with the good will which goes half-way towards making a hearty scientist, he forestalls the conclusion, he thinks it is true, and believes that God has actually dealt so with those stellar depths, and has really

[1] From the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, 1884; abridged.

[2] *Ibid.*, by Mgr. de Concilio on the "Plurality of Worlds."

peopled them with rational beings of our genus, though not of our species. For this he offers three arguments. We cannot distinguish more than three. Taking them in the order in which we mean to review them, we may call them the utilitarian argument, the argument for number of species and the argument for reconciliation.

I

Utilitarianism, in general, is the system of thought or action by which things are referred as means to an end. They are compared, assorted, accepted, rejected on the merits of this one relationship—how they comport with the end in view. Thus far we are all utilitarians, in theory as well as in practice. But there are two orders of utilitarianism, one broad, the other narrow; one viewing things at large, the other regarding them in a special field; the one being that of the commander, the other that of the subaltern. The broad system of utilitarianism does not exclude the view of any particular end, but it keeps its eye by preference on the more remote, to which all the others converge. Facts and their relations which lie outside the subaltern's field of vision appear, from a more commanding point of view, conspicuous and ordered, in keeping with the rest. Facts, even, which may seem in conflict with each other become co-ordinate through their subordination to a higher fact; and notes which sounded in discordant keys resolve into the intelligent elements of a more comprehensive harmony. In this broad view of the world such a thing as evil in the universe is possible, and the universe withal rolls on in its own perfect movement, perfect whether the rhythm of that movement be absolutely speaking good, better, or, in the sense of optimism, be

the best. Thus, in our narrow span of life and to our narrow stretch of vision, there are many facts, seemingly irreconcilable and having no point of contact, any more than meridians, which, at the Equator, appear perfectly parallel; but, when followed beyond the visible horizon and discerned by a more enlightened intelligence, these same facts are found to meet, so to speak, at the pole. Standing, as we do, upon the infinitesimal arc of some six thousand historical years, we are liable to over-estimate difficulties, and to feel great thoughts like a great weight on our little premises. And so it must be until, standing outside of our native narrowness, we come to ply a leverage of thought which is not restricted by the conditions of our birth, and are able to understand how all meridians meet at one pole. This is the broader utilitarian view of things. It is metaphysical and theological.

There is, however, another utilitarianism, that of the subaltern who is placed to aim at some nearer attainable end and bends every nerve to the attainment thereof. The nineteenth century dealt with very near ends indeed; it even revised all titles of nobility, by rearranging everything upon its own peculiar ground of material culture or the development of material resources. Men were to be accounted excellent, according as they excelled in the specialized study of some material thing. All specialized studies are limited, but these specialties in particular are limited to matters of sight, touch and hearing; and, even in their highest theory, they seldom wander far from the demands of material comfort. Thus hampered, if this kind of utilitarianism applies its principles to wider questions—to metaphysics or theology—it is narrow and warped in the effort. If it essays to control the nobler world of thought it measures religion by mathematics, piety by poetry,

monasticism by the fiscal system, eternal justice by material expediency. This is materialistic utilitarianism.

Having settled these preliminary matters, we may now approach the argument which the essayist bases upon utility. He first lays down the general principle: "God, having determined upon the amount of perfection to be created, was bound to draw from it the greatest possible amount of glory; no force of the universe should be allowed to go to waste; all the forces combined should be so drawn out as to realize, in the best possible way, the general end of the universe." Secondly, he proceeds to make the particular application of this vague general principle: "Now, without the plurality of worlds teeming with myriads of intellectual substances informing organisms, this law of wisdom would utterly fail. Pray, what is the physical use of such masses of matter? Can anyone tell? No use whatever can be adduced; we can see no necessity for such a vast number of colossal systems," etc. Therefore, there exists a plurality of worlds. We beg leave to determine the exact value of these two statements, especially of the second or minor proposition, that there is no use in such masses of matter.

Indeed, as to the first general proposition, no philosopher whose mind is imbued with the essentially broad views of St. Thomas Aquinas will ever start with narrow principles, or give in to the short-sighted materialism of the day. But it is quite possible that, with the broad principle of God's glory overruling everything, one should connect some secondary assertion too restricted in its nature, as that the said glory of God cannot be attained except in such and such ways as I designate; particularly if I designate them merely in default of my seeing other ways.

In all matters of God's free choice and determination, and such are the creation and arrangement of things in the universe, God chose freely what number, measure and weight He pleased. He did so on earth; He did so in the sky. No necessity is imposed on Him whether He should make things or not—no necessity arising either from the immutable essences of things, or from the immutable attitude of all things towards Himself. And, when He chose this world to make it in time, He made it as its essences demanded that it should be, and He made it essentially dependent on Himself, both as a whole and in all its parts. But, how much of the world there should be, and how its parts should be related to one another in the mingling and blending of their physical qualities, this was entirely the subject-matter of His free design, and He designed it all freely. Therefore is it that we know miracles are possible; therefore, likewise, philosophical optimism is false.

Is it necessary that one physical element more, or one less, should temper the world, so as to make it the very best? Is it needful that two suns, or no sun, should revolve here or there? Is it needful that more grass, or less rock, should fill up the prospect so as to satisfy the eye? What is there to make anything necessary when the whole thing is unnecessary, and every one of its parts arbitrary? If it can be shown, by an exclusive minor proposition, that such and such a method will be the *only* way for effecting the glory of God, then the argument will be quite conclusive that this way has been taken. But, if the economy of the glory of God is to be demonstrated by hypotheses which are not exclusive, then there is no inference metaphysically conclusive. At most, one can affirm: "I do not know what else can be said. I do not see the use of such an arrangement, otherwise. I can see

no necessity for such a vast number of colossal suns and planets, unless this hypothesis be accepted." But all this fails of coming to a certain conclusion, because the conclusion has started from an uncertain hypothesis, or a profession of ignorance.

Sometimes, indeed, it seems possible to argue absolutely, as when St. Thomas lays it down broadly that no created effect can exhaust the power of God, yet goes on to say that no dignity can be higher than that of the Mother of God—which surely seems to be only a created effect or result. But putting this aside, and taking the present world as it actually is, poised in the number, weight and measure actually given to it by God's free choice, and calculated by His wisdom to return just so much glory, not more or less, it will be difficult, from the general premise that God's glory must be elicited, and the world's forces must not be wasted, to conclude that, therefore, only this or that arrangement is possible. Laplace argued that, if God had not poised the moon in a certain way, there must have been an error in the process. But even if Laplace's speculation had been justified, what would that have proved? Merely that, in the parts of the world, there is no "optimism," just as in the world, taken as a whole, we know there is none. For the parts need not be better than the whole in that in which they offer themselves, indifferent and free, to the choice of God's free will. And who will show that the poising of a moon or the placing of a rational species, here or there, is not a free act; but that some other certain arrangements belong either to the intrinsic nature of things, or to the essential attitude of things towards God? This can be proved of one rational species, like man; but, given one such species, or even one individual, there the conclusion stops. Now here we are speaking of *more* than one rational

species : we are discussing the question of a plurality of worlds. Therefore, in the argument before us, while we grant the general principle regarding God's glory, we have to decline accepting the minor which is not, and cannot be, proved—that many rational species must exist in the stars to elicit the requisite degree of glory.

We might desist, here, from weighing the utilitarian argument more fully, but that we observe the argument itself insists and pushes forward. It borrows the aid of other reasons to confirm it. This subsidiary argumentation is derived from the size, number, weight and other material conditions of the heavenly orbs. Emphasis is laid upon the fact that, for over fifty centuries, they have rolled, unknown, through immeasurable space, and that myriads of millions of solar systems so vast, so colossal, so swift in their movements have all this while been moving in rhythmical revolution. Now this would have been a prodigality of outlay, unless the hypothesis of a plurality of worlds be accepted. We are therefore bound to accept it.

But it seems to us that these material conditions assume, in the argument, a degree of importance which is unfamiliar to our mind, either in connection with St. Thomas or with any " theological and metaphysical arguments " of our acquaintance, though it is on the basis of metaphysics and theology that the reasoning is said to be conducted. Are not these elements purely physical and materialistic ? Do they not appeal to mere imagination, which they tend to oppress with vastness, number and weight ? And does the oppression of the imagination tend to simplify, and not rather to mystify, the operations of a logical reason ? We suggest that metaphysical and theological reason will find a single grain of sand, or one drop of water, quite as effective in the premises as the burden of the

myriad millions. Nay, taking up the argument in the very sense which we are now criticizing, we affirm that if a single grain of sand on the far-off shore in a stellar space, if a single drop of rain falling in the midst of the sea on some starry orb, if a single "gem of purest ray serene" in the deep bosom of some solar ocean can be shown to be thrown away, to be useless in creation, to be *frustra*, then all the epithets lavished upon these vast systems, in the hypothesis before us, must on all accounts be expended on that grain of sand, that drop of rain, that gem so discarded. There would be a reckless "waste of forces"—a "failure to put the amount of forces created to the best possible advantage"—a "manner of acting absolutely and entirely unworthy of God's wisdom,"—and so forth.

Now, having made this admission, we turn round and ask: Pray, what reason can you assign why the drop of rain in *our* mid-ocean is not utterly wasted? why the grain of sand on *our* shore is not recklessly thrown away? why the protophyte is not prodigally squandered in the bottom of *our* sea? What reason can you assign that will not apply exactly to the uninhabited state of the stellar orbs? Is it that you see the actual use of the odd protophyte, which I now point out with the finger of my fancy among the million millions? Is it that you weigh the utility of that drop of rain in the midst of the sea? Can you estimate the exact value to creation of that unknown vein of metal in the bowels of this earth? Unknown, I say. If you cannot, why take offence at the unknown stellar orbs? If you can, apply the same reason to them. It will fit exactly.

Allow me to urge the point. "Hast thou entered into the depths of the sea, and walked in the lowest parts of the deep? Hast thou considered the breadth of the earth? Tell me if thou knowest all things"?

Can you understand evil in the world? Yet evil is here, and God's glory is gathered from it, and greater glory than if He had not permitted it. Now, if uninhabited stellar orbs are not evil, either morally or physically, what antecedent reasoning, either metaphysical or theological, can put them down as a failure, unless perforce they admit of such and such an hypothesis to save them from condemnation?

If man did know the reasons for this orb and not for the others, that would give him no premise to work on except his ignorance. But man's ignorance and man's knowledge alike, in the positive order of physical creation, are no criterion whatever of its why or its wherefore. Rather, the very development of man, that he might have something to know and might come in time to know it, is reason enough why God should have given the world an amplitude sufficient to supply us with subjects of thought throughout all time, without fear of the resources being ever exhausted. He has handed over the universe to our disputations, and He has given an occupation to the children of men. We are but embryonic, and, if we live, we live but for a day. And, as we might imagine a puzzled embryo philosophizing over its hapless condition—why this forming system? why this developing vertebra? why this locomotive apparatus for one who has never known motion?—and we answer, commiserating: "Wait a while, yet a little while, and the evolution of God's Providence will justify itself and you"; so it is with this embryonic universe, philosophizing in its centre, man. Or, if you will have it that he is no embryo, but developed and living for a few days, and that he querulously sends forth a cry from the narrowness of his view and the shortness of his ken, for he cannot understand the things that are about him, and much

less the things that are above him—lo! a sweet spirit of the sky may be heard to whisper in the simplicity of his soul: "Oh, man, who art thou that judgest? Behold yon sky! As far as the heavens are above the earth, so far do God's thoughts transcend your thoughts, and God's ways your ways. He is patient because eternal, *patiens quia æternus*. He has plenty of time, for He lives from everlasting to everlasting. You are impatient; you live but a day and you live fast; and thirty generations have come and gone before a sea-level is raised. It is meet you should have a resurrection!"

II

The next argument which we review proceeds to this effect, that the higher we mount in the scale of being the more manifold must we find the number of species in each higher order; and since, within the compass of this material universe, the rational creature is highest, the number of rational species should be indefinitely multiplied. Now, it is evident that mankind is only one such species. Therefore there must be others in the stars. Further, some other sayings or remote principles are cited from St. Thomas.[1]

We shall first consider the argument, and then set matters in the light wherein we conceive them, as well on their own merits as in the view of the Angelic Doctor.

Does not the argument go beyond its object and overleap itself, and instead of answering the difficulty raise it in an aggravated form? With the elevation of species, it is said, there should be an increase in the multiplication thereof; so that, since on this planet

[1] Omitted here, with the author's commentaries. See his original article.

there are many species of the lower orders and only one rational species, there must be other rational beings in the stars. Granted for the moment. But will there not be more species of the lower orders also in those same stars? If there are ten myriads of these lower orders here, to overbalance poor single-handed man, will there not be ten myriads of them to overbalance the poor rational being there? The difficulty is only raised in an aggravated form. For the same argument which will establish a rational being there, different in species from the rational being here, will differentiate the lower orders there from their compeers here. Is there, in fact, a reason drawn from the nature of things, from the power of God, from the conditions of climate, which will establish and vary one set, and not vary the other? It cannot be urged that the difficulty requires it so. We are denying that the difficulty does require it so, or rather that there is any difficulty at all to be solved. And that we shall now explain.

In the structure of scholastic philosophy, the prospect which is consistently presented to our view is that, in the whole of creation, there are two extremes and but one mean: the extremes being, on the one hand, the purely spiritual and, on the other, the purely material; the mean being the juncture between the two.

Now it is impossible to conceive that a juncture be more than one. It is impossible to conceive of a useful rivet which before it can hold two surfaces together must be riveted by another rivet, and that by a third, and so on indefinitely. Because, if this were so, the first would be no rivet at all, but be called so by a misnomer. Now St. Thomas is not misnaming; he is constantly proving the thing—that man is the rivet, the juncture, betwixt intellectual

substances above and material substances below. Man adequately joins these two orders together, in the indefeasible right of his being a mean between them; for he alone is double, compounded of both, having a spiritual soul and a material body. He cannot, then, need another juncture to unite himself, already the juncture, with either extreme; and then a third, and then a fourth. Such multiplication of species, which shall be edged in between man and the angel, comes under a head of argument constantly rebutted by scholastic philosophy, as when it proves that we cannot go on, indefinitely, in reaching a first cause; or that accidents do not need other accidents whereby they may be joined to their immediate subject; that the modality, for instance, called curvature, does not need another mode to hang it on to its subject, as a hook in the wall does not demand another hook whereby itself shall hang, and this latter a third, and then a fourth. Thus, again, no relationship between two terms postulates anything except the two. Given two extremes, the relationship between at once blossoms forth. And just so, in the infinite wisdom of God, given the two extremes of the purely intellectual angel and the purely material brute, the intermediary between both at once blossoms forth; and that is man. And, rising to a higher analogy in the infinite mercy of the Lord, given a fallen race and a commiserating God, the Flower of David blossoms forth between them, and the Word made Flesh joins the two in one.

III

Coming to the question of adjusting his theory to the teaching of the Christian faith, the author states impressively the importance of the issues involved.

"These questions," he says, "must be answered; for on them depends the whole controversy between infidelity and Christianity." The infidel Paine, whom he quotes, represented belief in Christianity as directly contrary to belief in the plurality of worlds, saying: "The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind, and he who thinks he believes in both, has thought but little of either." The learned essayist, accordingly, faces the question of those imaginary races in the skies and their attitude towards Christ, and he asks: "In what relation would these new personalities, so to speak, stand with regard to the whole system of our holy religion? What place would they hold in it?" etc. Then he lays down his propositions to satisfy these questions, affirming that Christ is the centre of all; that all these creations were made through Christ, glorify God dependently on Christ, and do so morally; that, as we all have received of Christ's fullness, so must they receive of His fullness to reach their destiny. We await the proof of this; but the author dismisses us with the observation: "Of course, this is not the place to prove the above statements or vindicate their truth. We must necessarily take them for granted."

But here we are at a loss. To whom is this appeal made for an indulgent acceptance? Is it to the Christian who accepts the conclusion about Christ, and possibly denies the premises about the plurality of worlds? Or is it to the infidel, who denies the conclusion and accepts the premises? The plea for mutual reconciliation placidly assumes what each accepts, and proves nothing of what either denies. And the sneer of Tom Paine still curls upon his lips.

However little this answer may serve to conciliate the infidel or to propitiate the believer, it will serve us

excellently as a transition, and by way of it we may enter into our own positive and constructive view of things. Let us observe, then, where all this speculation has left us. It has left us pondering over Our Lord's attitude towards those imaginary races in the stars. And what is that attitude? Let us apprehend its full meaning, and note the involuntary admissions which the theory before us makes, when it invites us to ponder on Our Lord's Providence in the world.

What is the attitude of Christ? It is that of One become Incarnate who, although Highest by nature, has deliberately chosen, not an angelic, but a rational species and assumed a lowly compound nature. And which of the rational species propounded in the theory has He chosen? The highest? No, but in the theory the lowest. He has not seized upon the higher races. He has not taken His stand upon the largest orbs. He has not selected a central sun; nor, in this system of ours which He has honoured with His Incarnation, has He chosen a sun at all. Among this little knot of planets, His glance has lighted favourably, not upon the largest, but almost upon the smallest. Further, on this little earth, did He honour the highest point, or a central spot, or the most fertile land, or anything, in short, that was either mathematically or physically symmetrical? Perhaps, politically speaking, He chose the centre of the human world? Is that so? Was Judæa a centre? And, in despised Judæa, did He at least make choice of Jerusalem and of the Temple, and at a fitting moment, in the splendour of solemnities, among the august throng of sacred priests and noble princes, walk forth upon this earth, in His pride of beauty, and seize in willing captivity the gazing eyes and ravished hearts of senates lost in admiration and of multitudes prostrate

in adoration? What a sarcasm on such a pretty fancy is Bethlehem and Nazareth, and Galilee and Egypt! What a shock to the æsthetics of science is the company He kept! What a scandal to all mathematics, pure as well as mixed, to all the equipoising of the worlds, political, solar and nebular, is everything He did! We may recall St. Augustine's festive vein in the application of the Psalm: "*Accedet homo ad cor altum et exaltabitur Deus*, Man shall reach to a deep heart, and God shall be deeper still. *Homo, scrutando scrutationes defecisti!* O man, thou hast missed it, in thy searchings so profound!"

This analogy illuminates our present topic, for in its light there is much less to wonder at if we find man, whose head Christ is, made a little less than the angels; and if, in the natural as well as moral conditions of his being, we behold him situated in exact accord with his prototype; for that prototype was made Man *propter homines*, for man's sake; and He is the model and sampler of all their existence. If man, then, is not located in a central sun nor on the largest planet; if he is not set in mathematical proportion either with the heavens above, or with the earth beneath, or with the waters under the earth; if he is not moulded to match the myriads of lower creatures afar off among the zoophytes, nor even to hold his own among his nearest neighbours, the elephant, the lion, and the horse, in their strength, size and agility; if these things are so, who is it that can take offence? Is it the world or its physics? Was man made for the world and its physics, or were they made for man? *Propter hominem.* And is it by quantity, by *moles* that he is better than they? Perhaps it is St. Augustine who answers somewhere: "*Non mole magna sunt quæ vere magna sunt.*" So too Ben Jonson:

It is not growing like a tree,
In bulk, doth make man better be,
Or standing long an oak, three hundred year,
To fall a log at last, dry, bald and sear.
The lily of a day
Is fairer far in May.
Although it fall and die that night,
It was the plant and flower of light!
In small proportions we just beauties see;
And in short measure life may perfect be.

Something more remarkable is this, that, as we mount higher in the dispensations of God, we tend more towards unity. In the supernatural order there is only one Man, the Mediator Jesus Christ; there is only one such couple as Mary and Joseph. And as we begin to descend, the comprehension of perfections becoming less, the extension of quantity becomes more. There are twelve Apostles and seventy-two disciples; and so on down to the broad base of the pyramid, the apex being a point, a unit, at the top. And in the natural order, in the world of matter and of man, the same holds good. Man is the apex of the orders; and, as we descend in the scale of beings, they lose, compared with him, in the comprehensiveness of their perfection; and so they gain in extension to make up by quantity for what they lack in quality; for man, in the material world, has been appointed to represent God in the universe. And, since in the universe no created word can represent God sufficiently or can articulate half His idea, the Divine Wisdom multiplies His words like an eloquent pleader; He distributes His phrases like a rhythmic poet; He speaks gently to win us sweetly; He showers His speech to impress us mightily; and to the end that, without being oppressed, we may receive largely of His resources, He has economized them for our

weakness in an unfolding reserve that shall open as we demand, and shall yield its deposit as we desire; and He has put the key thereof in the keeping of man. "*Tradidit mundum disputationi eorum*, He has handed the world over to their disputations." In the same station of dignity has He made man to stand with respect to the material world. All the creatures thereof are "groaning and travailing" to express man's perfections, who is the little world, the microcosm; and the big world is trying to copy him; and its efforts, well-meant but ineffectual, are made to multiply in unceasing energy and geometrical progression down to the broad base of the material pyramid, where perfection fades away to the monad and the star of clay, and number stretches out to the myriad and the dust of the Milky Way. If we are but partly conscious of this, it is because we are in a fallen state. Adam, before he fell, could call everything by its name.

With these analogies to strike the proper note of our subject, we may venture to approach what may sound a little reactionary; and, in the face of a science which professes to be enlightened, we advance the plea of what we know to be sane. We call it Catholic Instinct.

IV

Observe then this universe, high as heaven, deep beyond conception, all but wide enough to escape from under the wings of Omnipotence. Yet I feel not too small to be its centre; conscious as I am that I am not so high as my own roof-tree, or so deep as the well from which I draw, or as wide as the farm that so kindly supports me. After all, is it by length or height that greatness is measured? Is it by extension

of bulk, and not by intensity of worth? I fondly imagine that, as I cast my thought—a single fugitive thought, such as I can afford to throw away, like a passing sheen of my mind's activity—upon this darksome current of unreflecting creatures; as I glance from below upwards, and then down to the depths where microscope never searched nor telescope reached, I fondly fancy that my passing thought, this glancing ray flashing from an intelligent mind on the rolling tide of creation, is worth more in its native value, as it makes the depths pellucid with its fugitive being, than ever a poet's eye has caught in all the clay and metal and light and rhythm of the solar systems and starry depths. Behold! So many blades of grass on the sward, so many drops of water in the rills, so many suns in the welkin of creation, all teeming, if so you will have it, with sense, with vegetation, with their resources unexhausted and unopened! Yet I know that my one playful thought is worth more than all; and if all of them were laboriously brought into being that they might be tipped for one instant with the spiritual glory of being just thought of by my mind, and of thus being the occasion of one intellectual word which I speak to myself, then all creation would have been well devised, would have served a noble purpose, and might be suffered to slip out of existence again, perfectly content. So great a being is this single passing glance of intellectual light, and so great a function is the objective glory of stimulating one movement in a spiritual intelligence!

Now things do not pass out of existence, and we speak the intelligent word of knowledge, not once, but often and constantly and on their account. This is all their history—that they have been elaborated, slowly, deliberately, so as to befit the residence

intended for their liege lord, one like to themselves in the right of his body, above them in the right of his soul. To use the analogy of revelation, as I see the world of human society evolving for many a thousand years, to receive " the mystery of piety " in the coming of Christianity, a mystery which appeared in the midst of the ages, and not at the beginning of time ; and yet there was no waste, no neglect there, although tremendous results had been cast for time and eternity, all in its absence ; so, I cannot but ask, is the late discovery of some beds of clay in the sky, and is the tardiness of our personal arrival upon the scene to enjoy the discovery thereof, a matter of such vast consequence that we must remodel all which was ever known before, and must apologize for Christianity, and defend God ? Things seem to me just what they ought to be. There is an early rain of God's mercies, and of nature's revelation, and there is a later rain too ; and both make one progressive season in the creations and manifestations of His natural providence. I would not have the revelation earlier, nor would I have the formation later. In either case the precise measure of glory freely determined by God's will would not be what it is. In no case would there be " waste," " neglect "—terms which sound strange in our ears when God's action is called in question, and when no metaphysical or theological reason is adduced to establish some intrinsic impossibility.

Here, far from an impossibility or even an incongruity, I behold everything most congruous and proper ; an earth for man's body, a universe for his soul ; an earth scarcely yet opened to satisfy corporal needs, a universe just unfolding to develop his spiritual being. Will God, Who metes out so much to man in the right of the body and its needs, show Himself

chary in distributing food for the mind and the heart ; lend man no assistance for his heart to be humble, no aid for his mind to be great ? But, forsooth, as if begrudging us a prospect, God must be conceived as turning the landscape to some more practical account, by planting a bigger brother of ours there, who shall tread the prospect down with his feet, lest it should go to waste ! He, whose blessing hath overflowed like a river, is brought down to household economy, and utilitarianism forbids Him to allow us the sole use of the stars !

But, you assert, man does not use them at all. You protest, " No use whatever can be thought of if we suppose them deserted and sterile, and devoid of living inhabitants." You proclaim against " such a vast number of colossal systems of suns and planets lasting for so many centuries, without any known advantage, and for no reason that can be imagined." Is all that I have now alleged no reason ? And is contemplation no use ? What do you mean by use ? Consumption, burning up, eating up ? That is materialistic enough ; but even on earth that is not the only use to which things are put. If it were, it would entail this advantage, that half the socialism of the day would never have come into being. But half the socialism and nihilism of the present day have come into being on account of quite another use, to which even the things of this earth are turned—the use of contemplation or, rather, the abuse of contemplation. This is that use of things on earth which does not consume what it enjoys, but enjoys what it does not consume ; and, when it appropriates these things exorbitantly and enjoys them exclusively, it is a use so true, and it is so stinging an abuse, that mankind grows rebellious and socialistic and nihilistic :

The man of wealth and pride
Takes up a space that many poor supplied!
Space for his lake, his park's extended bounds,
Space for his horses, equipage and hounds.

There is more here than materialistic use. There is the use of contemplation, in the enjoyment of a prospect. Now in contemplation, to speak of it in general, the soul feeds on truth and beauty, as spirits feed; it witnesses as angels witness; it lives the life which God Himself lives, in the sole adequate witnessing of His own infinite perfections; and, by contemplating the world, man, according to Seneca, gives an adequate testimony to the world and "saves works so great from being without a witness."

I behold then the rays like messengers, trooping to me from the far-off stars. I see much. I hear of more. They tell me, as they arrive, that I cannot exhaust the prospect. God is not so poor in wisdom or in power as to stint the measure of the landscape, that I should ever be able to take it in with a single glance, no, nor in a single life, nor, may be, in the lives of all the generations. He who made the gardeners of the earth knows how to lay out a garden in the skies. So I gather them in, those rays, as they come to me and tell me of their long journeys, and I

Dilate
My spirit to the size of that I contemplate.

The undulations of light bear in upon my eyes, and the waves of grandeur come rolling over my spirit, and God comes with them, as Job says: "Like waves swelling over me, I feared God, and the weight of Him I could not bear." Since the deluge of God's eloquence would overwhelm me, He distributes His

words and dispenses the phrases. Hence, He has moderated His message to the capacity of our fathers and their sons and our posterity, saluting us ever with a new strain and by the voices of new messengers. I know them by number, that they cannot be numbered by me, and this, the conscious weight of the unknown, feeds my faculty with the magnificent. I know them by name, that they are each a little effort, energizing to express the message which they convey. They are telling—each a little syllable. They are voices—each a tiny sound. And in the sound is the element of a word; in the syllable, the fragment of an idea. I put them together and decipher them, not in the light of torch, nor of sun, nor of firmament, but in a higher light than all this, the light of my spiritual intelligence. Thus illuminated, they yield up their contents, clear and striking, what none of the stars and none of the suns, nor all of them together with the nebulæ of the Milky Way, have ever conceived; for neither any one nor all of these possess the light of my single thought, which placidly, without effort, reads: The Heavens are telling the glory of God!

All creation travaileth until now, endeavouring to bear this sealed packet unto us. It is labouring to unfold all its treasures. It will show us all—multitude, length, depth, motion—if we will but know; it will develop all its resources to whet our appetite for learning, and make us develop ours; and, if we do but know, all nature is honoured and rests in peace. Eternal life itself has no higher term than this—that we know.

Is contemplation, then, of no use?

From this service to man, if you discard the skies, you must also dismiss the earth. If the skies are not marshalled to their end by man's "*Benedicite omnia opera Domini Domino*, Bless the Lord, all ye works of

the Lord," then neither is this globe, for all the use man makes of it. Introduce here another and a higher race, or twenty of them, if you find reason to fancy a single one necessary in the sky. First, people the unexplored depths of our earth with rational species, to know it and consume it; the unknown deserts of the sea, to plant them and till them; the altitudes of the mountains, to mine them and work them; the dreary wastes of the clouds—I will make bold to say "the frightful waste"—of atmosphere, water, clay, rock, before you condemn the skies to the political economy of statistics.

The theory which we have been considering presents us, not with a grand conception of the world, but with a mean conception of man. Let it make man less, or make the world more, before we can find room for other species than our own. And yet, how much less shall it make the one, or how much greater the other? Let God Himself give us the measure. He does so. He leads us out of a starry night and bids us count the stars, if we can. Why so? Is it to beat down our pride and show us our place on this little orb of clay? Yes, and no! Yes indeed, for the turgid spirit of man needs humiliation; and therefore He has made us little and set us in a little place, with a thousand little mean things about us, to keep us walking in truth. Yet no! As if all that firmament were but a tent of the night, under which man rests his weary head during this mortal slumber, and which God will roll up like a tent when the shadows disappear in the morning, He does not promise this home as worthy of us, nor even a new heaven and a new earth, though they will be added unto us; but as to beings above all these, as to beings dilated in the vastness of our nature, He promises a home which befits us, and which, if we are scarcely worthy of it, is at least fully worthy of us.

And this is nothing less than the infinite bosom of God Himself: "I will be thy reward, exceeding great."

For "Catholic Instinct" in the foregoing, see the original article.

II

MISSIONARY COUNTRIES; OR, THE STATE AND MISSIONS [1]

I

NOT very long ago a venerable and learned authority gave it as his opinion that there was no future before the Latin Catholic nations but to step down and become missionary countries like any Protestant or infidel land.

When our authority expressed this opinion, he conveyed the meaning that the cradle-lands of Christianity in Europe would take rank, by a retrograde movement, with lands and people which, by a law of progress, had mounted from being nonentities, under the Government of the Church, to a recognized position, that of missionary territories. Australasia, Alaska and Matabeleland are such missionary countries under the Propaganda. The people of the two fair peninsulas of the Mediterranean, Italy and Spain, who had seen the Christian Church and been cradled by her, long before the barbarians beyond the pale came within reach of her voice; and France, that other brilliant nation which had been itself a very centre of medieval life and civilization, were, in our days, to step down from the vantage-ground of Christian tradition, thought and instinct; were to be disowned, as incapable of sustaining any longer the full constitution

[1] From *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January, 1899 (vol. XXIV), pp. 1–25; abridged.

of ecclesiastical legislation and organic life ; and were to sink to the level of any infidel or Protestant nation. A great fall, if it were possible, and a great dishonour, if at all probable. For a great honour it has ever been to present the full features of Christian life and manhood in the body corporate of a nation mature, far in advance of mere adolescence or infancy. An honour undoubted for a Christian nation, to be neither unformed, nor deformed ! And a dishonour immeasurable, after being a source and dispenser of light and doctrine to the new-coming races of the world, now to sink, and hear them salute : So thou too art fallen, and become even as one of ourselves !

In Church parlance, a missionary country corresponds very much to what a " territory " of the American Union is, compared with a State. We shall not enter into technical particulars, and distinguish with precision, the missionary from the canonical state of national organization. For the discursive view, which we wish to take of the phenomenon before us, by means of parallels and analogies, we shall consider as " missionary " all countries where the Church has been impeded in the course of her functions, whether by the total want of a Christian State to help her, or by the apostasy of a State once Catholic, and now alien to her purposes and constitution. In this sense we rank as missionary all the States which are non-Catholic, though like England, an ancient isle of saints, they may have received baptismal grace a thousand years before the Reformation ; or though, like Prussia, they may have scarcely been christened before being seduced to heresy. We reckon as missionary those nations which have come into existence since the date of the fifteenth century, and quite irrespective of the Church's influence, like the American Republic ; or which, developing and forming

after the same date, had begun indeed under the full influence of the Church's control, but ended otherwise, through the vicissitudes of politics. In this sense, Catholic Canada became a missionary country.

If we ask for reasons, why the old stock of Catholic nations, in Europe, should undergo such a change, we are reluctant to admit the possibility of any reasons, as distinct from wilfulness, being at all adequate; still we can discern, as partial reasons, the consequences and effects of a century of revolution. The relations of the State with the Church have been so strained by the men in charge of the secular power; they have been so entangled, and so often have snapped, that merely to mention the years of Freemason government in Italy will recall to the mind a whole drama of bitter antagonism to the Church on the part of that State, whose one prime duty, as of a Christian, was to assist her. In Portugal, Spain and France, the central power has been dominated by anti-Christians, since Pombal, D'Aranda and Choiseul prepared the way for the great infidel revolution of last century. All the machinery of concordats and Christian antecedents, of property-rights and official relations, of nominations and stipends, has been wrenched and turned against the Church with the refined arts of constitutional and other methods; till her property has been expropriated, her institutions dispersed, her episcopate silenced, her very Sacraments and altars invaded and controlled. In older times, when men were so minded, they took a straighter path: they simply invaded both State and Church and became Protestant. Now Protestantism is generally dead; but the age of revolution and infidelity has succeeded.

In moral and social affairs, mixed with the changing

contingencies of politics, no syllogisms can be formed, nor rigid inferences deduced. We can but summon up certain analogies, and leave our readers to draw such inferences as seem likely and probable. But one point we beg to emphasize as sufficiently clear. It is, that no change of canonical institution, no loosening of Catholic bonds, nor even the possible defection of great numbers of Catholics from their mother the Church, can, in any light, or under any pretext whatever, be considered as an advance of Protestantism, as an accession to its territory—still less as a victory. The issue between Catholicity and Protestantism on the score of expansion was closed two centuries ago. Since then, while the Catholic Church has lost in one place, has gained in another, has moved over the world like the vital power she always is, never in all this time has an accession been made to what was once called Protestantism. This form of belief has not even held its own in any part of the world. It has lost its prey in the direction of Catholicism; it has lost in the direction of infidelity; and what the Church has lost has never accrued to Protestantism. The thousand-and-one arms of non-Catholic propagandism have been only so many levers of nineteenth-century indifferentism or infidelity.

We shall now venture to offer some analogies, from the history of the past and the present, as a possible ground for inferences, with respect to the course of the future.

II

We conceive that five or six different types may be comprised in the general notion of a missionary country. In the first place, there is a social condition such as faced the Apostles when they beheld, stretching

out before them, a whole world more or less civilized, with no visible agency friendly to them ; some of the powers that were being positively hostile to them, but all existing in a condition of more or less stable civilization. This stability of peace and order was itself a preparation for the delivery of the Gospel. For, indeed, according as any stage in human life is higher in the possession of God's natural gifts—and such are peace and order—it is also a stage nearer to the reception of His supernatural graces. So, without scrip or purse, without any sort of protection from civil powers, the Apostles went forth into the fields of human souls. This was also the history of missionary life in Japan and China, under St. Francis Xavier and his successors. The death which was braved and so often met, in fields like these, was incurred in spite of the peace and guarantees of civilization. It was the human protest of corrupt nature against the swelling tide of the supernatural, the weight of which it could not bear.

Another type of missionary career was that which lay outside of any such civilized influence, as arises from previous peace or previous conquest. It was one which faced the conditions of utter barbarism, of what the Jesuit Father Joseph Acosta called " the boars and crocodiles," in the woods of Brazil and Florida and Paraguay, in the wilds of the Moluccas, and amid the savages of Mindanao, in the Philippines. In North America this form of missionary life penetrated into the dens of the hyenas and foxes, who under the name of the Five Nations occupied the valleys of the Genesee and the Mohawk. Sometimes it encountered only the soft and unwarlike characters of the islanders in the Antilles, or the Solomon archipelago.

A third field of missionary labour differed from the two preceding, in that it was protected by the arm of

powerful conquerors, Christian warriors, who had either "reduced" inferior races and laid them open to the peaceful arts of the catechist, or who were felt at least to be hard by, protecting with the glamour of their name the angels of peace and grace; and the missionary bands moved about freely among the subject classes. This was the history of many nations, under the Spanish domination, in South and Central America. It was also that of Goa and the adjacent territories, under the Portuguese rule. The condition was not unlike that of Britain under the strong Roman power, after the Empire had become Christian.

No one of these three kinds of missionary enterprises, in reducing new countries to the kingdom of Christ, could be, of its own nature, a final settlement of the religious condition. They were only the inauguration of a permanent state, to follow, which sometimes never followed, or else failed to endure. It is the glory of the Spanish and Portuguese domination that under it the Church always took root, unfolded rapidly and grew like the mustard-tree; while in other countries, as under the Vandal, the Saracen, the Turk and the Cossack, there ensued the absolute exclusion of Catholicism, root and branch. In lands so favoured as those discovered by the Latin Catholic nations the Church was seen to organize with even canonical regularity. Just as a vast hierarchy existed in northern Africa, before the Vandal invasion, so in India and South America the policy of Portuguese and Spanish discoverers, with the Catholic government behind them, produced the finest spectacle of Catholic States wedded to the Church, and labouring with it for the kingdom of God—human vice and cupidity notwithstanding.

We mention these three forms of missionary work, crude and transient as their conditions were, only to

clear the ground for understanding other forms of settlement, which have become the normal state over so large a portion of the globe in our days. But before we dismiss them, several considerations arise.

The first consideration which is suggested on every page of history, whether it be European, Asiatic, African or American, is that, from the beginning till now, the evangelization of the world has, with but few exceptional episodes, been carried on by the Latin nationalities. We do not lay to their credit the work of saints, like Cyril and Methodius, of Boniface and Patrick, beyond noting that they too imbibed their saintly instincts and drank in their divine powers either through residence in the Eternal City or through intimate contact with the Christianity of Latin countries. Nor do we fail to make allowance for the fact that, when great movements were in progress for the reduction and civilization of the globe, the non-Latin nations were either themselves imperfectly incorporated in the Kingdom of Christ, or, after an honourable career, were actually falling away from the unity of the Church. What we do advert to is the certain truth of history, that the hunters for souls, even before the Reformation, and much more since, have sprung out of the luxuriant Christianity on the European shores of the Mediterranean. Since the Reformation nothing else might be expected by Catholics; but much more has been claimed by Protestants. And yet what have we seen? A negative instance and a positive one will convey the whole answer. In Japan, Englishmen and Dutchmen almost presided over the final extirpation of the Catholic Church; and they sold their wares over its grave. In America, while the whole sea-board of the Atlantic, from Maine to the Carolinas, was growing into a great nation of Englishmen, with not a few other

nationalities intermixed, not an Indian village was made Christian by all the millions there, not an Indian tribe was saved from extermination on all the broad lands there; while, at the same time, the whole country to the rear, from the Bay of Hudson to the mouth of the Mississippi, was traversed and evangelized in all its tribes by a little French colony on the shores of the St. Lawrence.

If an exception could be pleaded to this utter barrenness of a money-making nation, that exception would be found in the little beginning made in Maryland, when English Jesuits, belonging to the same stock of faith and devotion as their brethren across the French frontier, carried the good tidings of grace and peace to the aborigines thronging round. But if theirs was a missionary career it can rank with no one of the three kinds described above. It must stand out, as of a kind unique in history, peculiar to Maryland alone; when a gentle race of Indians practically subject to a strong neighbouring power—that of Calvert's English colony—was anxious to receive grace and light; when the neighbouring power itself was nominally Catholic, with missionaries on hand ready to work and actually producing fruit among the savages; and yet these same missionaries were crippled in their very first essay by the action of circumstances not originating with the Indians.[1]

These thoughts merit reflection. They have arrested the attention of others who were not Catholics. A Protestant preacher, Jonathan Boucher, speaking in Maryland just before the American Revolution, quoted with approbation the estimate formed by a Protestant

[1] The whole of this matter regarding the Indians of North America has been treated by the author in his *History of the Society of Jesus in North America*, by T. Hughes, S.J., volumes (Text) I, II.

Scotchman, Mickle, on the work accomplished by the French and Spanish missionaries in America North and South; and it is to be observed that the Indians mentioned, as examples of their success, were precisely men of the most savage types ever known. He says: "The customs and cruelties of many American tribes still disgrace human nature; but in Canada and Paraguay the natives have been taught to relish the blessings of society, and the arts of virtuous and civil life." About this same time when the Indians towards the west were in arms against the British colonies it was a bitter complaint, re-echoed by the British Governors in their letters to the home authorities, that the Indians would be no nation at all but for the French of Canada!

Nothing could be truer, both for what the complaint said, and for what it did not say. It did not say explicitly that, wherever the blighting influence of the non-Catholic colonies reached, the march of a "progress" was inevitable and irresistible, in corrupting the native tribes and in extirpating them. Wherever the British colonist set his foot he made terms with the natives by making their homes a desert. We may add that, wherever the missionary of the British Society for the Propagation of the Gospel set his foot, he too came to terms, and either he withdrew, or the Indians did. And all this while, right in the savage dens of the Five Nations themselves, and far away from all human resource, there had been chosen souls won to Christ; a whole colony of Christians, or "praying Indians," were rescued thence when the tribes fell under the baleful influence of Albany, and the same "praying Indians," with other tribes of Canada, have survived to our day, some of them as distinct in feature as when they abandoned their kinsmen the Iroquois, others, far more numerous, being

blended by intermarriage with the whites. One may feel a throb of Christian pride when he sees them but a few steps away, so to speak, from Montreal, at the Lake of the Two Mountains, and at Caughnawaga—full-blooded Indians, half-blooded Indians, meeting the French *habitant* in complexion, as they had been adopted by him in creed. But to find an Indian in the United States one must go far out to a western pen, called a "Reservation," where he will hear periodically of interesting feuds, the Indians shooting the whites, and the whites shooting the Indians with repeating rifles; or else, next to that, he will hear that the Indians are being hanged by United States Justices, or they are shooting one another. It is the very sublimity of civilization, running smoothly in its native channels of rum, fraud and rapine.

In Mexico, we have the same beneficent influence of the Church in a much more ample form, owing, no doubt, to the high state of anterior civilization found there by the Spanish conquerors. Out of a population of 13,000,000 there are, as some state, 10,000,000 Indians; or, as others put it, half the population of Mexico is full-blooded Indian, four-fifths of the rest are a mixed breed, and about 1,000,000 are pure white. Yet the Spaniards have been settled there during no less than 400 years, quite enough for a non-Latin breed to have wiped out two or three continents. In the Philippines it is only too clear that there is a native population. They are the insurgents who, having been preyed upon by the Freemasonry of governmental Spain, have paid back governmental Spain the full price of the article imported.

If we look at the ways and means employed for the civilization of native populations, we shall find the lesson quite as entertaining as anything else to be considered. From the end of the seventeenth century,

and the apostolic age of Dr. Bray, commissary of the Bishop of London for the plantation of Maryland, the ambition of the Protestant world, with its headquarters in London and its ramifications in Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York and New England, ever floated in felicitous dreams of erecting, possessing and conducting a sort of Congregation "*De Propaganda Fide*." Hard things were said of the Roman Propaganda. The smoothest talk never ceased to flow over a Protestant Propaganda. And, when the fight waxed hot, at the end of the eighteenth century, between the Boston Puritans and the emissaries of Canterbury and London—who came to sit down in fat places of New England, instead of cultivating spare diet and the Indians out in the frontier wigwams—Jonathan Mayhew flung the wicked practices of the Roman Propaganda in the teeth of him of Canterbury, and taunted him and his with having so often condemned the said practices of that "other famous society, *De Propaganda Fide*," and yet having imitated them. Whereunto Archbishop Secker replied demurely that "the Popish Society *de Propaganda* never was blamed in sermons before ours for supplying those of their own Communion with the means of their own worship, but for making it their principal employment to bring over other Christians to that worship, which ours hath not done." Accordingly, never having brought over other Christians to their own worship, and having done with the Indians what we shall see presently, the said Protestant Congregation *de Propaganda Fide* has recently celebrated its two hundredth anniversary of missionary prowess.

Now, when this society had been at work during half a century, and its missionaries had been drawing their salaries, Jonathan Edwards wrote in February, 1752, from Stockbridge, N.E., to a friend in London :

"That society," he said, "have been vastly imposed upon by the representations of their missionaries." Having explained this point duly, he proceeded to depict the French missionaries: "The French here in America have been more faithful to those by whom they have been entrusted than the English—the French Government have been more faithful to their King—the French missionaries more true to the interest of their religion—they have had their missionaries constantly for many years amongst the most powerful of these nations of North America, who have been great in their labours among them, using all the arts and subtile devices of the Romish clergy, prejudicing them against the Protestants and English by innumerable Jesuitical falsehoods; and, by accounts we have from the Mohawks, the French fail not to make great use of our negligence as to their instruction, as an advantage to fix an ill opinion of us in their minds; telling them it is apparent the English care not for their good, as they take no pains to instruct 'em in religion; at the same time offering their own assistance and labours for their eternal salvation, if they will be their friends." In the midst of so much unimpeachable truth, the only "Jesuitical falsehood" which the zealous Jonathan felt confident enough to mention was that the English were very negligent as to the instruction of the Indians—an assertion "Jesuitically" false; for it was just what he himself asserted in the same breath!

Dr. Samuel Johnson, after resigning the presidency of King's College, now Columbia College, New York, writes from Stratford in 1763 to the Archbishop of Canterbury, indulging in a side-fling at the zealous Boston Puritans. This Episcopalian Johnson, though a world away in sentiment from Jonathan Edwards, agrees with him in two things; he stays in a

comfortable home, while running down the Protestant missionaries, and he thinks the Protestant missionaries might just as well have stayed at home. Speaking of the Puritans of the Boston Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge he says: "I know of but two or three little clans of a kind of Christian Indians they have; not many more I believe than Dr. Barclay had." "A kind of Christian Indians!" We wonder what kind of an Indian and what kind of a Christian was a "kind of Christian Indian"?

Now be it known of all men that this inevitable Dr. Barclay, whose name recurs at every step in the quarrels between the two fraternal Graces of Boston and Canterbury, was a kind of St. Francis Xavier for his evangelical work among the Indians. The first time that we personally lighted upon him was on the 14th November, 1745, when the General Assembly of New York allowed "to the Rev. Henry Barclay, for instructing the Indians in the Christian Religion, from the 1st of September last to the 1st of September next, the sum of £20." This is the one documentary proof we have found that he was a great apostolical preacher. Immediately afterwards the same Assembly voted a tariff of premiums for the scalps of Indians: "£10 for the scalp of a male Indian over 16 years of age; and £5 for the scalp of any boy under 16 years of age." So that their estimate of the Rev. Mr. Henry Barclay's services to civilization amounted to the significant value of two men's scalps, or of four boys' scalps, allowing him twelve months to realize the same. Now the Rev. Henry Barclay himself did not appreciate the annual recurrence of such terms, as the facts of the sequel show. Nor did his Mohawks, for reasons which appear in the sequel. Somewhere between 1746 and 1748 the two parties change sides: the Rev. Mr. Barclay is no longer the evangelical agent and the

Mohawks his patients; but the Mohawks are the agents, tomahawk in hand, and they are just looking for Barclay, who, we must suppose, has turned patient. They send in a petition to the effect that he has embezzled "for his singular service" the whole spot of land which the Mohawk chiefs had set aside for him and his successors.

Dr. Johnson writes a solemn book against Mayhew, and tells him that Dr. Barclay really worked with good success, and for ten years, among the Mohawks; and, making no allusion to the embezzlement of mission property, the Doctor goes on to show where the trouble really lay: "The last war, about 1745," he says, "threw them into such confusion; and the influence of Popish missionaries, and the wicked insinuations of a certain great man in those parts, created such a disaffection in them, that his very life was in danger; so that he was obliged to desist." That is to say, he ran away.

To be sure, things had changed since the time when Fr. Jogues was brained by the tomahawk of one of these Mohawks. A price had been put by Bellomont, in 1700, on the head of any Jesuit who should be found south of Lake Ontario. Hence a free field of fair favour was opened for the Protestant missionaries. There was now no tainting of Popery going on among these unsophisticated tribes of the Five Nations, with the Tuscororas recently added. So Dr. Charles Chauncy complacently remarked, when preaching at the ordination of Bowman. This was at Boston in 1762, when the field had been cleared of Jesuits during half a century. He said that "there were numerous tribes among them as yet untainted with Romish superstition"; there had been amongst them nought but pure leavening with the doctrine of Mr. Thoroughgood Moor and Mr. Andrews, besides Dr. Barclay,

not to mention the Bostonian apostles. But, only three years after Dr. Chauncy's sermon, a military gentleman, named Colonel Bradstreet, sent in his report to the authorities about these same Indians, so pure and "untainted with Romish superstition." He said: "Of all the savages on the continent, the most knowing, the less useful and the greatest villains are those most conversant with the Europeans, and deserve the most attention of Government by way of correction; and these are the Six Nations, Shawanes & De-Lawers [Delawares]." And so was justified the private and sad remark of Secker, Archbishop of Canterbury, to Osbaldstone, Bishop of London, when they were discussing their Puritan rivals of Boston; he wrote in 1762: "It will be said we ought gladly to let others do, what we confess we have not been able to do ourselves in any great degree."

However, to the philosophical mind which seeks for the ultimate causes of phenomena, this spiritual bankruptcy of the Anglican missioners may be traced to several errors in the premises. There was a financial one; and there was a social one. The financial error had clearly been committed, in not following the wise advice of Dr. Bray, father and founder of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. He had recommended expressly to the Bishop of London in 1696 that it should be in the power of the Society "to propose and alot what pensions they shall think fit, to such Ministers as shall most hazard their persons in attempting the conversion of the native Indians." Now we have found no record of other salaries than those which made the missionaries comfortable, with interpreters and schoolmasters and wives, etc., to boot. Clearly, an error was committed in not laying the extra bonus aside, for the man who should run in farthest, and make an "attempt," and get back safely

for his money premium. Then there was a social omission, significantly alluded to by that very judicious fanatic, Dr. Douglass, M.D., who wrote between 1747 and 1750. "Our young missionaries," he observed, "may procure a perpetual alliance and commercial advantages with the Indians, which the Roman Catholic Clergy cannot do, because they are forbidden to marry; I mean our missionaries may intermarry with the daughters of the Sachems and other considerable Indians, and their progeny will, forever, be a certain cement between us and the Indians." But Mr. William Smith, historian of New York, remarks hereupon that "Dr. Douglass expects too much."

In short, to dismiss this matter with some degree of seriousness, the Roman Propaganda had several resources exclusively its own for evangelizing heathen nations, though it could not offer marriage or money prizes. Several of them were noted as far back as 1662, in a letter from Virginia, addressed to the Rt. Rev. Father in God Guilbert, Bishop of London. The writer said that the consideration of the missionary power of Christian Humility and Charity "enforced the accute Acosta, after he had spent seventeen years conversing with the Heathen in the new World, (though he was of a Church that pleads much for miracles) ingenuously to confesse, that the greatest and even the only miracle necessary to the conversion of those Heathen is the gracious life of Christians, agreeable to that Christian faith, and in this he subscribes to St. Chrysostome." He went on to plead urgently for this Christian life, with its humility and charity; for "while the grasse growes, the steed starves." Hence, there should be immediate enforcement of contributions of good tobacco for the support of the missionaries. Too much bad tobacco has been passed off on them of late. One hundred years later

we find the grass still growing and the steed still starving, from New York to the Carolinas, in spite of the best tobacco that Virginia could raise, and in spite of the best salaries that the London "Propaganda" paid.

III

The occasion offered us to point the contrast between the Catholic missionaries of France and the Gospellers of another type has made us somewhat discursive on colonial methods and ways with reference to the Indians. But this must not excuse us from pointing a similar moral with regard to the poor negroes. We find record of an episode in which the Spanish Governor of Porto Rico had something to say to a British colonial Governor in 1752. Governor George Thomas, of the Leeward Islands, sent on a letter of complaint to the Board of Trade in London, treating of a grievance, "worse on the Sugar Islands," he says, "than if the King of Spain urged a perpetual war"—as bad, no doubt, as if the beet-sugar competition had arisen one hundred years before its time. It appears that runaway slaves, who escaped from their barbarous lot under the British masters, not only fled to the Spanish plantations, but were wonderfully content to stay there. Governor Thomas has appealed to the Spanish Governor, who writes an answer from Porto Rico, which Thomas denounces as a sheer pretence. The letter was to this effect, that, acting upon orders from his Sovereign, the Spanish Governor found himself in the impossibility of delivering up "the negroes escaped from your government and come to this"; and he adds that it has been so, "as your Honor knows," in all such cases heretofore: "All the slaves," he says, "who escape here, come to embrace

the Roman Catholic Religion, as these six last [*that you demand*] have, and after being asked if they come with that intention, and they answer in the affirmative, they are absolutely free at the expiration of one year, during which time they are under tuition of proper persons to instruct them in the rudiments of their religion, and give them the holy water of Baptism. . . . Philip Ramires, Porto Rico, Oct. 1, 1753."

This must indeed have sounded like a mere pretence to people, whose traditions were such as animated the English people of that date. Under the later Stuarts and the glorious House of Orange, the Royal African Company figured, during fully forty years, in all kinds of documents, as being a privileged corporation, entitled to receive every encouragement from the good colonial subjects of England, and to be well patronized in its lucrative employment of buying or stealing the black natives on the African coast. About the same time there was loud expostulation to be heard, both in North American colonies and in the West Indies, against the fantastic notion that anyone should think of having negroes baptized. They would become too conceited; they would begin to think of freedom. The people of Barbadoes, in 1680, declared in a public meeting against such conversion of negroes and against any baptizing of them. Though Maryland formed an honourable exception in many respects, its neighbour, Virginia, put limitations on the power of masters to manumit their slaves; and if one were freed he was hunted out of the country like a wolf. A Spanish ship was brought into the port of New York, and, besides other booty, negroes were found aboard. They declared that they were freedmen. The pious New York people "presumed" that they were not, and reduced them to slavery without further ceremony.

To such people the plea of a Spanish cavalier was unintelligible indeed, that negroes might be freed, and that they might be instructed and baptized as Christians. But, in our day, another generation has come, which seems to have thought it so intelligible that it has gone to the Spanish islands itself to relieve the negroes of the Spaniards and the Spaniards of the islands.

The real facts of the case will appear less difficult to conceive if we take account of the character of the Spaniard, and compare his natural pride with the marked spirit of gentleness which nothing but genuine Christianity could have produced in him. The Rev. Mr. Boucher, of Maryland, endorsed the following singular description of different nationalities in their relations with slaves. It shows what Catholicism has done and has maintained in the spirit of Latin nations; and what Protestantism has undone, and left a wreck in others. He says that what someone had already observed seems to him to be founded in fact: "The Spaniards, whose natural character is not supposed to be distinguished for gentleness, are said to be the most indulgent masters to slaves: next to them, the French; then the English; and last of all, the Dutch. I once heard an Indian make the same remark, respecting the French and English, in their treatment of Indians. The remark is not an uncommon one, that persons most clamorous about liberty are, in general (on a comparison with others), most apt to be domineering and tyrannical in their private characters; for the same reason, I suppose, that even tyrants, who have always been despots, are sometimes found to be indulgent and generous, whilst none are more apt to be insolent and tyrannical than those who, having been slaves, suddenly become possessed of freedom and authority over slaves."

One might go to the other end of the world in our own days, and he could witness a contemporary proof of the nobility of treatment extended by this Catholic nation to a dependent race. A London non-Catholic journal [1] recently described with admiration the Spanish plantation in Western Australia, called New Norcia, "where," said this account, "the Spaniards have a remarkable monastic colony, governed by the only mitred Abbot in Australia, Dr. Salvado, one of the original Spanish missionaries who went out more than half a century ago. That the Spanish monastic has the talent of civilizing the native population is evident from the account of New Norcia. New Norcia is the only permanently successful effort to evangelize and civilize the Australian blacks. Even the post and telegraph office is in charge of a black girl. Last, but not least, New Norcia possesses the only organized team of black cricketers in Australia. How different from Matabeleland!"

What we have said may suffice as a specimen of the witness borne to the abilities and merit of the Latin Catholic nations in the conversion of barbarians. We pass on now to a couple of other forms of missionary countries, and both of them are represented near home. One is Canada, the other is Maryland.

IV

By Canada we mean to signify at present, not the abode of the savages whom the French Canadians converted and civilized, but the home of the French themselves. It was originally attached to its Catholic mother-country, and received thence the form of ecclesiastical polity; being further endowed and

[1] *The Chronicle*, quoted in *The Tablet*, May 28, 1898, p. 856.

supported by the lavish benevolence of France, the "eldest daughter of the Church." Times changed, and the colony passed under the dominion of a Protestant power which, at that time, was the more narrow-minded and bigoted, as all religion and faith were fading away in England into practical indifference for everything. Such a colony, at such a juncture, offers a specimen of the missionary countries, resembling what Porto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines are becoming at present.

As soon as it was appropriated by the British Government, Canada was treated as a close preserve. Two currents of thought and policy were scrupulously diverted from the frontiers of the country. One was that of the revolutionary tendencies which prevailed in the colonies adjoining, then on the point of separating from Great Britain. The other was that of the revolutionary French; and their agitation, atheistic as well as political, was kept out of Canada with a jealousy which no quarantine excelled. Meanwhile, the Canadian population shut itself up in religious and national exclusiveness, quarantining the religion and ideas of its new governors. And all the long-suffering hopes of the rulers, that one day the light of a purer Gospel might penetrate into the darkness of Canadian Catholicism, continued to flicker with but intermittent brightness, cheering up successive incumbents of the gubernatorial chair. No doubt these hopes served some turn, as long as there was need or plausibility for entertaining them. But the Canadian faith was impracticable; and the hope of extracting its root died away in blank despair, at the incorrigible stubbornness of this "inferior race," as one of the governors graciously styled them. So they persisted innocuously, in their immunity from revolution, in their immunity from atheism, in the

perfect franchise of their own religion, and in the uninterrupted enjoyment of their Christian civilization.

This hapless result of British zeal was not owing to any want of British aspirations or efforts. Nothing was wanting on the English side, either in the colonies adjoining or in the island beyond the seas. Both were ready to make an Ireland of Canada. It was only Canada itself that was wanting. It had no ambition to be made an Ireland; and it was too strong to be made an Acadia. Meanwhile, during forty years, it was as much as the English governors felt they could do to keep a footing at all in Canada on behalf of Great Britain. To be asked for more, and to make such a country English and Protestant, was what no reasonable governor could understand. So, by a refinement of justice to themselves, if not to the Canadians, the governors at all times, amid a fair embroidery of other aspirations and other hopes, ever wove in a strain of justification for this French people, that is, for themselves. And we may observe the momentous consequence, that the series of British Governors in French Canada were the first examples of that liberal class of rulers who, after the sharp lesson conveyed in the American Revolution, developed the admirable political wisdom which distinguishes the proconsuls of the British colonial empire. They began to go then, as they have gone since, on the new principle: Let well enough alone; or, *Quieta non movere.*

After the cession of Canada to England, the efforts made from the American side of the Canadian frontier were in several lines, and they were the occasion of several acknowledgments. On August 10, 1763, the Dr. Samuel Johnson whom we have quoted wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury on the theme of procuring a Protestant Bishop for Quebec; and, he added,

if the said Bishop "had some good missionaries with him from the government, he might do much good in converting Papists and Indians." The Rev. Henry Caner, of Boston, assured his Grace, in January of the same year, that both dissenters and Anglicans were on tip-toe of expectation with regard to the spoils of the Papists on the St. Lawrence; that "as a great part of the conquests made in America will probably be ceded to the British Crown, so remarkable a crisis, it is natural to imagine, will fall under such regulations, as will either greatly establish the Church of England, or the dissenting interest in this part of the world." The Acadian plan of wholesale expulsion was running in their heads at that time. But, this being discredited by the action of General Amherst himself, the conqueror of Canada, there remained only the Irish plan of the Cromwellian and Orange settlers.

The choicest analysis of the Canadian missionary problem is supplied us by the Rev. Dr. William Smith, President of the Philadelphia College, who happened to be in London, and who wrote to his Grace of Canterbury, March 29, 1762. In a persuasive exordium on the great increase of wealth and grandeur to the English nation, obtained in the accession of "these distant settlements and acquisitions," he begs to take with his Grace a view more important still, and consider them as an "immense addition to the Kingdom of Christ, and to the Protestant faith and interest on earth." Then he continues in this strain:

"A great and growing people, unenlightened by the Gospel, sunk in ignorance, strangers to the arts of humanity and to the just use of rational liberty, would not only be a very unsafe and unprofitable appendage to the British government, but even unworthy of having derived their origin from so high a stock." On this note he plays for some time, how the Canada

of the future will not merit to be descended from the high stock of Great Britain, if not raised by her, if not elevated by England, which is the chosen instrument in the hand of Providence "to call the remotest regions of the new world, in their turn, to the enjoyment of everything that can exalt human nature, while so many parts of the old are falling away into their original barbarity." Then the luminous gentleman resumes his description of the new acquisition: "In this great American harvest, there is an ample field opened for those that love to do good, and lay foundations for posterity; and, what should be more animating, is the amazing pains which the emissaries of a false religion have taken, and the multitude of establishments, which we find they have made, under the public sanction, in all the countries that we have recovered [!] from them; while the labours of the Venerable Society over which your Grace presides, and a few seminaries of learning, chiefly of a private establishment, is the most that we can boast of in this way." From which strange rhetoric and stranger logic it appears that the benighted people on the St. Lawrence, "unenlightened by the Gospel, sunk in ignorance, strangers to the arts of humanity," and so forth, were possessed of an organization of enlightenment and a network of establishments for all the arts of humanity, which the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, the ardent missionaries, both Anglican and Puritan, and all the civilized English colonies had nothing to compare with, from the Penobscot down to Savannah!

In thirty-seven years after this date things had lapsed so sadly that the Secretary of the Gospel Society wrote to the Secretary of State, confessing he could not procure "one or more clergymen to go to Canada." He said: "Those that are improper it

would be disgraceful to send; and those that are proper are most difficult to find." And he proved it: "We have now a vacancy in the Bahamas, where the emoluments are greater than from Canada, and cannot get a proper clergyman to go." So far Dr. William Morice, in October, 1799.

V

We come to a fifth type of missionary country, but we must be brief. The condition of Federal America, as it unfolded on missionary lines during one hundred and fifty years, was a slow and harassing commencement, very different from the ample development, which we witness in our generation. The main features were in general the same as those in England.

The history was simply this, that where the original stock of Catholics had been too large to die out in a century and a half, it was still alive at the period of the American Revolution; that where it had been small, it seems to have died out completely; and if it was still visible anywhere beyond the confines of the large Catholic colony of Maryland, that was owing, not to the survival of an old plant, but to the growth of a new seed. Thus was it in Pennsylvania.

Catholics landing in America, where there were no priests available to assist them, mingled with the population, as sweet waters with the salt sea. We dare say they helped to sweeten the sea before the great Revolution occurred. Their names and their origin were not then so far lost but they might be traced in the volumes of rolling humanity, as we see them still in the volumes of written records, blending but still distinct, then blending farther and lost. Where

missionaries were at all available, and Catholics landed feeble in numbers, there is no saying how long the faith might have survived in any measurable proportions, or how soon it would have mingled with the bitter salt waters around, had not two circumstances come to alter the course of the future. One was the swelling of the slender stream with the accessions of new arrivals. The other was the Revolution which broke over the country, and, though freighted with the bitterest anti-Catholic bigotry, cleared away, finally, in the fresh, balmy air of general toleration.

It may be thought that such a description of ancient Catholicism is not quite complimentary to our predecessors. To this we reply that it is not complimentary to those who should have been our predecessors, and have not been such. But the truth of it, we think, cannot be gainsaid. Finally, far from being derogatory to those who were our predecessors, it is a high tribute to them that they kept the faith in any appreciable measure.

We take it that the truth of such a description is patent. It describes the Catholicity of both Maryland and England. It is the description of every country which was once Catholic and then became Protestant. The seven thousand who bent not their knees before Baal, while a bitter persecution was raging, did bend their knees in the second and third generation, when a petty, teasing, harassing persecution took the place of the hue and cry, of the hounding and gibbeting, that had gone on before. The Cross will ever make heroes, when a sneer and a gibe and double taxation will make apostates. There is not one so-called Protestant nation, full-housed and numerous as it may be now, which did not become so merely by virtue of what the Italians call "*domicilio coatto*"—by the very same principle, which makes all the inmates

of a penitentiary or house of refuge as wicked as the worst among them. By sheer necessity the conscientious Catholics had to live in their own country; and by force and fraud in some countries, by fraud alone in others, the whole organization of society was made to roll on, beside and beyond them, if they would not take a seat in Protestantism and ride along with it. Their domicile in Protestantism was as much coercion as that of the Scotch rebels taken at Preston and then domiciled in America. These took things at their best and became Americans; and the conforming Papist took things as he found them and became Protestant. In fact, as a contemporary satirist said, the conforming Papist "is one that parts religion between his conscience and his purse, and comes to Church not to serve God but the king. . . . He would make a bad Martir and a good Traveilor; for his conscience is so large, he could never wander from it." And another, not a satirist, but one pretending to be in sober earnest, argues: "Dear Brother, Is conviction for Recusancy so slight a matter, that it is only to be laught at, or is it that you have a mind to give his Majesty two of your three thousand a year? [1] . . . Is it reasonable to think that I am bound to part with two-thirds of my estate, because some fool, my neighbour, may think me an Heretick by my going to Church; no, let him think on: the sin is his, not mine, who do nothing but what in itself is lawful, and what becomes my duty by the Laws commanding it. . . . But suppose all here said nothing to the purpose, but that 'tis likely many would be changed in time, and become Protestants: What is that to you or I, Brother, or indeed to any rational Lay Catholick in England? for he, whose case it should be, need not

[1] In modern values: twenty of your thirty thousand pounds sterling a year—by way of fines and taxes for being a Catholic.

much repine that his conscience should lead him into a more advantageous Religion as to this World."

Such was the development of the so-called Protestant nations. By force or by fraud the members of the household became all of one colour; and they became a free people, with not a bond to shackle them without or within. They enjoyed the privileges of "a more advantageous religion as to this world," and they prowled about accordingly. And one nation became vulgar and rich and powerful; and another became ferocious and military and imperial; and a third became stolid and sottish, but made money all the same, and they rule amid the powers of the lower air to-day.

When, therefore, we say that in English missionary countries there was a constant decay in faith, we imply no slight on our predecessors during recent centuries. On the contrary, we imply that they were still extant, in notable numbers, both in Maryland and Pennsylvania. The example of an heroic French colony of Catholic brethren across the borders was there to serve them. Their proposal, on more than one occasion, to pass over under a happier Spanish domination shows that they were not far remote in thought, as they were not at all in faith, from the sentiments and sympathies of a devoted Catholic nation not far away.

Here we meant to illustrate the decay of faith, in the two separate stages; first, slow decay under slow persecution; secondly, rapid decay under slow emancipation. Let three quotations, from three different persons and epochs, suffice to sketch the line of the history.

On July 14, 1710, Fr. William Killick wrote from Maryland to another Father in England: "I'm sorry I can't give you any such tydings as you hear from that [*factory*] of Madura and ye East, etc. It goes here

much as in England; where by ye severity of times, we do little more than keep our own. I think there is between 200 or 300, yt. frequent my store; all ye good I do is to try to make them constant and good customers; thousands of whose failings I hope I have concurred to pvent; who otherwise without our help wu'd become renegades. This and the will of God makes me contented with my station, even without that great advance which is made in ye Eastern factorys." [1]

Fr. Killick said well that things were going on in Maryland and England after very much the same fashion. For a note regarding this very year 1710 was found by Dr. Oliver in 1843, who, communicating it to the Jesuit Provincial, Fr. Lythgoe, expressed the opinion that it represented also the state and need of England in their own day. The note was part of a report sent in 1710 to the Superiors of the Society, and it ran thus: "The greater part of our duty, in England, is to save the Catholic families. Here is the sum of our labour; and, thanks be to God, during these twenty years, no one of the families, which Ours have charge of, has been lost to the faith, although the most grievous temptations have tried them, through the duty imposed on Catholics of paying double taxes." Now one hundred and thirty-three years separated 1710 from 1843. The former date represented the slow grinding persecution. The latter date represented Catholic emancipation. Yet Dr. Oliver thought that the needs of the Church were identical at the latter date with those of the former!

The explanation of this phenomenon, both in England and America, we are precluded by our space from giving. But the statement of it we shall give, by way of conclusion, in the perspicuous language of

[1] In Hindustan, China, etc.

the eminent Bishop Milner. Writing in 1820 against Charles Butler, whose Memoirs of English Catholics were only an apology for the part he had taken in Catholic decline, the Bishop speaks of the consequences of legal relief, and remarks, with other ecclesiastical writers, that the termination of pagan persecution, under the Roman Empire, had opened the era of Christian relaxation and of heresy. Then he continues :

" This was in some measure the case with the English Catholics, on the blunting of the penal laws about the beginning of his late Majesty's reign, and still more manifestly by the subsequent repeal of different parts of them. Then it was that our people, who had been so rigid in the faith, so respectful to their clergy, so pure in their morals, and so fearful of the infection of the world, while the sword of persecution hung over their heads, on this being withdrawn became, many of them, and especially those of the higher orders, lax in their belief, neglectful of their religious duties, disdainful of the priesthood, immoral and worldly in the general tenor of their lives. Several of them, at different periods, even apostatized from their religion." Here the Bishop notes : " About this time fell from the Catholic faith the Lords Gage, Fauconberg, Teynham, Montague, Nugent, Kingsland, Dunsany, their Graces of Gordon, Norfolk, etc., the Baronets Tancred, Gascoign, Swinburn, Blake, etc., the priests Billinge, Wharton, Hawkins, Lewis, Dords, etc." He then continues : " Others, who did not run this length, took such liberties with its doctrine, its discipline, and its authority, as demonstrated that either they had never learnt their religion, or that they equally disregarded its threats and its promises. Then it was that laymen took upon themselves to dictate professions of faith to their bishops, and to correct their catechisms, and even to call upon the Apostolic See to

abrogate the celibacy of the clergy. Nor was this all, but, to prove what they called their liberality, they even presented Protestant Churches with communion cups and dishes. The same mock liberality in compliment to their patrons, but with far heavier guilt, was affected by some of the priesthood."

Compare with this the spirit of other times, when the Faith meant the Cross, and the Cross supported the Faith—that spirit which the poor Acadians enshrined in hymns, their hearts breaking meanwhile with anguish, during their last days on the shore of their once happy home :

Vive Jésus !
Avec la Croix son cher partage,
Vive Jésus !
Dans les Cœurs de tous ses Elus
La Croix de son Cœur est le gage
Futur du plus bel partage :
Vive Jésus !

Much of the material of this essay was taken from the British Museum MSS., Sion College MSS., Lambeth Palace MSS., and the Public Record Office, and is used more fully in the author's *History of the Society of Jesus in North America, Colonial and Federal.* Very ample citations of these sources may be found in vols. I and II of the said work, dealing with the respective topics mentioned in this essay.

III

THE TEMPORAL POWER: HISTORICAL SKETCH[1]

I

Speaking of the Pope's Temporal Power, the Italian, Cesare Cantù, in his *Universal History*, expresses himself in this sense: "When the Bishops had grown to be great personages in the kingdom, it was natural that their chief [*the Pope*] should acquire, in relation to the State, a position which, although not at variance with his mission, still was not essential to it. From very early times, the Pope possessed rich estates, which were assuredly in keeping with his dignity, and served to answer the demands of charity, to build new churches and to restore those already fallen into decay. But it was proper to enlarge his resources when he came to stand at the head of Bishops who exercised a dominant influence in the [*civil*] government. Pepin and Charlemagne thought it opportune to augment the possessions of the Holy See, not only to prevent the Lombards from domineering over Italy, but because they knew how much the Church could assist in restoring discipline and the reign of law long fallen into abeyance. They saw how fitting for this purpose would be the possession and use of such wealth as alone was then known—that of territorial domain." Moreover, the Pope was regarded

[1] From *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, May, 1892 (vol. VI), pp. 321–332; abridged.

as a judge and arbitrator; and Cantù observes that, in this official character, he was appealed to very frequently when the extended monarchy of Charlemagne was followed by a number of little kingdoms, balancing one another in material power. The discharge of his office as judge or arbitrator was "a popular exercise of influence which averted wars, protected the weak, lent a hearing to the appeal of right as against the abuses of power. It is, in truth, a sublime conception, that of a priest unarmed, who, being himself apart from earthly interests, defines the question of right in the contests of princes, or between princes and people."

Touching on the question of the relations between the Temporal Power and the political condition of Italy, Cantù says: "Unfortunately, to maintain in requisite independence the spiritual power in an age when material force prevailed, it was found necessary to attach them to a temporal principality, lest the Pontiff of the world should be reduced to the condition of chaplain to the king, within whose jurisdiction he lived. . . . Italy derived much profit in the line of its intellectual development, but it was hampered in its political evolution." [1]

How far these observations of Cantù are correct, and how far they are inaccurate, will appear most readily from a cursory inspection of the historical results in the Papal exercise of a Temporal Power; and such a sketch will suggest the logical inferences to be drawn.

In the very first ages of Christianity the different Churches, and especially that of Rome, acquired, through the free oblations of the faithful, not only means requisite for the proper performance of divine worship and the support of the clergy, but also farms

[1] Cantù, V, 204; VII, 589.

and estates, with the amplest revenues. When, in his own person, the Emperor Constantine had made the empire nominally Christian, he ordered the restoration of houses, possessions, fields, gardens and everything else which had once belonged to the Church. At the same time the ecclesiastical patrimony began to receive the most extensive additions. The Christian Emperors themselves were in the first rank of benefactors; but, passing them over, "no one," says Thomassin, "is such a stranger in matters of Church History as not to know that, in those times, almost countless numbers of noblemen, as soon as they accepted the Christian faith by receiving baptism, or entered the ranks of the clergy by ordination, or adopted the monastic profession, resigned immense patrimonies, distributed the proceeds to the poor, and looked upon themselves as truly rich, when they had left all these false and deceptive riches behind them. Now it was one and the same thing then to give to the poor and to give to the Church, that nourishes all the poor. For, as all the substance of the Church was the patrimony of the poor, so whatever was dedicated to their use was wont to be consigned to the Church."

The annual revenues of the properties belonging to the churches of Rome alone, without counting the rich basilica of Constantine, amounted in the time of the first Christian Emperor to £10,400, and more. The basilica just mentioned enjoyed a revenue of over £9,200. These sums were large indeed, considering the value of money then. The farms and estates generally, which were given or bequeathed for the use of the Pontiffs, and which carried with them the tillers and husbandmen attached to the soil, are computed by John the Deacon, in his "Life" of St. Gregory the Great, to have been in the time of that Pontiff,

twenty-three "patrimonies"; nor did he include all in his calculation. The Cottian Alps, comprising the city of Genoa and all the neighbouring coasts to the frontiers of Gaul, were only one of these patrimonies. Others were distributed all over Italy. They were found in Sicily, Africa, Corsica, Gaul, Dalmatia. Those in Sicily and Calabria alone, which Leo the Isaurian confiscated, yielded an annual revenue of £16,000.

With these possessions there was connected a proportionate administration. Multitudes of clerics, of the poor, of widows and consecrated virgins were provided with temporal necessities from these resources. One item of St. Gregory's expenses was the support of three thousand nuns to whom he gave annually a sum exceeding £3,000; and they needed it, if we may judge from his letter to the Princess Theoctista; for he speaks of nuns who had not wherewith to protect themselves "from the piercing cold" of the winter nights. Writing to the Empress Constantina, the same Pontiff mentions incidentally various heads of expense. "As in the territory of Ravenna the solicitude of our masters has appointed a treasurer who provides the daily expenses to meet contingent needs, so in this city I am treasurer to meet the same needs. And yet this Church which expends so much and so unceasingly on clerics, monasteries, the poor, the people, and on the Lombards besides is weighed down by the affliction of all the churches."

The title to all this Church property was that of ownership. It was a right vested in the Bishop, not held in the name of the State, or the Emperor of Constantinople; nor was it a trust in law held for the benefit of others. The Christian feeling of the Bishop, however, always regarded it as a trust in

charity, held in behalf of the poor and the suffering, of the orphan, the widow and the stranger, who were always at home under the shadow of God's Church, and had never to fear destitution as long as there was a chalice left to melt down. For the poor are in truth God's living temples, more precious than those of stone or marble, dearer to Him than pillars of onyx or candlesticks of silver, or than walls lined with pure gold. This was the organization of Christian beneficence—without taxation ; it was not sterile philanthropy, but Christ's own charity.

The very amplitude of such resources, dispensed in this manner, involved the Bishop in something like a civil administration. But there were many other circumstances, inseparable from his office, or at least inevitable in the condition of the times, which concurred to make a chief pastor nothing less than a civil magistrate. He became a judge in the fullest sense of that term. The very connection between things temporal and spiritual, the confidence of the people in the ecclesiastical authority and their profound reverence for his person, made him necessarily a referee ; but, besides all that, the legal codes of the Valentinians, of Honorius, Theodosius the Younger and Justinian, invested him with the fullest judicial capacity ; and what these enactments established the successors of Justinian amplified. In the West, this official competency of the Bishop, whether judicial or administrative, civil or military, became almost unlimited, as the successes of barbarian invaders weakened ever more and more the bonds of political union between the West and Constantinople. In the light of this we can well understand St. Gregory's complaint, in a letter to the Bishop Sebastian : " At one and the same time to have charge of Bishops and clerics, of monasteries also and of the people at large, to keep a vigilant watch

against the insidious attacks of the public enemy, to be always on the alert against the treachery and malice of the governors—what labour all this entails, and what pain it gives, your fraternal charity is the better qualified to divine, according as you bear a sincerer attachment to me who am the sufferer under these inflictions."

In the eighth century of the Christian era the force of so many concurrent agencies, operating in the very nature of the political crises which arose, pressed the Roman Pontiffs forward to the full exercise and possession of a sovereign power. As Cantù expresses it: "If any hope of a resurrection, or at least of some relief, still remained to the Italians, there was no one on whom to rest such a hope except that Pontiff who, by his character, was called to be just and forbearing; who still kept in honour among the nations that Roman name which on other accounts was held in contempt." Governed by the Exarchs of Ravenna in the name of the Greek Emperor, those parts of Italy, including the Roman "duchy," which still acknowledged their dependency on Constantinople, were made to feel their subjection in two very galling ways; first, in the wretchedness of a government which was utterly helpless against the attacks of the northern invaders; secondly, in having to endure a tyrannical rule which, in proportion to its helplessness without, signalized its power within by levying the heaviest taxes and drawing the last drop of blood still left in the hapless country. Not content with material oppression, the civil power invaded the most sacred rights of conscience. Nominally Catholic, orthodox, and most devoted children of the Church, the Greek Emperors then, like so many others of the same kind since, would fain dictate to the Popes doctrinal decrees and dogmatic formulas, order synods and prescribe canons,

and force them to be accomplices and abettors in furthering all the novelties and heresies which took the fancy of the Emperors. Fortunately, when a bold warrior like Leo the Isaurian undertook to enforce his heresy with the edge of the sword, he was but helping to sever the last ties which kept the Roman Church in servitude. All Italy was up in arms, and the Pope alone kept them in their obedience. Hoping still for the conversion of the Emperor, he commended the fidelity of the Italians to the cause of the true faith, but he bade them not to waver in their fidelity likewise to the Greek Empire.

If it were a people's choice that was to determine the question of their emancipation, on what deliverer was the choice of the Italian communities likely to fall, as between a Phocas and a St. Gregory the Great, between a Constans II and a St. Martin or Vitalian, between a Justinian II and St. Sergius, between a Leo the Isaurian or a Copronymus and SS. Gregory II, Gregory III, Zachary and Paul I ? However, it was not choice which settled the question of the Pope's temporal sovereignty. The willing consent of the populations concerned was not wanting ; and every legitimate title of cession, of donation, of restitution, was formulated in the final establishment of his power. But that which has a right to be considered his fundamental title to an independent sovereignty is that which alone escapes the free disposal of men, and is manifestly the work of Divine Providence in the order of the world—the imperative necessity of self-preservation, the temporal salvation of a people, and, in the instance before us, the salvation of faith and morality in the face of devastating hordes which, if not repelled or controlled, would have hurried all to a common grave, nor have come themselves to the knowledge of Christian faith, morality and civilization. No power

in the world has ever possessed such a title to temporal sovereignty, nor enjoyed it, with every prescription of time and public consent, for so many centuries.

II

It was the era of the Lombards. They were a nation already largely Christian, but scarcely Catholic. For they had been forestalled in their belief by the frauds of Arianism. They had already laid a yoke of thirty-six "duchies," like a harness of iron, on the subjected and despised Italians. Whole provinces were depopulated by the sword, and, though Rome was a territory exempt as yet from their rule, the Romans themselves were not exempt, any more than the rest of Italy, from the slaughter of nobles and priests, the sacking of churches and the destruction of cities. The Roman territory at this time coincided pretty closely with what has been known in our day as the Patrimony of St. Peter, along with a part of Umbria and the Campagna of Rome. After many perilous crises, finally in the year 739, while the Iconoclast Emperor Leo was carrying on his war of heresy against the Roman Church, Luitprand, King of the Lombards, carried fire and sword into the imperial exarchate of Ravenna, ravaged the patrimonies of the Holy See in those parts, and then turned to Rome. Nothing was spared on his way. And on the 16th of June he laid siege to the Eternal City.

A curious composition of humanity these Lombards were. The three kings who at this time figured successively on the stage of history, fulfilling in a remarkable way the designs of Providence with respect to the Roman See, were, we may take it, a fair specimen of

the rest of their kin and clans. Paul the Deacon, himself a Lombard, describes Luitprand as a man of much wisdom, sagacious, very pious and a lover of peace; mighty in war, moderate, pure, modest, and so forth; not ignorant of letters, but a bit of a philosopher, etc. No doubt he was so, as long as the fit was on him, and spells of a different kind did not control him. Indeed, the reverence and docility which these semi-barbarians showed to one Pontiff after another is one of the marvels of history. In the full career of victory, at the moment when they were reaching the goal of a long-cherished ambition, we find men like Luitprand humbly sacrificing all, at the word of the Vicar of Christ, and that while actually besieging the same Vicar of Christ in his own city! Hence we may appreciate how sincerely happy was a barbarian like this, when, after taking dinner with Pope Zachary at Pavia, he expressed his lively sense of the Pontiff's sweetness, and the air of sanctity which surrounded everything, by saying that "he did not remember having eaten so much in his life before"!

His immediate successor Rachis was undoubtedly a valiant man, as much so as Luitprand; but he was endowed with a genuine piety and mildness of disposition; and, on receiving a solemn legation from the Apostolic See, he signalized his love of peace by granting the Pope a peace of twenty years! All treaties of peace in those times regarded a limited time, and it was yet to be one of the achievements of the Bishops of the Church, by means of the pious and ingenious device of the "truce of God," to keep men from cutting one another's throats for at least a few days each week. But perhaps a twenty years' peace in those times was quite as long-lived as a "perpetual" one in these days of mildness and mutual benediction.

In point of fact, this twenty-year peace lasted fully five years, and, after that long period of good behaviour, we find Rachis pouring his forces with great fury on the Roman territory. The saintly Pontiff Zachary went out to meet him at Perugia. The Roman forces were the same as usual; they consisted of the Pontiff's own personal sweetness, with the presence of some of his clergy, and considerable gifts. The immediate raising of the siege of Perugia was not the only effect of this interview. With the Pope's exhortations ringing in his ears, the good king, a few days after, abdicated his throne, and coming as a humble pilgrim to Rome, accompanied by his wife Tassia and his daughter Ratrude, he begged the Pope to admit him into the ranks of the clergy. The Holy Father gave him the clerical tonsure and the Benedictine habit, and sent him to Monte Cassino, where Carloman, the eldest son of Charles Martel, was already a monk. Tassia and Ratrude became Benedictine nuns at Piumarola, not far from Cassino—no rare spectacle in those days, when, within the space of fifty years, England alone beheld five kings and one queen exchanging the crown of their own accord for a cowl or veil.

The successor of Rachis seems to have been a villain, if ever man was. This was Astulph, the brother of Rachis. He was astute and ferocious, yea, the most ferocious of even the Lombards; he was wicked, impious, atrocious; the like had never been seen in the days of even the Lombards. So the various historians of the time agree in describing him. It was fortunate for Europe that he was so, and that Pepin was King of France at the same time. Things never went better than when they went so badly, God arranging all things for the good of His Church. But what was the end of this man, as soon as the excess of his wickedness had occasioned the inauguration of a

new order of things by the final and permanent establishment of the Temporal Power? Stricken by the hand of God—"the first example," says Cesare Balbo, "of what we have often witnessed since, that whoever in Italy revolts against the Pope is not far from his fall"—Astulph died in the arms of the monks, whom he had always loved and fostered much during life. Under the spur of an insatiable ambition he had indeed been carrying on wars to the last extremity of violence and brutality against the Pope, but at the same time he had been building churches and splendid monasteries; and with a refinement of devotion which must have been exquisite according to a barbarian's standard, he had robbed the churches which he was devastating round Rome of the bodies of the holy martyrs, but only to transport the sacred relics, with every demonstration of honour, to his new temples and altars at Pavia.

At the time that Luitprand was beginning his career of conquest in the exarchate of Ravenna, and pushing on into Italy against Rome, Leo the Isaurian was carrying on his war of persecution against the Church. He sent a fleet against his own city of Ravenna, which had rejected his impious heresy, and he "expropriated" the ancient patrimonies of the Holy See in Calabria and Sicily. This Emperor, as chief sovereign, was the natural protector of Rome. But, whereas his protectorate and that of his predecessors had been distinguished for some centuries by a truly imperial freedom in the imposition of excessive taxes and an unremitting vigour in religious persecution, now, when the Lombard was at the gates of Rome, the natural protector kept at a safe distance—the Iconoclast, ever busily occupied in sacking churches and murdering Catholics.

III

Many a time before, the Roman Pontiffs had faced the storms which swept over Italy, and had saved the relics of civilization from the swords of Huns, Goths and Vandals. But never before had the moral ascendancy, which alone they could employ, been so utterly without temporal aid as when the tempest burst upon Rome from the side of Luitprand the Lombard. Pope Gregory III knew not whither to turn for protection; and, therefore, looking beyond the Alps, he appealed to Charles Martel. The French warrior's intervention seems to have turned Luitprand from his purpose, and Rome was left in peace. But the following year the exarchate of Ravenna, still belonging to the Greek Emperor, was again made the scene of the Lombard's depredations, and this time it was the Pope's intervention in behalf of the feeble province which saved it for the Court of Constantinople. The prestige of Rome was mounting high; to friends and strangers alike His Holiness was the one arbiter of the fortunes of Italy. This was in 743. In 751 the ferocious Astulph took possession of all the territory of Ravenna, captured the city itself, and put an end for ever to the dominion of Constantinople in northern Italy. Apparently neither the people of the conquered country thought it worth their while any longer to dispute who should be their masters, nor did the Emperor Copronymus seem to think the loss of the western province worth a moment's attention. His arms were too busy elsewhere propagating the Iconoclastic heresy.

Then it was Rome's turn again to feel the invader's sword. But here the history of Pepin begins, like an epic at the opening of medieval politics. We cannot follow him as he routs Astulph at Susa, and receives the pledges of his plighted faith under the walls of

Pavia ; nor pause to narrate how, when that faith was broken, and such scenes followed under the walls of Rome as make the blood run cold, Pepin hurried once more over the Alps and brought the abject Astulph to terms. One thing only need be recorded, and that is the restoration of all properties to the Roman See, and the bestowal of the extinct exarchate of Ravenna on the Pontiff. Through the length and breadth of the exarchate, and of what was called the Pentapolis,[1] Pepin received the formal and final surrender of every city ; and not one of them but was glad to be liberated for ever from all claims of the Greek Empire over them and from the hated dominion of the Lombards. These cities Pepin conceded to Rome, because he considered they belonged to Rome. He " restored " them and all other properties, because, as he said to the envoys of the Greek Emperor, he would be alienating them from St. Peter if he acknowledged any other title to these domains. All were to remain under the exclusive and absolute temporal jurisdiction of Rome. And neither now, nor later when Charlemagne confirmed and enlarged the " donation," was there any reserve of power or jurisdiction to the donors, as if they were to be the suzerains of Rome. They were only its protectors, to be called on when the Pope thought fit. Thus every form of legality by public treaty was made to confirm the intrinsic legitimacy of the Papal Temporal Power. The city and its dependencies which had long been the Rome of the Popes—the " Sacred " Republic of the Romans—having for their legitimate prince, possessor and lord, St. Peter in his successors, now took a place of their own in the political relations of nations, just at the epoch when the nations were forming into that system of polity known as modern Christendom.

[1] Rimini, Pesaro, Fano, Senagaglia, Ancona.

The divine philosophy underlying all this is thus sketched by Bellarmine: "Even if, absolutely speaking, it were perchance preferable that Pontiffs should manage only spiritual things, and kings temporal affairs, still, on account of the wickedness of the times, experience clearly proclaims that it was not only useful but necessary, in the divine arrangement of Providence, that some temporal principalities should be conferred on the Pope and other Bishops. For if, in Germany, Bishops had not been princes, there had been no Bishop remaining in his See to our day. As therefore, in the Old Testament, there were for a long time Pontiffs who wielded no temporal power, and yet in the later ages religion could no longer maintain itself and be defended, unless the Pontiffs were also kings, viz., in the time of the Machabees; in like manner we see in the affairs of the Church, that, whereas in the first ages she did not need a temporal principality to defend her majesty, now she seems to require it as a necessity." It was the difference between a state of infancy and adult age; between her being in an environment of political government, whereof she could not be a part, though she was in it, and being in quite another environment, which could not do without her as an integral part of Christian polity, and as the vivifying centre of law, morality and national life.

From that time to this, in the enjoyment of an imprescriptible right and with accessions, neither slight nor dubious, made to their possessions by various Catholic Emperors and by the Countess Matilda, the Popes have presided over the moral welfare of Christendom, and, in particular, have made and preserved the fortune and heritage of Italy. If Cantù speaks of their "having hampered the political development of the peninsula," he may have in mind those material interests which, broadly speaking, can

be classed under the general head of the accumulation of riches—an accumulation which we observe has taken place in a superlative degree precisely there where faith in the supernatural has been paralysed by heresy ; where morality has declined more rapidly than faith ; and where misery and pauperism abound exactly in proportion to the apoplectic fullness of wealth. But if the prime element in the political development of a people is social happiness, as bound up with faith and morality, we find that the fortunes of Italy have been in the ascendant according as the Roman Pontiff has been in honour and power. Any other conception of the political well-being of Italy either rests on some gratuitous and revolutionary theory about the " rights of man," or, if it takes exception to the conservatism and intangibility of the Papal domain, then the true conception of Italy's highest welfare is that which was long ago expressed by M. Thiers : " This interest," he said, speaking of the Pope's Temporal Power, " is one of a superior order, which should overrule inferior interests ; as, in a State, the public interest silences individual interests." This is an elementary principle which has been applied, not only by Europe in neutralizing certain nations like Belgium or Switzerland, or in closing the Dardanelles, but also by the United States of America in setting apart the District of Columbia as being the honoured seat of a higher government.

The story of Italy's prosperity or adversity, as varying with the fortunes of the Roman Pontiffs, would form an apt commentary on this philosophical conception of the country's history.

Brunengo, Giuseppe, S.J., *Osservazioni sopra la Storia Universale di Cesare Cantù*, 1891, Roma.—*Origini della Sovranità Temporale dei Papi, parte* I, cc. 2, 5–10.—Cantù, C.,

Storia Universale, IV, 556; V, 204; VII, 589.—Thomassin, *Vetus et nova Ecclesiæ Disciplina*, III, lib. I, c. 161, n. 5.—Gosselin, Power of the Pope, I, Introduction, nn. 73, 74; v, vi.—Jungmann, *Dissertationes in Historiam Ecclesiasticam*, XIV, nn. 11, 55.—Bellarmine, *De Romano Pontifice*, I, v, c. 9.—Dupanloup, *The Temporal Power*, ch. iv, §3; (on Thiers).

IV

THE SAFEGUARDS OF REPUBLICS; OR, CHURCH AND STATE [1]

I

On February 16, 1892, the Holy Father addressed an encyclical letter to the clergy and to all the faithful of France; on May 3rd he wrote to the French Cardinals; and on June 22nd he had occasion to answer the Bishop of Grenoble, and through him the Congress of Catholic Young Men, recently held in his episcopal city. These documents contain the full expression of the Holy Father's policy, when he enjoins upon the French Catholics the acceptance of the Republican Government. Abstracting entirely from the question of fundamental right, as to who is entitled to hold the reins of government in France, he dwells wholly upon the question of fact, that the reins of power are actually in the possession of a party who are using them with fatal results to religion, morality and the general good of society. Desiring the Catholic body to pursue no line of action, even legal in its nature, which will only continue to paralyse their own powers, his Holiness exhorts all the French Catholic parties, and he orders them to amass their divided strength, and help to rectify by constitutional means the irreligious legislation which is being passed under constitutional forms.

[1] From *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, January, 1893 (vol. VIII), pp. 1–14; abridged.

The Holy Father said in his encyclical: The object of social life and of legislative action is the well-being of society. That is impossible without morality; and morality rests upon religion. Religion is the first basis of all society, domestic, social and political. Now, there is in full progress a systematic destruction of all religion and morality. The family is being destroyed by legislation on civil divorce; the future generation of citizens by infidel and godless education of the young; the clergy by enforced military service; the religious orders by exile or legalized confiscation. It is a duty incumbent on all to set about reforming the abuses of power; and, in such a campaign, on the basis of such a principle, there is every reason to expect support from all fair-minded citizens, who mean well. The policy to compass this must begin with a recognition of the actual Republic, which certainly is the depository, at the present moment, of social authority. For social authority is a necessity; and, wherever a society exists in fact, there is, in fact, that power which comes from God. But such recognition of the power existing in some subject *de facto* does no prejudice to the rights of anyone else who may be the subject *de jure*.

This administrative action of the Holy Father, though the matter clearly involved religion and morality, was very distasteful to some leaders of the monarchical party. Heroic characters like the Count de Mun obeyed at once. But the Count de Paris, who was the legitimate heir to the throne, the Count de Haussonville, his lieutenant, the Count de Barrême, quickly signified their resentment at this intrusion, as they were pleased to consider it, of the priesthood into political affairs. At once the old distinctions and subtleties, which have been of use in similar conjunctures, and will probably recur in the same service

to the end of time, were put in requisition, about the two planes, one spiritual and the other temporal, about infallibility where they choose to place it, but not in favour of obedience when they do not wish to practise it.

If the reason for practising obedience to authority in the order of ecclesiastical administration, and in the civil and domestic order of things, must be infallibility in him who directs, what will remain of any human order whatever in the world? Parents are not infallible. Political authorities are not infallible. Priests and bishops are not infallible. What remains but rebellion and perpetual anarchy in the world? This question of a Catholic's duty, not only in the matter of serving truth by the acceptance of doctrinal definitions, but also in the conduct of life by obedience to religious and moral authority, merits full and careful consideration, and the subject is as important for the citizens of other States as for the citizens of the French Republic.

So much for the circumstances in which the encyclical was published. We now approach a couple of doctrinal or practical points, which concern ways of thinking and acting in a democratic State somewhat different from the French.

II

There must be a relation of some kind or other always subsisting between the Catholic Church and political government. Thence arises a certain duty for the Catholic subjects or citizens who are under the rule of respective Governments.

We have often heard it said, and not by Protestants alone, that a separation of Church from State, or, as

the phrase goes, "A Free Church in a Free State," is the only policy which is rational; that it deserves application both where it is in use and where it is not. And, by an extension to the past ages of Christendom, we are given to understand that the opposite policy of union between Church and State was an error fruitful in evil consequences to both State and Church. We are not concerned with the arguments with which a Conservative, such as Mr. Gladstone was once, did battle in behalf of union, or with which Lord Macaulay did battle against Mr. Gladstone. It is the maintenance of such a theory by Catholics that interests us now. The theory rightly estimated receives its due in the utterance of the Roman Pontiff.

No doubt such a theory put forward by members of the Church admits of an excuse, and perhaps of more than one. The first explanation that occurs is the influence of the environment in which men live and breathe. Under the irradiations of a daily and monthly press, which is neither theological nor philosophical nor anything in particular, it will not be surprising if the opinions of men so formed claim no strict kindred with any of the sciences which figure so slightly in their formation. Another explanation is to be found in the fashion of cultivating a general ignorance on all matters of general history, prior to the date, say, when Franklin flew his kite, or Stevenson laid the first rails, or when a mob stormed the Bastille and set up a paper constitution, or, as the remotest date possible, when Luther purified the Papacy and nurtured in his bosom that good Protestant gospel, the art of printing! Simplicity like this in matters of history is found outside of Protestantism. Now, constitutions are very good, especially when not of paper; and the useful arts too are good,

and printing also. But so is sound historical information.

History is eloquent on the subject of Church and State. Its account is so distinct that it merited to be made the subject of the most concentrated ignorance. Without the past union of the Christian Church and State we should be a little worse off to-day than those who hate even to know history; for we should never have had a Christendom to write history about. That union has meant the concord which exists, and in the plan of divine Providence is meant to exist, between the secular power wielding one sword and the divine power of the Vicar of Christ wielding the other, a spiritual sword. "Lord," said the Apostles, "behold here are two swords." And He said to them: "It is enough." That union means the peaceful harmony between soul and body in the composite nature of human society, which, deriving its spiritual sustenance from Christ in His Church, calls for a peaceable exercise of its rights, "that we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all piety and chastity." [1] It is owing to this same concord that the prophecy has been fulfilled: "He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth. And all the kings of the earth shall adore Him; all nations shall serve Him." [2] For Christendom, religious and political, that great monument of Christian polity, bearing witness as it does to the sovereignty of Christ, by its jurisprudence and its wholesome institutions, by its countless works of beneficence and enlightenment, testifies at the same time to its own origin, which was in great part due to the possession of both spiritual and temporal powers by the prelates of the Church, and in great part due to the docility of Christian rulers in following the

[1] 1 Tim. ii. 2. [2] Ps. lxxi. 8, 11.

Church's counsels. This is so evident that, under the contrary policy of separation, our highest ambition can reach no farther than that we be left alone and be not trampled on as Catholics. No, God is the source of order, and therefore of subordination; and, if every soul is to be subject to the powers above it, so is the lower power to be subject to the higher, since "the powers that be are ordained of God." [1]

"We do not wish," says the Holy Father in his encyclical, "to pause and show all the absurdity there is in this theory of separation; every one will understand it for himself." Then, after briefly showing that the voice of reason proclaims the same truth, he continues: "Therefore let Catholics be most carefully on their guard against maintaining the theory of such separation. In fact, to wish that the State be separated from the Church would be to desire as a consequence that the Church be reduced to the liberty of living according to the common right of all citizens." Then he shows that this bare common right of citizenship, which entails no privilege of special recognition, is in practice found subject to one reservation—that the State will condescend to recognize the Church when it wants to persecute her.

Leaving this general doctrine intact, it may be urged that union with the State cannot be any longer favourable to the Church. Italy and France are specimens now; and, it may be added, the whole course of the Middle Ages afforded specimens in the past.

Parenthetically we may remark, it looks odd for the Vicar of Christ to be saying one thing, in the province of his official functions, and for other people, Catholics, who, though highly placed, speak vicariously for no body and no science that is known, to be telling

[1] Rom. xiii. 1.

us the contrary. As to France, the encyclical is written for the express purpose of maintaining religion there by a continued union of Church and State. Contrasting that country with other nations where the principle of separation holds he says: "In France, a nation which is Catholic by its traditions and the present faith of the great majority of its children, the Church ought not to be placed in the precarious condition which it is subject to among other peoples." Of Italy he says, in his subsequent letter to the French Cardinals, that his policy there is identical with that which he has urged upon the French. "It is these identical religious interests which require us in Italy to demand unceasingly the full liberty that is necessitated by our exalted ministry of Visible Head of the Catholic Church"; and therefore he cannot resign the freedom of the Church by resigning the temporal power, consenting to separate Church from State, and sinking to the level of a State chaplain.

As to the Middle Ages, our space utterly precludes entering upon them. Nor does our predilection lead us that way, to find out imaginary connections between our ideas and medieval terms. We will only say that, if all the evils which ever afflicted the Church must be due to the union of Church and State, then let it first be granted that all the good, likewise, which was effected—the prosperity, peace and civilization which made the Christendom whereof we are heirs—was due to that same union, concord and harmony betwixt the two powers, both of God. And if in these times, which are not conspicuous for their Christian faith, nor for any prosperity, peace or civilization of their own, outside of a wild and stupendous growth of material comforts and goods, the Holy Father reaffirms his own teaching on the

Union of Church and State, reaffirms the teaching of Gregory XVI and the condemnation which Pius IX passed on the contrary doctrine of "A Free Church in a Free State," [1] we may well apply the argument *a fortiori* to the Ages of Faith gone before. Nor will we admit that the evils of simony, ambition, clerical worldliness and all the troubles of "investitures" were due to that union which Christ intended. They were the gratuitous contributions of human free wills, which can abuse even the best things, and have done so always, and are at the same occupation still. That which is good remains good in spite of abuse. Even that which is necessary can be abused, yet it still remains necessary. This is the argument which the Holy Father uses, in the same encyclical, with respect to the legislative power of governments and the bad legislation which an infidel government can pass. He says the legislative power is a "social necessity," and must be respected; but the bad laws are an abuse of that power, and are to be corrected.

Coming down now to the general truth that an organic and mutual understanding between Church and State was good and necessary; that it is good; that the absence of it is merely to be tolerated as a necessary evil, let us go on to draw out the doctrine of the Pope on two practical points. One is that state of things—about the worst conceivable—when the Church is subjected to Masonic legislation. The other is that of the Church being without right or title in the world, enjoying indeed an immunity from the abuse of right or title, simply because she has neither; and leading that separate existence which is not her good by necessity, nor her good by choice; for it is not by nature a good at all. This is the condition of Catholicity in divers great nations to-day.

[1] Syllabus, Proposition LV.

III

In the state of separation, or of a Free Church in a Free State, the same liberty is allowed to the religion of Christ as to any citizen or organization of citizens that may be found in the country. A religious condition which is antecedent and superior to all civic citizenship, that is, the religious dignity of being a child of God, a member in vital union with Christ by the Sacraments, is so far recognized as to be classed with membership in any society or corporation, whether of sectarian and false religions, or of a commercial nature, or of the most reprehensible and illicit principles. "This situation," says the Holy Father in the present encyclical, "is a manner of existence, which, if it is subject to many and grave inconveniences, offers also some advantages, especially when the legislative power, by a happy inconsistency, does not omit to let itself by guided by Christian principles; and these advantages, though they cannot justify the false principle of separation, nor authorize anyone to defend it, do yet merit toleration [1] for a state of things, which practically is not the worst that might be."

Whether the form of government be of one kind or another does not alter the merits of the question. "Every form of government," says the Holy Father, "is good, if only it knows how to proceed straight to its end, that is, the common good for which social authority is instituted." He says further: "From a relative point of view, one or other form of government may be preferable, according as it is the one better adapted to the character and customs of such and such a nation." This adaptation will have been determined "by the sum of circumstances, historical

[1] *Rendent cependant digne de tolérance.*

or national, but always of incidental human origin, which have created in a nation its traditional and even its fundamental laws; and, by means of these, such and such a given form of government is realized, with some special method of transmitting the supreme powers."

Let us suppose, now, that a certain republic is animated by an unchristian and even an anti-christian spirit, so as to pass laws most injurious to religion. Let us even suppose it true, what the French royalists have urged against the French Republic, that it is the "incarnation of impiety." What follows? The Pope answers: "This view of the case is what has given rise to dissensions, and has aggravated them. But such angry discussions would have been avoided, if accurate account had been taken of that most obvious distinction between *constituted powers* and *legislation*. Legislation differs so far from the political powers and their form, that, under a government the most excellent in form, the legislation can be detestable, while, on the other hand, under a government the most imperfect in form, one can meet with excellent legislation." Now, "legislation is the work of the men who are invested with the power, and who, as a matter of fact, are governing the nation. Whence it results that, in practice, the quality of the laws depends more on the quality of the men than on the quality of the form of government. These laws, then, will be good or bad, according as the legislators have their minds imbued with good or bad principles, and allow themselves to be guided either by political wisdom or by passion." "Behold here," continues the Pontiff, "the precise ground on which, apart from political dissensions, good citizens should unite as one man to combat, by all legal and honest means, such progressive abuses of legislation."

This doctrine, as every one can see, comes right home to us. To complete it, let us consult the fundamental principles of all political institutions, whereon the Holy Father rests these self-evident conclusions. He says, near the beginning of the encyclical: "Let us take for our point of departure a truth most plain, admitted by all men of good sense, and loudly proclaimed by the history of all nations, that it is religion, and religion alone, which can create the social bond; that it alone suffices to maintain on a solid basis the peace of a nation." For the scope which men set before themselves in the social state "is not merely to provide for their temporal welfare, but, most of all, to attain thereby the good of their moral well-being. Otherwise, society would be but little raised above any aggregation of creatures without reason, whose life consists entirely in the satisfaction of the sensual instincts. . . . Now, morality supposes God, and with God, religion. . . . Since, then, religion is the expression, internal and external, of that dependence which, in justice, we owe to God, a grave consequence arises: All citizens are bound to unite in maintaining the true religious sentiment in the nation, and, if need be, to defend it, should any school of atheism, in the face of nature and of history protesting against them, endeavour to cast God forth from society, assured thereby of extinguishing the moral sense in the depths of the human conscience."

In States having those qualifications for self-government which characterize a people born and bred in the traditions of self-government, we are not subject to the excesses which a little possession of the supreme power begets in other temperaments that are not to the manner born. With the even temper, the fund of practical common sense, the enduring patience which begets mutual deference

and a ready self-accommodation to circumstances—with these moral conditions around, such political means as a constitution, representative assemblies and legislative bodies produce results very different from the wild vagaries of an upstart class, distinguished by its arrogant restlessness in a nation remarkable for many estimable and brilliant gifts, but not for the moderation and calmness of a colder and more calculating race. Still, even in such conditions as we enjoy, though the ingrained spirit of moderation, or the absorption of mind in the interests of material prosperity, or, as the Holy Father gently expresses it, though a "happy inconsistency in the legislator," do avert the immediate irruption of destructive forces, there is no absolute security, as facts clearly show, against the action and extension "of that vast conspiracy" which, as the Pontiff bears witness, aims at annihilating Christianity; and still less security is there against the effects of that animosity with which a certain class aims at "trampling under foot the most elementary notions of liberty, and of justice for the sentiments" of a large proportion of the nation.

A Masonic programme adopted in a meeting held (September, 1892) at Paris laid it down, as the policy to be pursued with a Catholic nation, that "the emblems of worship should disappear from the tribunals, from the public high-roads, that the State should not procure at its expense either local pastors, or chaplains, or ministers of any form of worship, whether in its ships, or in the precincts of its lyceums. In short, it was necessary that the laicization, already effected in the whole field of education, should be gradually extended to all the great public offices, and that an absolute neutrality should be attained." "Atheocracy" is the new watchword. And, in perfect conformity with the principle of eliminating

the divine from humanity, there was inflicted on the nation the public presentation of the brutal and the foul, under every seductive form, to capture the human soul. Journals and periodicals, placards and plays, the fine arts themselves, all coming down to a form of vileness which baffles and at the same time repels description, all are part of the same programme to corrupt and annihilate the moral sentiment. And, lest Catholics by accepting the Republic, in obedience to the Pope, might take it on themselves to purify the State, an orator proclaimed on the occasion that "when all call themselves Republicans, it is natural that there be formed a party in favour of the *Republican Republic*; that is to say, the Masonic Republic whose watchword is pronounced anti-clericalism, and lay socialism with all its liberties"—which we may describe better as an atheistic socialism, with all the licence of libertinism.

When such junctures occur one is tempted to recall that phrase of Macaulay's about "gangs of foreign banditti calling themselves patriots." Such a crisis is not in immediate prospect before a nation like our own. Whether it is likely to approach is a question depending very much upon one's manner of reading signs, and his gift of interpretation.

Brandi, S. M., S.J., *La Questione Francese e il Dovere Cattolico. Commentario dell' Enciclica di S. S. Leone XIII, ai Francesi*, pp. viii, 171 (cf. *Civiltà Cattolica*, 1892).

V

FREEMASONRY IN A DEMOCRACY [1]

"Error which is not withstood, is approved; and the truth which is not defended, is crushed. . . . If anyone ceases to oppose an evident crime, he does not go free from the responsibility of secret partaking with evil-doers." These words of Pope Felix II for the guidance of pastors in the Church of God are quoted by Pope Leo XIII, in his epistle to the Italian Bishops on the subject of Freemasonry. Of the people who are beguiled by the seductions of Masonry, he says in the same letter: "They either do not see at all the magnitude of the danger, or they do not estimate it at its proper value." Referring to the efforts of the Masonic sect to inveigle the inferior clergy, the Pope says that "it desires to win them over gently to its side, and to withdraw them from a due regard for legitimate authority, by involving them in the spirit of the revolution."

Addressing the people of Italy, in an Apostolic letter under the same date, the Holy Father sketches the working of the Masonic sect. The information which he uses, he says, it is not necessary "to derive any longer from mere conjectures, based on some sparse and fugitive indications, or to reason out by arguments founded on the series of events, which have been evolving for thirty years; the sect itself, intoxicated by its successes, has spoken out with a loud voice, and

[1] From *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, April, 1893 (vol. VIII), pp. 250–266; abridged.

has told us what it did in the past and what it proposes to do in the future." He refers to the documents which he has already issued on the subject. "We discoursed at length upon it in the Encyclical, *Humanum Genus*, of April 20, 1884, and in one of more recent date, that of October 15, 1890, addressed to the Bishops, clergy and people of Italy."

Lest anyone should imagine that the Holy Father is not alive to the importance of associations in these our days, we may quote the following grave words of his towards the end of the same epistle: "An excellent enterprise is this of forming associations most varied, which spring up in these times with a prodigious fecundity on every side, and in every order of social relationship; societies of working people, societies of mutual benevolence, of insurance, of science, letters, arts, and the like; and when they are animated by a good spirit, both moral and religious, they are certainly profitable and opportune. But, since it is just at this point, and here by special preference, that the venom of Masonry has insinuated itself, and is doing so at present, those associations should in general be held in suspicion and avoided, which, keeping aloof from all religious influence, can be easily directed and dominated by Masons; as well as those others which, over and above the aid they lend to the sect, are simply its seed-plots so to speak, and its noviceship."

I

In the United States we do not hear much high and loud talk to tell us what Masonry has done, and what it proposes to do. Several reasons could easily be assigned for this taciturnity. But what present occasion has not induced it to do, a previous occasion

did for it with a vengeance. We refer to the commotion which arose over the abduction of William Morgan, a recanting Freemason, in 1826. Such a chorus of testimonies as then arose is not likely to be heard again; if for no other reason than that a deep religious sentiment animated, in those times, the populations of New York, Massachusetts and Vermont. It was this religious feeling, no doubt, which prompted in great part the revelations of five hundred seceding Masons of different degrees, and stimulated the consciences of some thousand five hundred more to withdraw from the vicious institution." [1]

Now we all know that such a religious sentiment is a thing of the remote past with the live Puritanism that engendered it; but that need not prevent us from going back, with profit, to the revelations then made; and we may readily infer from them what kind of fresh and yet immature youth this Masonic organism was mewing in the country. The deeds of its immaturity it will probably never do again with the rawness and crudeness of those years, except perhaps when it is the Catholic Church that is the term of its operations. But we are not so sanguine that it will ever have a mind to change the spots of its skin, even when in its maturity it goes out of its way to put on the fleece of the lamb.

At the date we refer to (1826) the Speculative Freemasonry, which we know, was young. Practical Masonry, or the builder's art, which was the scope of many a guild in the Middle Ages, is possibly as old as modern Masons pretend their craft to be; Solomon's temple is a convenient date, or, farther back, the building of the Tower of Babel, or even the date of Noah himself, from whom not a few persons and things

[1] Cf. Address of the Rev. Moses Thatcher, in Faneuil Hall, September 8, 1829.

can rightly claim descent. But speculative or modern Freemasonry was first recognized by the Church when Clement XII, in 1738, banned the sect by issuing his Bull *In Eminenti*. The first American Grand Lodge seems to have been formed in Boston in July, 1733, receiving its charter from England. But we must look to France, to the "Illuminism" or infidelity of Voltaire and the Encyclopædists, for the great impetus which the progress of the association received at the end of the last century, the epoch of the French Revolution and the Principles of '89. It became the object of "illuminated" activity to destroy superstition, ignorance, fanaticism, by which terms are denoted Christianity, and particularly Catholicity, or as it is otherwise called "the assassin," "assassination," "the assassinated." "Lie, lie, something will remain," was Voltaire's very exact statement of the policy to be pursued; and subsequent developments added the familiar use of the dagger and poison. It is curious to note, in this connection, that in all the Protestant and infidel literature on the subject of Freemasonry the Jesuits are unfailingly mixed up with the growth of the craft; the secrecy of the *Monita Secreta* is invariably assumed as its type; and the morality of Pascal's *Lettres Provinciales* is, in the minds of anti-Masons, the succulent stem on which, at the suppression of the Society of Jesus, Masonic morality was grafted.

We propose to show now, from the testimony of an eye-witness, how the ascendancy of the French infidels, or "Illuminati," rapidly unfolded the latent powers of the condemned society. And, considering the new facilities for international communication which have characterized this century, we can understand the energetic and responsible unity which supervened to render the most widely separated

lodges a strictly-bound organism of anti-Catholic propagandism. Enlarge the following resolution of the Massachusetts anti-Masonic Convention, so that it apply to twelve countries, and not merely to the one which the convention is directly regarding, and the conception of this international unity is accurately conveyed: "*Resolved*, that the system is one and indivisible, whether consisting of three degrees or of fifty; that it is erected on the same foundation, constructed in the same form, inhabited by the same spirit, and governed by the same laws; that the acts of exalted Freemasons, and of lodges and chapters in one State, are the responsible acts of the whole system in the United States, and that it is proper to make Freemasonry answer for the conduct of its constituted authorities, wherever they are situated." [1]

The eye-witness we have cited above is John Robison, LL.D., who was Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Glasgow at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth. After long personal acquaintance with Freemasonry, he wrote a notable work, which was quickly republished; and the New York edition in our hands is dated 1798. It is entitled *Proofs of a Conspiracy against all the Religions and Governments of Europe carried on in the Meetings of Freemasons, Illuminati and Reading Societies.* We quote some of his personal narrative:

"In my early life, I had taken some part in the occupations (shall I call them ?) of Freemasonry; and, having frequented the lodges on the continent, I had learned many doctrines and seen many ceremonials, which had no place in the simple Freemasonry which obtains in this country" (England), where, as he goes on to tell us, "I had seen a Mason Lodge considered

[1] *Opinions on Speculative Freemasonry*, by James Odiorne, Boston, 1830, p. 243.

merely as a pretext for passing an hour or two in a sort of conviviality, not altogether devoid of rational occupation. I was frequently led into France and Italy. There, and more remarkably in France, I found that the lodges had been the haunt of many projectors and fanatics both in science, in religion and in politics, who had availed themselves of the secrecy and freedom of speech maintained in these meetings, to broach their particular whims or suspicious doctrines, which, if published to the world in the usual manner, would have exposed their authors to ridicule or censure. It has accordingly happened that the homely Freemasonry imported from England has been totally changed in every country of Europe, either by the imposing ascendancy of the French brethren, who are to be found everywhere ready to instruct the world; or by the importation of doctrines and ceremonies and ornaments of the Parisian lodges. Even England, the birthplace of Masonry, has experienced the French innovations; and all the repeated injunctions, admonitions and reproofs of the old lodges, cannot prevent those in different parts of the kingdom from admitting the French novelities, full of tinsel and glitter and high sounding titles." The reader will remember that this was the age for inaugurating revolutions, and the same eye-witness continues: "I have been able to trace these attempts made, during a course of fifty years, under the specious pretext of enlightening the world by the torch of philosophy, and of dispelling the clouds of civil and religious superstition, which keep the nations of Europe in darkness and slavery. I have observed these doctrines gradually diffusing and mixing in all the different systems of Freemasonry; till at last an association has been formed for the express purpose of rooting out all the religious

establishments, and overturning all the existing governments of Europe." [1]

To supplement this, let us add a word from Cesare Cantù: "Adam Weishaupt, professor in the University of Ingolstadt, at the time when the power of the Jesuits inspired the sect with dread, conceived the idea, having himself known the Jesuits, of substituting for them another hierarchical society, just as vigorous, but severed from religion, and assuming for its principles the very tenets which they mendaciously attributed to the Jesuits." [2] Weishaupt was a Jew; and the sect which he founded was that of the Illuminati, soon fused into Freemasonry.

II

The scientific and philosophic aspect assumed by Masonry gave some currency to the idea of its utility among several classes of men who did good service afterwards, in the cause of honesty and probity, during the anti-Masonic agitation of 1826, and in later years. A number of excellent people were enrolled in the ranks of Masonry, from Washington himself downwards; and many Protestant ministers were Freemasons. As Professor Robison himself was not an American, it is to these witnesses we must turn for information on the nature of the craft in the United States. Washington, at the close of his career, had reason to complain bitterly of "self-created societies."

[1] Introduction to *Proofs of a Conspiracy*, pp. 7–11. Cf. Odiorne, *Opinions on Speculative Freemasonry*, pp. 45, *seq.*

[2] *Gli Eretici d'Italia*, Disc. LVI, p. 610, quoted by Signor M. S. Giordano, *La Massoneria senza Maschera*, § 10, p. 71; Salerno, 1892.

The Hon. C. D. Colden, who had been Mayor of New York, and also member of Congress, made a lengthy statement regarding Masonry, wherein he had held "very high offices and honours." He remarks incidentally how it is not possible "he should ever forget that he had seen many venerated clergymen sanctifying, by their presence and their prayers, the labours as well as the refreshments of a lodge." But, speaking of the pretension that the lodges are schools of moral and physical science, he says: "I have never heard of any attempt to impart any other moral instruction than that which could be conveyed by precepts like these: That Masons must live within the compass; walk upright as the plumb; must deal on the square; and other such mystical advice. As to the sciences, the whole scope of the instruction goes no further than frequently to remind the brethren that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west and rules the day, and that the moon rules the night." [1] The disappointment felt by men of upright intentions is well expressed by General Henry Sewall, who in 1830 reviewed his Masonic career and gave the reasons why he disowned all connection with the sect.

At the very date when Robison's book was published in America, President Dwight of Yale College wrote to Dr. Smith, author of the *Commentaries on the Prophecies*: "Illuminism exists in this country; and the impious mockery of the Sacrament, described by Robison, has been acted here." The reader may need to be informed that the whole series of higher degrees in Masonry, with their limitless tissues of oaths, binding the members to the conditions of secrecy and to new obligations of service, is embroidered with parodies and blasphemies, which in their complete circuit bear on the whole economy of the Church's

[1] *Opinions on Freemasonry*, p. 108.

Sacraments, and on all the chief mysteries of Our Lord's life and passion. After touching on the circumstances under which this deistic infidelity was organized among Americans, Dr. Dwight says that the societies of Illuminism "spread with a rapidity, which nothing but fact could have induced any sober mind to believe. Before the year 1786, they were established in great numbers through Germany, Sweden, Russia, Poland, Austria, Holland, France, Switzerland, Italy, England, Scotland and America [*twelve countries*]. In all these places was taught the grand principle of corruption, that the goodness of the end sanctifies the means." This principle Dr. Dwight, in a Fast Discourse delivered at Yale, fathers on the Jesuits, whose place, he says, was taken by Weishaupt's system with special atheistic improvements.

Dr. Smith himself reports various testimonies from Masons regarding the identity of the new form, recently established in America, with the French Masonic Illuminism or Deism. The lodge "Wisdom" in Portsmouth, Va., was the 2260th descendant from the Grand Orient of Paris. This great number was scattered in twelve different nations, of which America was one. Girtonner, in his *Memoirs of the French Revolution*, says: "The active members of the Propagandists [*propagators of French Masonry*] were, in 1791, fifty thousand, with funds then of six million of dollars." These men were sent over the civilized world. And it was an axiom in their code that "it was better to defer attempts fifty years than to fail of success by too great precipitancy."

We are particular in adducing this evidence, however briefly, which shows the fundamental identity of Freemasonry in America with the European system, because we have before our minds the well-known

fallacies which some Catholics ventilate rather freely, and which it would suit the Masonic interest to have Catholics believe, that there is no connection, there is no identity, between the fraternities on the two sides of the ocean. It will be proper, therefore, to add a point or two on the deep policy which the European lodges pursue, and, in keeping with our present purpose, to throw a little more light upon the fungus-like propagation of secret societies in the dark.

Signor Giordano well remarks, that the Masonic lodges in Italy and the Carbonari are but two deep recesses of the same cave; and Young Italy, which issued from the Carbonari and was founded by Mazzini, was the party of the Radicals, and the most advanced among the Carbonari. In fact, all these sectaries of Italy, having attained their end, have turned back into the bosom of the sect that gave them birth, and at present we hear no more of Carbonari or of affiliations to Young Italy, but only of Masons.[1] Compare this with what a very energetic seceding Mason, the Rev. Moses Thatcher, affirmed of the method adopted in the United States, and we shall have occasion to understand the evolution of such associations as "Know-nothings," "American Protective Associations," "Patriotic Sons of America," which have afflicted the Catholic Church during fifty years with something more pungent than their arrogant or barbarous names. He says: "It is convenient for Illuminism to have its own societies whose avowed object, every one knows, is to propagate its own doctrine. But it is still more convenient to employ societies professedly devoted to other objects, because in these it can more easily conceal 'the hand that gives the blow.' That societies of the first kind,

[1] *La Massoneria senza Maschera*, § 7.

which I have mentioned, exist in America, there can be no reasonable doubt. The society of 'United Irishmen' was formed in the United States, years ago. Besides this, there have existed lodges in several sections of the country, which originated from the 'Grand Orient in Paris.' We may doubtless add 'The Society of Oddfellows.'" [1]

As to the Knights Templar, let it suffice to record what Professor Robison says of a certain lodge situated at Lyons, in France: "We know that this lodge stood, as it were, at the head of French Freemasonry, and that the fictitious order of Masonic Knights Templar was formed in this lodge, and was considered as the model of all the rest of this mimic chivalry." [2] It is in the obligation administered to an "Illustrious Knight" that his oath covers an interesting issue of practical business-life, when he, as a new Knight of the Red Cross, swears to bring a faithless companion to condign punishment "by pointing him out to the world as an unworthy and vicious vagabond, by opposing his interests, by deranging his business, etc."

III

We may throw a few more sidelights on American Freemasonry from the European lodges. It is said, in the report made to the New York Senate, February 14, 1829, that when the opponents of Masonry, on occasion of the murder of William Morgan, "undertook the great work of reform, three-fourths of all the offices in the country were held by members of that institution" (the Masonic). The select committee

[1] *Letters to a Brother in the Church.—Opinions on Freemasonry*, p. 49.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

is speaking of New York State, and it calculates that the Masons are only one-ninth of the voting population, that is to say, about 30,000. In the same year, October 27, 1829, an important meeting held at Waterbury, Vermont, adopted an address in which the following significant words occur: "The Masons in Vermont are about one-twentieth part of the freemen, and they hold about three-fourths of all the important offices of the State. Is this owing to their superior fitness, or to political Masonry?" An address delivered at Lyons, New York, September 11, 1829, by Myron Holley, contains the statement that in "forty counties of this State, being all from which authentic information could be obtained, it was ascertained by the anti-Masonic Convention assembled last winter in Albany that, in the year when Morgan was murdered, there were in office thirty-three Masonic sheriffs. More than half of the important public offices in the Union are filled by Freemasons, although they do not count one in four of the whole number of persons equally qualified and eligible to fill them."

Compare with this the condition of things in France, where the principles of '89 are carried out to the last conclusions, as was said recently by the *Bulletin du Grand Orient* (September, 1892): "Let us not forget one thing, MM .·. FF .·.; it is that Freemasonry brought about the Revolution of 1789." Now, in 1863 it was reported that "25,000 French Freemasons —there are no more—have invaded the public offices and administrations, in a proportion as if they were at least 25,000,000; while we Catholics, who are 38,000,000, have out of our own number, in the high administrative offices, scarcely more in proportion than if we were 38,000 French Catholics. An original manner, to be sure, of putting into practice the great

modern principle of Government for the country by the country." [1] This is the more noteworthy as the Freemasons are largely Jews.

Again, a little before the outburst of anti-Masonic indignation which has served to intensify the secrecy and silence of the craft in the United States, a prominent Mason, Mr. Brainard, described in an oration delivered at New London, Conn., the influence of Masonry as "comprising men of rank, wealth, office and talent, in power and out of power, and that in every place where power is of any importance," etc. As to this piece of policy, we can but refer to M. Giordano's analysis of the Masonic method of procedure with different types of persons belonging to the influential classes—how far they are admitted to the "Light of the Orient," the "Grand Light" (compare *Oriens ex alto illuminare*, etc., in the canticle of Zachary); and how it is that, if they fall short of the hopes entertained, they can subsequently be left in comparative immunity, for they carry away with them but little of the essential knowledge of the system, while they served in their day as its honorary figureheads.[2] Nor do they always succeed in obtaining the adhesion of men whom, however, it suits their purposes to elevate and keep in power, for reasons special in each case. For the rest, their appropriation of all representative, legislative, judicial and, of course, financial posts, offers a unique and striking spectacle in several countries of Europe to-day, where it is made no secret of, and reaches to the most flagrant miscarriage of justice. Similar results in America have been testified to by seceding American Masons.[3]

[1] Père E. Abt., S.J. "*La Franc-Maçonnerie et la Gouvernement de la France depuis quinze ans*," in the *Etudes*, January, 1863, p. 12.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, § 6, *Intento politico della Massoneria.*

[3] Cf. Odiorne, as above, Appendix, p. 255.

But the prime interests of the sect are in the region of morality and religion. Weishaupt, realizing the fundamental importance of education, recommended his adepts to obtain, at any price, an absolute control of instruction. What this Jew recommended his adepts are executing, with a degree of systematic persistence and general success that may well astonish the political observer. In this way are sapped the very foundations of Christianity, and especially of Catholicity, and with them all the bulwarks of law and morality, of social self-restraint and civilization. F .·. Yves Guyot, Minister of Public Works in the French Cabinet, has said : " Religion, then, is it folly ? Exactly, neither more nor less. The profession of the priest is to systematize, to foster, and to intensify this folly. While we build hospitals to cure fools, pay physicians to tend them, ought we to keep churches to keep up the folly, and pay priests whose sole function is to excite it and to exploit it ? " [1]

Masonry is itself a substitute for religion ; its rites a travesty of Christianity ; its manuals a collection of sacred lessons which one might casually take to be a collection of " Epistles and Gospels." But the meaning of all this is not very remote. In the degree of " Knight Adept of the Sun " these words are used : " Behold, my dear Brother, what you must fight against and destroy, before you can come to the knowledge of the true good and sovereign happiness. Behold this monster you must conquer—a serpent which we detest as an idol, that is adored by the ignorant and the vulgar, under the name of Religion." Hence the Massachusetts anti-Masonic convention, in its address to the citizens of the commonwealth, affirms : " In short, all the ceremonies and appendages of the Masonic institution, from the first to the

[1] *Etudes, loc. cit.*

thirty-third degree, we consider directly calculated and most artfully contrived to lead on, step by step, to blank atheism." [1]

IV

Is the system in America the same, or not, as the Masonic organism in Europe? We have heard the answer returned in the negative: "The Freemasons are not, in America, what they are in Europe." If this opinion is held with regard to the substance of the main system itself, it may not be surprising if some associations, otherwise irreproachable, take to imitating the accidental features of the craft, aping its pomp, its secrecy, and even a profane use of oaths.

Now, to hear anyone say, "The Freemasons here are not what they are in Europe," is so far reassuring, inasmuch as it indicates that the speakers would not undertake to defend the action, policy and lives of European Freemasons. So far so good. They do not endorse Masonry in the gross. Of course we know that America is not Europe, so we do not expect that flat truism to be urged as an argument. But what positive proofs are adduced by those who maintain the essential distinction between the two branches of Masonry? We know of none, except the kind of proof that consists in referring to kind acts done by Masons. We recall to mind, as an instance, how when a Jesuit was building a College in the far West, he received a present of a hundred dollars from a Masonic Grand Master. We doubt, though, whether the Jesuit's notions of Freemasonry underwent a change on account of the softening dew of this benevolence; especially as the gentleman said, when tendering the

[1] Odiorne, p. 236.

gift: "I expect this back, you know, in the way of business." Perhaps he was a Jew.

Still it is urged Freemasons are not doing here what they do in Europe. That again is comforting; provided it does not imply that we are to wait, with the simplicity of the dove, until they have accomplished in America all that they have accomplished in Europe. Indeed, we have reason to be thankful to a benign Providence that even the worst specimens of human nature can find diversion either in money-making, or pleasure-seeking, or other occupations; and the most profligate of men, as he sinks deeper into the slough, can still say with truth: *Non omnis moriar*, while he still retains any part of the original good gift which the God of nature gave him. But this is all a very negative basis of demonstration. And the fact that all attempts at disproving the identity of the craft on both sides of the ocean are notoriously negative indicates clearly enough that, in this matter of an absolutely secret society, no positive proof is forthcoming which is competent to prove anything. On the contrary, the essential act of membership is clear and definite in its rites, its meaning, its purposes, its drift. And, as we say in other things, *Standum est pro valore actus*. This signifies that the act stands for what it is intrinsically worth, even if its worth be sometimes taken out of it by simplicity, stupidity, or other accident of frail human nature, which oftentimes fails to mean all that it does, or fails to do all that it means. For instance, how often do Protestants, when approaching the Catholic faith, fall short of what they intended in their inmost heart, and die on the threshold! Similarly, it may happen that people get more and more entangled in the meshes of Freemasonry, but never go the full lengths of indecency, profanity and blasphemy, to

which they implicitly commit themselves. In the process of initiating the Knight Kadosh, which is the thirtieth degree of Masonry, the neophyte has a dagger put into his hands at the foot of a crucifix, which he receives the intimation to strike. If he will not do so, he is commended, but the more secret degrees are shut against him.[1]

We need not experience the active participation of Freemasonry, or other condemned associations, to witness this process of human decline. The mere aping of methods exercises a powerful influence on minds. The imitation of an occult ritual, with its emblems, its tokens, its titles, excites the imagination of the young and foolish into a glow; curiosity and levity spring forward with a frisky activity; an ill-regulated conscience is inefficient to call a halt. Add hereunto the circumstances of a young man who, in daily intercourse with Freemasons or Oddfellows, perceives that they can assist him in the path of ambition—upward for his worldly interests, downward for the life of his expiring morality—and the result is one which was never intended by the originators of such mummeries in Catholic associations, but is, alas! altogether too frequent, as they can testify who have to mourn the degradation and loss of promising characters. The mystic rite acquires the stronger hold on the imagination of an unballasted mind, because while secrecy is made so much of, even to the taking of extra-judicial oaths, the most garrulous have full play for their tongues within the precincts of the lodge; and that most exaggerated form of levity is developed which consists in a partial assumption of secrecy and gravity. And, when once the young man has gone the full lengths, and graduated from the aping of secret societies to the sober reality

[1] Cf. Giordano, § 9.

of membership in them, then, as Pope Leo tells us, "it is a work of much labour and doubtful issue, judging by the spirit of the sect, for anyone to extricate himself, who has once been caught in the toils of Masonry." [1]

Un-American and undemocratic to the highest degree is the whole spirit and form of this secret system. The Republican anti-Masonic members of the New York legislature explained this at length to their constituents (May 5, 1829): "Democracy abhors and forbids all artificial distinctions, ranks and orders, 'stars and garters and titles of nobility,' those 'gewgaws that amuse so many children in the shape of men.' . . . Freemasonry is wholly of foreign invention. The institution, in this country, receives with passive obedience, whatever is transmitted from the foreign seat of its empire. . . . What has been attempted in other countries, may be expected in our own," etc.

And, as to the use of extra-judicial oaths, imposed by men who have no authority to assume such rights, either over their fellow-men or over the things that appertain so directly to the honour of God, we do not know that anything more ample or more exhaustive could be urged upon the subject than was laid down at length in various documents, manifestoes and argumentations issued by many Protestant writers, both lay and clerical, sometimes in conventions or governmental committees, at the date to which we have referred so often. On this point Catholics should not have to receive instruction from such a source. But we will quote one word on the morbid cultivation of secrecy: "If a man is obliged to act openly, he is strongly induced to act honestly. . . . Thieves, robbers and counterfeiters do not mature their plans

[1] Encyclical to the Italian Bishops.

in open assemblies, 'neither come they to the light, because their deeds are evil.'" [1]

When, therefore, by way of conclusion, we repeat the words of Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical, *Humanum Genus*, addressed to all Catholics, *Boni omnes amplissimam quandam coeant opus est agendi societatem et precandi*, "All good people should enter into a vast organized plan of action and of prayer," we need add nothing to what we have said on behalf of religion or morality. But, as to the interests of charity, union and benevolence involved in the policy which His Holiness recommends, it is sufficient to observe what Satan teaches us, in the most God-forsaken institution which he has so far established on earth. He actually clothes it in the garment of charity and brotherly love! It is the strongest plea of defence that the Masonic fraternity have ever put forward, and it is about the only one they have ever had to put forward, until, as is the case in Italy and France, it is no longer necessary to use pretexts at all. But the plea has been torn to shreds over and over again. Says one who knew them well: "It may be doubted whether all that has ever been applied to the charitable funds of the institution would equal a hundredth part, perhaps I may say a thousandth part of what has been expended by Masons for their temples and their decorations, for personal trappings, for jewelry, for funerals, for processions, for festivals and in the conviviality so inseparable from the meetings of the fraternity." [2] We are assured that there is little exercise of apparent, as there is no exercise of real benevolence. But what a splendid testimony is rendered to the work of God's Church in the elevation

[1] Odiorne, p. 130. Reply of the Genesee Convocation of Ministers.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 104; Hon. C. D. Colden.

of Christendom thus far, by the unintermittent display of her divine charity; when such a rationalistic institution as this finds it advisable to put on the air of benevolence, to pay some respect thereby to the Christian sentiments of its candidates, and so beguile the latent Christianity which still murmurs its inarticulate remonstrance in the hearts of the worst of men.

Leo XIII, *Encyclicals on Freemasonry* to the Bishops of Italy, December 8, 1892; to the Italian People, December 8, 1892.—Thatcher, Rev. Moses, *Address in Faneuil Hall, Boston, Mass.*, September 8, 1829.—Cantù, C., *Gli Eretici d'Italia*, disc. LII, p. 393.—Giordano, M., *La Massoneria senza Maschera*, § 8; Salerno, 1892.—Odiorne, James C., *Opinions on Speculative Freemasonry, Relative to its Origin, Nature and Tendency*; Boston, 1830.—Robison, John (University of Glasgow), *Proofs of a Conspiracy against all the Religions and Governments of Europe, carried on in the Secret Meetings of Freemasons, Illuminati and Reading Societies;* New York edition, 1798.—Abt, E., S.J., *La Franc-Maçonnerie et le Gouvernement de la France depuis quinze ans; Etudes, janvier*, 1863.

VI

THE EARLY CHURCH: THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS[1]

A MANUSCRIPT, newly found, was given to the world in 1883 by the Metropolitan of Constantinople, and since that date it has appeared under every possible form. It is called the Διδαχή (*Didaché*), "The Doctrine or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles." The work now before us, published by Father Minasi, S.J., and dealing with the *Didaché*, furnishes from the records of remote antiquity a commentary of the gravest import on the doctrine and practice of the Church to-day.

The author is led to infer that "The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles" dates from some time after the composition of St. Matthew's Gospel, and before the other three Gospels were composed. It is itself smaller in compass than any one of the four Gospels. He considers that it emanated from a certain Council of the Apostles, held probably at Antioch, and referred to in the Canon of the Holy Apostles as well as in a letter of Pope Innocent I. The document itself is cited by Eusebius, St. Athanasius, the anonymous author of *De Aleatoribus*, by Hermas, Barnabas, Clement of Alexandria.[2] As to its matter and its style of language, it invites comparison chiefly with the Gospel of St. Matthew, the Acts of the Apostles,

[1] From *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, March, 1892, vol. VI.

[2] *Minasi*, *Proœmio*, ch. III, pp. xix–xxiv.

the first letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians; and, among patristic writings, it admits of special illustrations only from the very earliest, such as the works of St. Justin Martyr, Hermas, and the Martyr St. Ignatius.[1] It is more characterized by Hebrew forms of speech than any book of the New Testament. And the whole tenor of it, the tone which pervades it, as well as the very title, "The Teaching of the Lord through the Twelve Apostles to the Nations," all go to show that the directions which it contains for priests, levites and the laity, on the gravest subjects of worship and morals, are not being merely transmitted from a higher authority through some intermediary, but are being promulgated directly by the Apostolical authority itself, for the observance of the whole Church of God.

If, practically, it became a lost monument, because copies were allowed to grow scarce, that would be no unique instance of the kind in the history of the early Church. A sufficient reason for such scarcity existed in the imperfections which crept into current copies. For, as time went on, the document became in certain parts less fitted for the use of the faithful; and in view of being rendered more practical, it underwent some modifications. Additions and changes were made which brought it finally into discredit. St. Leo touches upon this process.[2] But, as to the copy lately discovered, what with the authenticity attaching to it as a well-preserved and very ancient monument, and the authority intrinsically belonging to it as the teaching of Our Lord, formulated by the authority of the Twelve Apostles themselves, it throws into relief questions of dogma, morals, rites and sacred languages, in a manner prolific of instruction and edification.

We shall give a single example, which, like any

[1] *Proœmio*, p. xviii. [2] Epistola 15.

other instance that might be taken, will be drawn from the various parts as they are aptly co-ordinated in Minasi's work—from the Proœmium in which the general notions are summarized ; from the text which is most accurately reproduced ; from the author's own translation, with the notes immediately appended ; but chiefly from the ample Commentary which follows ; and, finally, from the interesting Lexicon of words employed in the *Didaché*. The example which we shall take is that of the meaning or sense of the most sacred mystical rite, the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. And to this explanation of the Sacrifice we shall append the order of Divine worship, as observed in the Holy Mass on Sunday.

It is this order of worship on certain days of the week, and especially the ritual on the Lord's Day, that forms the central subject in the *Didaché*. Sunday, the Lord's own day, as having been signally honoured both by His rising from the dead and by His first solemn apparitions, is first and foremost in the week. Next in dignity are Wednesday and Friday. In the first two centuries of the Church's existence the Christians celebrated the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass only on the Lord's Day. As late as the time of St. Justin, this was the custom everywhere. It is not necessary, says our author, to define the precise date when the celebration of the Holy Mysteries took place on Wednesday and Friday also, or when Saturday was added. Whatever that date may have been, the day of days in the week, at the time when this document was written, was the Lord's Day, on which the mystery of faith perpetuated the Sacrifice instituted at the Last Supper. Wednesday and Friday were days of fast and penance—the one because of the treason of Judas, the other because of the Passion and Death of Our Lord. Hermas, writing earliest after

the time of this document, calls these days Stations, which, as we see in our Missals, is the same name that has entered into the regular discipline of the Roman Church.

The faithful, then, on Sunday held their σύναξις (*synaxis*). This is an exclusively Christian word, and the meaning of it involves many heads of doctrine. Its proper and principal sense is "the uniting" of the faithful with the body of the Lord; from which union with Christ follows union amongst themselves, as if they were one body and one substance among themselves. The argument of the Apostle to the Corinthians turns upon this point.[1] "The Chalice of benediction which we bless, is it not the Communion of the Blood of Christ? And the Bread which we break, is it not the partaking of the Body of the Lord? For we, being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread." From the first and principal meaning, so explained, others were derived; thus *synaxis* came to mean the assembling of the faithful in one place; then the place in which they met; finally, the prayer which was offered in that holy place, because with it and in it we are united to Jesus Christ. In this last sense the word *synaxis*, translated into Latin, becomes in Tertullian "[*oratio*] *Collecta*" the same word which we use now when we speak of the prayer "Collect" of the Mass.

As the term *synaxis* has for its first meaning the idea of incorporation with the Immaculate Victim on the Altar, and from this meaning others are derived, so the Sacrifice, wherein they are incorporated, is the θυσία (*thysia*), which, as the *Didaché* expressly teaches, is the θυσία καθαρά (*thysia kathara*), or "clean oblation," foretold by the Prophet Malachy. And from this first use of the term *thysia*, or "sacrifice,"

[1] 1 Cor. x. 17.

others are derived. The faithful themselves, who are incorporated in the Sacred Victim, are called the "sacrifice." For the *Didaché* teaches that they are to confess their sins and to be reconciled to one another, "in order that their sacrifice be clean," "in order that their sacrifice be not profaned." Now, it is quite plain that there can be no question of the Immaculate Victim Himself requiring purification. So that the Church herself is considered as the victim washed and purified. And, as Jesus Christ is the Lamb, with the attributes of being innocent and of being intended for sacrificial consecration, so the faithful are styled by the Prince of the Apostles "immaculate lambs" (*agni immaculati*). Indeed, as the *Didaché* expresses itself, the Father has "made Christ take up His abode within us." Each one of us becomes, as St. Paul says, "another Christ."

The sacred bread itself, which is taken from the oblations made by the Christians at the Offertory, represents in a symbolic manner the real and underlying purpose of Him who suffers Himself to be placed under these species. The bread is made up of many grains of wheat which form one leaven; so the Body of Christ upon the altar is considered in the Sacrifice, not only as what it really is, the physical substance of Christ, but also as what it mystically is, the body of His Church composed of every tribe and nation under Heaven, united intimately, in the holy *synaxis*, to Himself, the Eucharistic oblation. Hence, the *Didaché* has these words in its beautiful eucharistic prayers, which on the days of the Stations are to be recited by the faithful before Holy Communion: "As this fragment [*the species of bread*] was scattered over the mountains, and was gathered [*i.e., the grains of wheat that form the bread were gathered*] and became one, so may Thy Church be gathered from the confines of

the earth into Thy Kingdom." This is the gathering of the nations spoken of by the Prophet Malachy, whom the *Didaché* quotes thus: "In every place and time offer Me a clean sacrifice, for a great King am I, saith the Lord, and My Name is wonderful among the Gentiles." And, speaking of these peoples and tribes and nations, St. Paul says that we are the body of Christ; one body in Christ; that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of this body; that He is the Head of the body, the Church; that He suffers in His body, the Church.[1] In this same sense, again, the *Didaché* speaks of the mystical body of Christ as sacrificed, as consecrated for oblation. For the exquisite eucharistic prayers, to be used by the faithful after Holy Communion, contain the following: "Remember Thy Church, O Lord, to free it from all evil, and to perfect it in Thy love; and from the four winds unite it (*σύναξον αὐτήν*, *synaxon auten*), sanctified into Thy Kingdom which Thou hast prepared for it. For Thine is power and glory forever and ever. Let grace come and the world pass away. Hosanna to the Son of David. Amen." Here the word "sanctified" means sacrificed, made holy by oblation; and thus the Church is "made perfect" in the sacrifice of the charity of Jesus Christ.

Several interesting difficulties have attached to some parts of the Canon of the Mass, and what we have just said gives us a footing for clearing them away. How, for instance, does the priest venture to bless the consecrated species after the sacred words have already placed under them the Body of Christ, and there is nothing else there to bless? Or, again, how does he come to pray soon after: "Bid these oblations be borne by the hands of the Holy Angel up to Thy sublime Altar," etc.? The reasons appear from what

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 13; Rom. xii. 5; Eph. v. 23; Coloss. i. 18, 24.

has been said; they are the same which govern the tenor of the prayers before consecration. Under the form of the bread presented at the offertory, the faithful have been symbolically united, from the very first, to Christ, the Head, and to all the other members of the Church. Similarly, under the form of water mingled with wine in the chalice, they have been united to Christ, as all the liturgies indicate. Then, as being so united with Him, they are understood in all that follows. Thus, extending his hands over the oblation, not yet consecrated, the priest applies the rite of the Old Law to the New, signifying, in precisely the same sense as of old, that the offering over which he extends his hands is substituted for those who offer it, and that these are represented in it. Then, making three signs of the Cross over it, he pronounces these words: "*Quam oblationem tu Deus, in omnibus* [membris] *quæsumus, benedictam* [in terris], *adscriptam* [in cœlis], *ratam* [in corpore Christi confirmatam], *rationabilem* [spiritualem] *acceptabilemque facere digneris*"; that is to say, while designating the sacred species, he asks that the oblation may be blessed in all its members upon earth, may be entered or registered in Heaven, may be ratified in the Body of Christ, may be spiritual, no longer carnal, and so may be acceptable. Clearly, he is contemplating something else before him in the Sacrifice than merely the physical Body of Christ about to be placed there. Making two more signs of the cross, he adds: "*Ut* [oblatio] *nobis* [pro nobis] *corpus et sanguis fiat dilectissimi filii tui Domini nostri Jesu Christi*; the desires expressed in the preceding part of the prayer will be fulfilled if the oblation which he is designating and blessing become the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ.

When the consecration has been accomplished, the faithful are effectually united, as the mystical body

to their Head, present and sacrificed. This union is what is signified by the term *synaxis*. The priest blesses the *synaxis*; he prays that it may be taken up by the hands of the holy angel to the sublime Altar of the Divine Majesty; and that all who are partakers, sharers, in this sacred Altar or sacrifice may be filled with every celestial grace and benediction. It is only when the sacrifice itself is entirely completed, in the Holy Communion, that the faithful partaking in it will be replenished with every grace. Then Christ, at last, is incorporated vitally in every member present. No wonder that Our Lord has multiplied His presence on myriads of altars over the world, that, from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same, "in every place *and time*" (as the *Didaché* quotes the words of Malachy), this vital incorporation of each and every child of man in Christ's own being may be possible to all, by the *synaxis* or union in His Sacrifice completed at the eucharistic banquet of Holy Communion!

Just by the way, we may remark what light this doctrine throws on the union in the Sacrament of Matrimony, as explained by St. Paul.[1] Explaining this union, the Apostle declares it to be a great Sacrament, and he adds emphatically: "But I speak in Christ and in the Church." He has just enjoined on husbands to love their wives; he has required wives to be subject to their husbands in all things. And what are the reasons? He repeats them over again: That Christ is the Head of the Church; that He is the Saviour of His body; that Christ loves and nourishes and cherishes the Church, "because we are members of His body, of His flesh and of His bones. For this cause shall a man leave father and mother; and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be two in

[1] Eph. v. 22–32.

one flesh. This is a great Sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

We have taken this one instance of the author's treatment to show how his researches illustrate the liturgy; and not only that, but dogma also, of which the liturgy is an authentic and organized expression. To complete the instance, we may add from his proœmium the sketch which he gives of the Lord's Day, as hallowed by this most solemn act of Divine worship.

He premises, and illustrates from St. Justin Martyr, that the ordinances relative to this day are from our Lord Himself, who instructed the Apostles on various occasions after His Resurrection. Then the author goes on to describe the ritual observed on Sunday.

The faithful assemble, either in the synagogue which has become Christian, or in the cœnaculum of a private Christian, like that "Church which was in the house of Prisca and Aquila at Rome." [1] The day on which they meet is called, in Jewish language, "*una Sabbatorum*" ("the first day of the Sabbath"); in Gentile terms, *dies solis* (Sunday); in Christian terminology, *dies Dominica* (the Lord's Day). A section is read from a Prophet or some part of the Gospel; then follows the homily delivered by the President, the *antistes*, the *archiereus*, that is to say, the Bishop; after that, the confession of sins and the reprehensions. Prayers are now offered up for all the faithful and by them all. These being finished, the Deacon takes part of the offerings made by the faithful, a loaf of bread and a chalice of wine. He delivers the oblations to the President, who rehearses over them the words and actions of Our Lord at the Last Supper. So the *Didaché* expressly directs; and then says no more about it, referring merely to the

[1] Rom. xvi. 5.

Gospel: "As you have it in the Gospel of the Lord." The consecration being thus effected, the President alone, in the name of all, makes a solemn thanksgiving to God the Father, for all gifts granted in the order of nature and grace. After this thanksgiving, the consecrated gifts are distributed to those present, and borne to those absent by the hands of the Deacons. And the faithful, having received the Body and Blood of the Lord, sing hymns to Jesus Christ.

The author says: "The sense of this rite was understood in this manner. The offering of the substances necessary to support life is made instead of the persons offering, who are represented therein. When the bread and wine have been consecrated, the body of the faithful are represented now, not in the offerings which were made, but in the Body itself of the Lord; and for the body of the faithful, the Body of the Lord is substituted. The conception is fundamental in the sacred rites of Jews and Christians." The idea of personal presence at Mass, on the part of the faithful, is so much a part of the original conception, that the author notes an addition made later in the Roman Canon of the Mass to include expressly "those [*absent*] for whom we offer," as distinct from "those [*present*] who offer."

So much for the Sacrifice itself and its place in the week. The *Didaché* treats besides of the ministers destined for the celebration of the Holy Mysteries. They are called *episcopi* and Deacons, different from the Apostles, Prophets and Doctors. These *episcopi*, mentioned here and in the New Testament generally, are proved to be not what we mean by Bishops; for in that sense the Apostle or his consecrated legate, the President, the *antistes*, the *archiereus* of the *synaxis*, is the Bishop. The *episcopi*, spoken of both here and in the New Testament, are priests as

understood by us. This is abundantly shown by the author.

The precise state of the Church for which the document legislates is one which has never existed since the first century. It speaks of the extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost as common among the Christians, and of the ministry of the Prophets, still subsisting as in the Old Law. Of these charismata St. Paul treats at length in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, chapters xii–xiv. The *Didaché*, moreover, addresses Christian communities in which there was not yet a settled *Presbyterium* or clergy, composed of Bishop, priests and deacons, under the general jurisdiction of an Apostle, or some legate of the Apostles. Belonging to the latter class of Apostolic chiefs were Evodius at Antioch, Mark at Alexandria, Timothy at Ephesus, Titus in Crete. The apostolic authority, with which Paul and Barnabas were invested, included all that was termed, at a subsequent period, "episcopal." The present designation of "Bishop" had not as yet the fixed and settled meaning which it was to receive in future.

These well-formed Christian communities, not yet provided with the priesthood in their midst, had their origin in the conversion of entire synagogues to the faith, or of portions which withdrew from a rebellious synagogue and formed a Church among themselves. So the Apostle St. Paul did with his neophytes at Corinth. St. James addresses his Catholic Epistle to "the twelve tribes which are scattered abroad." St. Peter indites his first letter "to the strangers dispersed through Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia."

Writing in A.D. 112, Pliny the Younger says that he found in Bithynia many Christians who had professed the faith for twenty years before his arrival; and he

speaks of the large numbers belonging to every class and order of persons; he describes how they are scattered in the cities, the towns and the country; and he states that the temples are deserted, there are no more sacrifices, and no one to purchase victims.

But we are touching now upon points, any one of which would furnish an example similar to the one we have chosen, for illustrating early Christian faith and practice. We might mention, besides, the newness of the Christian code of morals presented at that time to a Gentile world; and even a newness of Christian language which had to correspond. But we can do no more now than refer to the learned work from which the above is taken.

Minasi, Ign. M., S.J., *La Dottrina del Signore pei Dodeci Apostoli bandita alle Genti, detta La Dottrina dei Dodeci Apostoli. Versione, note e Commentario*, 8vo., pp. lii, 389; Roma, 1891.

VII

THE SERIO-COMIC IN THE VATICAN ARCHIVES [1]

Much has been written on the private archives of the Vatican. There have appeared ample accounts of what these ancient repertories, with their thirty thousand manuscript tomes, offer to the historical students of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Perhaps enough has been said for the present about the outside of these volumes, but a few points taken from the inside of them might interest readers. I will note here some features which have struck my eye or caught my fancy in the study of the folios. I will disown at once all intention of describing the inexhaustible fund of historical treasures. The things I will select are rather of the singular and exceptional sort, and such as I was not looking for.

I

In the first place, all the great affairs of the times, even in the heart of Protestant countries, form the subject, if not of direct narration, at least of incidental commentary. Where there were no Papal Nuncios, nor formal representatives of any kind, there were always other persons, either on the ground or on the borders of it, who were sending in to the authorities

[1] From *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, June, 1896 (vol. XIV), pp. 538–550; abridged.

at Rome their accounts of interesting events. One prolific class is not easy to describe, for, I must confess, it is not easy to identify. These are the persons whose correspondence bears no official stamp, and yet is comparatively regular. Whether it is by personal inclination merely, or by some sort of invitation, that they have become correspondents of the Cardinal Secretary of State, they are evidently acceptable to him, and from time to time he answers them. They almost enjoy the privilege of a postal commissary who, when forwarding to Rome the letters which arrive at Lyons from Paris, or at Genoa from Spain, not infrequently uses the occasion to say something on his own account. But the class we speak of, which has nothing whatever to say except on its own account, has a privilege of its own; it is totally disembarrassed, unrestricted by official mechanism and forms. There is no doubt of it, a personal forwardness, if it has not already pushed them into this position of confidence, serves to keep them in it. And evidently they enjoy it. In the suaveness of their French style, in the seeming adulation of their Italian superlatives, in the overflowing gratitude they express at being allowed to address the eminent Cardinal, and the delighted self-abandonment with which they profess themselves his servants, his creatures, his slaves, their ardent affection at times seems to swoon away in the effusiveness of love, of desire, of burning zeal to minister, to expend itself, to lay down life itself in giving the slightest gratification to such an ecclesiastical potentate. Language seems to fail them in attempting to breathe forth the soul of such sublime conceptions that just struggle for utterance. Generally, a parenthesis comes in sooner or later—a certain abbacy or bishopric for the writer, or some worthy third person, would be thankfully received. And at times it would

appear that the failure of the parenthesis seals the fate of the correspondence, which then begins to languish. But the class is not thereby extinguished. When some go others come; and the race, like Tennyson's brook, itself goes on for ever. This is probably the class which supplies the largest income of the gossipy, the spicy, the satirical, the scandalous. Here I am reminded of an instance in point, which shows the nonsensical trifles or quarrels of which so much court-life was made up. A certain Becatti writes from Venice, at a date near the close of the seventeenth century. He is rich in accounts about the newsmongers there (*i novellisti*), who are tearing the Papacy and the Jesuits to pieces. A new Jesuit preacher has just opened his course, taking for his text: "Generation cometh and generation goeth." Whereat the sensitive aristocrats wax wroth; for they fill up the text, as they saw by the eye and intonation of the preacher that he meant it to be filled up; and so constructed it ran thus: "Generations come and generations go, but the Jesuits go on for ever!"

The ordinary avenues of official information are being trodden every day by the regular couriers. The style of information is very uniform, however varied in matter. Still, it is rather dry. It is that kind which answers to the green books and blue books of Parliament and Congress, wherein statesmen find their natural pabulum; and, while other people would die of melancholy, they somehow seem to thrive and keep cheerful. In such an official series, an historian can follow out his thread with considerable accuracy; for, when a Nuncio touches a chord in some one of his many paragraphs, he will naturally return to it in subsequent letters. And there the investigator will pick his footsteps amid the tangle of other matters until the issue closes; or until he enters into the land

of his chosen investigation. Thus, from the first warning notes on Gallicanism or Jansenism, and then remarks about dubious tenets propounded in one university or other, he moves on into a babel of sounds, into a war of cries, complications which fill tomes upon tomes with correspondence about suspected dignitaries, infected institutions, dubious candidates for the episcopacy, and the tortuous ways of crowned heads. Here emperors and kings and queens, saints and sinners alike, come forward to have their say; but nothing is to be learnt from their diplomatic phrases, except, perhaps, the transcendent power and dignity of the Court of Rome.

It is notorious in the administration of human affairs, and in the accounts which go under the name of history, that what predominates there is not the even course of events, the normal current of national life. In secular history it is not the life of the towns or of the peasantry, not the smooth development of internal resources, nor the features of domestic simplicity and happiness, that fill the pages of histories, and pretend to be the story of nations. Instead of that we have usurpations, and violence, and wars, and insurrections; we have the flashing of swords and the sacking of cities; we read of earthquakes, inundations, of the errors that have ravaged minds, of the vice that has seized weak imaginations. All this fills up pages, and chapters, and books. And it is very much the same with the administration of all human affairs, and especially with high administration. Here, too, the feature predominates of dealing with the abnormal, with the diseased, with all the woes, intellectual, moral and social, which afflict humanity. That it should be so is of the very heart of the position. Administration, or the exercise of legitimate authority in society, is not for the purpose of interfering in life,

but of merely helping it from without, and remedying the evils which afflict the social body. And, in fact, no judicious person ever recurs to a high authority above the level of his ordinary life, except to receive help there, when elsewhere other means have failed.

From this consideration we might divine beforehand a certain trait very conspicuous in the archives of the Vatican. It is that a dominant tone running through them is not that of the even course of the Church's life, the administration of the Sacraments, the growth in virtue of Christian peoples, or of the clergy, or of religious Orders; it is not the progress of Christian education, or of civilization in general. All these things appear and they are refreshing. But they appear only incidentally. Whatever is strange and abnormal—that abounds. Strange and peculiar persons—they come to the front. The correspondence is as wide-reaching as humanity itself; but, as a general rule, the unofficial representatives of humanity, who rush forward and insist on having a word with Peter on his rock, either have singular things to say, or pitch their voices on a singular key to make themselves heard.

II

The style of expostulation with the Vicar of Christ is rare. In dealing with any court the want of etiquette makes business impracticable. And reasonably; for no business improves by ignoring etiquette; and, therefore, the absence of it creates a presumption from the beginning against the value of a communication which gives offence. It is true, that in dealing with the head of the church, one enters into a realm where conscience reigns—a factor not to be counted on in any other court.

A doctor, who seems to be a Spaniard writing from Rome itself, addresses the Pope, insisting that the Gospel should be preached to the Jews every Sabbath day; that all Jews who are above twelve years of age must be forced to attend and drink in the doctrine. Then, passing to Spain, he dwells on certain abuses connected with convents, where ecclesiastics enjoy privileges of too close intimacy; and he remarks, that hence the evil has spread to the Indies, "*ubi major est licentia peccandi.*" He closes the letter in this style: "*Testis ero in horrendo judicio, quod per istam epistolam conscius fuisti, et debebas providere de remedio.*" It is a little odd that the Pope to whom this letter was addressed is Odescalchi, Innocent XI, one of the two who were most preoccupied about that time with the reformation of monasteries. It would appear as if the mere knowledge that such was the energetic policy of the reigning Pope simply provoked correspondence in keeping with the policy; petitions and complaints coming from all quarters. But the singular circumstance is, that the policy of reconstruction should also entail the portion of being abused, and that by a good man who has the same views as His Holiness.

A Milanese writes over his own name a vile philippic against the Pope, against all the Popes, all ecclesiastics, and religious Orders in general, for neglect of their duty, and for carelessness in cultivating sanctity of life. He execrates in particular six orders, and states the heads of indictment; one of the heads being, that what they got by way of alms they sold by way of trade. Here we have a parallel case to the one above. This letter is to Pamfili, Pope Innocent X, who was zealous like his namesake, Innocent XI, in bringing back decayed religious life to the sanctity of its institute. This philippic is an item among his perquisites.

As the Spanish doctor, Canales, had insinuated, when he said that "the evil was spread into the Indies," it is from the fringes of Christendom that the most dreadful accounts are forwarded; and not merely by partisans who are working for private ends, but by the persons most gravely concerned in the responsibilities of the situation, with documents signed and countersigned—from Canada, Malacca, from Cochin China, from Mexico, from Yucatan. One almost doubts at times, whether he is reading of things that occurred one or two hundred years after the Council of Trent, or of things which went before, and prepared the apostasy of the nations. Nor is Europe wanting in its elegies. A grave publicist, a Count, writing from Venice to Chigi, Alexander VII, proposes drastic measures for the reform of the Church. St. Vincent de Paul, in a very beautiful and eloquent letter, tells Innocent X, of the decadence of Christian life in France. And so in other parts; and these things are grave.

We may reasonably suppose that no one meant to be comic. But for the refined sense of humour there is plenty of comedy, and to spare. The subject matter is furnished by the ambition to get deaneries, canonries, abbacies, bishoprics. One would imagine that not only the interested candidates were wide awake early every morning to take a survey of the situation, but that their fathers, their mothers (especially the fathers and mothers of baby candidates), all their brothers and all their sisters, were taking in bulletins every day of the likely demise, the imminent death, the unhappy convalescence, the lucky departure at last, of bishop, canon, abbot, of all the enviable prebendaries visible betwixt the rising and the setting sun. Now it is not the post, the place, the duty, the vocation, that are thought of in the least. It is only

the revenues. Sometimes there is a miscalculation, and the petition of the candidate or his supporter has arrived in Rome before the incumbent is actually dead. And stationery, ink, and patronage are lost.

Candidates for the episcopacy who write for themselves are not a rarity. One Englishman, Barclay, resident in France represents how important it is that an Englishman, who has made such sacrifices for the cause of religion in his native land—or rather whose father has done so—should now be appointed to the bishopric of Toul. Incidentally it transpires that he himself is the person thought of in that connexion. But he wishes to say that he is not going to curry favour with the French court by buying up the court-ladies all round. Not he! He wishes that "all the glory of his elevation shall redound to the honour of the Holy Father exclusively." (This, of course, would be a less expensive proceeding than buying up the ladies.) Meanwhile, others come in, or they are covered by those (presumably the lady-courtiers) who come in for them. The assiduity of the Englishman is charming. His letters lie through the tomes, like a line of advanced pickets—until there is silence. Somebody else has got it. Other bishoprics heave in sight; but the sprightliness of his ingenuity is gone. The last time when he appears over the horizon is when he announces in a letter, somewhat alarming for its tone of stern energy, that he is on his way to Rome to recover enormous damages from a certain Bishop, and from "a powerful religious Order," whichever that may be.[1]

With such a system of court-patronage prevailing, the embarrassment in Rome is naturally extreme.

[1] Here may be recalled the controversies between the Jesuits, Bellarmine and others, on one side, and the two Barclays, on the subject of Papal power.

When there is such a clamour all round, and all notoriously are interested, who is the man to appoint ? Then a queen intervenes, or a king signifies his likings, and political relations are not to be despised. There are not wanting grave admonitions, which the supreme authority of the Church directs shall be given, but in diplomatic style, to some crowned head or other ; conveying what in plain terms means that it is none of his or her business, why such or such a person was appointed rather than some favourite, and that the *momenta rationum* belong to the secrets of the Pope's conscience. These royal people may ask for preachers ; they may ask for confessors ; even the horrors of abbacies given *in commendam* may pass, because in its origin that was a salutary institution. But to manœuvre the bishoprics in behalf of men who only mind court levees or political concerns, and are first and last gallant gentlemen, that is just a little way beyond the reach of the royal prerogative.

An individual cries out to the Cardinal Secretary of State : " The abbacy of Santon is vacant ! I am not known to your Eminence." And he soon after confesses that he does not know the abbey either, never having had anything special to do with it. But he continues : " The abbacy is due to me *ex justitia*." And he excogitates the title of justice. Then he urges all haste, for " others are now working through their *fattori* [*agents*] to get it for themselves." Another, who describes himself as a very great *lector*, demands an abbacy for his pains, past, present and future—the future being especially in the service of his Eminence. It is noteworthy, how the adulation of this and other classes of men plays upon the chord, " the exaltation of your Eminence," hoping that there is a response in his inner heart to so delicate a suggestion of his becoming Pope some day.

But why talk about abbacies, or bishoprics, deaneries, canonries, or the post of preacher during Lent in some cathedral of distinction? It is within the range of some folk to pick off the cardinalate itself. An amiable fool of a lay-brother writes to the Pope, recommending the unnamed bearer of his letter. This bearer is a man engaged in profound researches for the philosopher's stone. His Holiness has only now to advance him to the dignity of Cardinal, and then the said investigator for the philosopher's stone, having become a Cardinal, will render unnamed services to the Holy See—when he has found the stone. Besides that, he will also do the pleasant writer himself a service by saving him from the tyranny of his superiors, who at present make his life very hard!

Here is the field for the attempted exploiting of cabals and their programmes; on the principle, doubtless, so familiar to agitators, that if they can only get the right ear from the beginning and keep it, they possess the key to the situation. If these restless people had ever conceived in their wildest flight of thought, that their papers would stand exposed on the table of students in a public hall, under the light of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, how many a cabal would have been still-born! A clique in Tuscany, laying its train, wants Cardinal Panzirolo to illuminate it with the smile of his favour, by pushing in their candidate at the impending election for a General, and then they say with a gush of abject devotion: "Your Eminence will be absolute *padrone* of him." The generalate of Religious Orders was quite a favourite object of ambition with the noble cousins, brothers, uncles and perhaps aunts, of likely subjects; and, in this as in other equally worthy causes, a stereotyped argument was that of the Cardinal's commanding the future services of the

fortunate creature, and being henceforth "absolute *padrone*" of the same.

It is altogether certain that some men had missed their vocation. Here is one who should have been a Yankee travelling agent on an American railroad. He is about to dedicate a book to His Holiness. He narrates how, being a man now of forty-five years' standing in his profession, he has come to understand St. Thomas. No one else in creation has ever yet understood him. He knows it all now; there is no mistake about it. And he just tantalizes the Pope by sketching the title-page, in which the inspiring idea is grovelling flattery of His Holiness. It would be passable, if the attempted sketch were, I do not say pretty, but barely decent. As it stands, it would not do credit to a schoolboy of only ten years' standing in the world of breathing things.

There is many a document of the style called memorials; many a narrative told of current events, of wars and intrigues; many a practical question expounded in theology or canon law. It sounds like an echo of our time, when a memorialist, writing from Germany in 1655, speaks at some length on behalf of Protestant pastors and preachers who wish to become Catholics, but whose conscience is checked by the insuperable objection of having a wife and children, and no prospective means of living, if they submit to the Church. The memorialist suggests a kindly remedy, that of providing a relief fund for the maintenance of the newly converted. Probably the question was left just where it stands to-day, and where God placed it; that He has a right to demand the sacrifice of all and of everything on the part of those who want Him. Another memorialist offers an ample scheme, which he begs the Pope to keep strictly to himself. It is a political programme, which might

be described as feudal-democratic-paternal-universal, subjugating the whole civilized world to the Holy See by a system very like the modern "armed peace" of Europe, but with several important variations. The Pope is to be the centre; he will have Cardinals placed in each of the great cities of the world; all kingdoms will be held by some kind of feudal tenure. But there is a democratic cast somehow on the affair; and the powerful government at Rome, while being of the paternal kind, will have at command the armed force of all against each, if any part thinks of rebelling against the central authority. The memorialist naively observes, that hereby the principle of authority will be preserved along with that of force.

III

As interesting a circumstance as any, in the history of documents, is the fate which awaits them. There they lie. And there they have lain, so many of them, since the day they were received. To be sure the greater number were acknowledged. Many among them have not only the endorsement, including a summary of their contents, but likewise a note of the answer to be given. Many others must have been simply ignored. For instance, the summarist writes: "N. N. to His Holiness about Padre N. N. He says that the Padre is a saint; that he always knew that the Padre was a saint; *ed altre semplicità*." Many are endorsed: "Postpone answering." Others of greater consequence: "Keep the letter till further instance be made." When a note like this appears on an important epistle from the faculty of Louvain, containing an urgent appeal for the defence of their privileges, one feels in the light of other correspondence

which is going on at the same time, that the Pope will use their claim for defence as a lever against themselves, against the Baianism, Erasmianism and other little peccadilloes which are giving him concern in the management of that great institution.

A Greek letter comes from a schismatic Bishop, recommending a certain missionary for a bishopric in Tartary. The Pope refers the matter to a Monsignore, who answers that he will examine the antecedents of the affair. Then comes a pretty exposure. It appears that the gentleman proposed had been involved in political intrigues in Tartary, and had made the place somewhat hot for himself; that recently, when he was back in Europe, and stayed awhile in Rome, he had been noticed here as going about with all the airs and ways of rather a fast secular, with little or nothing of the ecclesiastic about him; that formerly he had worked other wires to get himself appointed bishop; finally, concludes the secretary, this would seem to be only the old plan under a new guise.

The smooth Jansenist, Antoine Arnauld, comes forward from time to time, smooth and sleek, with all the humble and sweet devotion of a devout Catholic. He presents to the Pontiff his *Perpétuité de la Foi*. But never a word about Jansenism; though the tomes are just teeming with collateral accounts of what is going on in France, thanks to Antoine Arnauld and his clever little clique.

The gist of many an important principle is given in a note, either endorsed as the immediate answer of the Holy Father, or reported from some quarter to which he has referred it: "To Salamanca. The favour asked for by the Chapter cannot be granted, since the case expounded does not concern the necessities or utility of the Church, as is necessary, but only

the interest of a private family." To a petition from France, that the King's gift of a certain abbey *in commendam* may be confirmed in favour of a secular abbé, this principle is laid down as the basis of the reply: "The said abbey could be committed *in commendam* only in case the buildings were in a state of ruin, and then only for the purpose of restoring them; or in case the goods had been alienated, and then for the purpose of recovering them; and, even so, it could not be done without the consent of the Abbot General, along with an authentic attestation of the state of ruin into which the property had lapsed." Soon after appears a forcible remonstrance from the Abbot General of the Cistercians, detailing the untold evils into which the abuse of the *commendam* had sunk the monasteries of his Order. Since those times Divine Providence has so arranged that the titles and revenues of abbeys and monasteries go no longer into the pockets of courtiers, who sucked out the very life-blood of the Orders, and bloated themselves in luxury and dissipation.

However, we must not rest under the impression that there is nothing pleasant and edifying among so much that is weighty and distressing.

Sister Gonzaga writes from time to time about the beatification and canonization of her dear uncle, Luigi (Aloysius). The whole line of Visitation convents comes forth, on special invitation from Rome, asking for the canonization of St. Francis de Sales, and then thanking the Holy Father afterwards. The relations previously existing between the former Nuncio, now elected Pope, and his friends, are far from being broken off by his elevation. The physician asks about his health. Some maternal Duchess or Queen loves to say a word to her old friend. Two seasons are specially prolific in this respectful or

affectionate correspondence, which shows the great figure of the Vicar of Christ on his human side; the first, just after his election; and, secondly, every year at Christmas time. And no one seems beneath his kindly regard. He answers the humble nun in her convent; his old confessor, who has scarcely ventured to write; or a devout friend, who is suffering under some affliction. He is the father of all, and his supernatural dignity is thrown out into splendid relief in the reverence, devotion, affection, without flattery, that rises towards his throne from the Christian hearts of the faithful all over the world.

But perhaps these are specimens enough of the by-play in the great historical drama that unfolds amid the archives of the Vatican Palace.

VIII

JANSENISM AND SECULARISM: A NEW ERA [1]

I

A GENTLEMAN of Cambridge, Mr. H. C. Bowen, has published an account of the "Jansenists and their Schools." There are many features about the teaching of the Jansenists which the writer finds worthy of praise. There are other points about which he does not profess to know much, but which he considers must have been present in some laudable degree, even though appearances would show their existence improbable. A few of the characteristics he notes are decidedly Jansenistic, and these are highly lauded. But whatever the writer imagines to be distinctly Catholic or Jesuit, in the art of education, is introduced at convenient moments by way of reflection and contrast, to set off the superior wisdom of the Jansenists.

It so happens that the praiseworthy points are distinctively Catholic, though the writer does not know that. Thus the "watchfulness, patience, gentleness," exhibited in the "little schools" of the Jansenists, came from the practice of the schools whence the teachers themselves came. These teachers were a product of Catholic education, had lived in a thoroughly Catholic atmosphere, and, though rapidly becoming heretics, did not all at once cease to be

[1] From *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, June, 1894; abridged.

Catholic in their ways. The advice of the arch-Jansenist, St. Cyran: "Speak little, bear with much and pray still more," appears quite novel to the non-Catholic mind, yet it is quite normal in all Catholic systems of teaching and conduct. The writer states that "the masters never went to their classes without first praying God in private that He would bless their work. Men," he goes on to say, "who taught in this spirit, who set so high a value on love, and who strove in every way to develop the judgment and reason, were not likely, I think, to go far wrong."

Not everything, however, which still clung to the Jansenists from the days of their Catholic life meets with unqualified approbation. Thus the personal reserve with which a Catholic teacher, and still more a Religious consecrated to God, guards against undue liberties however slight, is made a subject of ridicule; it is pronounced "laughable, and partly vulgar in its suggestiveness." That is strikingly true to the Protestant mind, which considers it not respectable for an elegant person to think of sin as at all possible, or of vice as within any measurable distance.

But it is the out-and-out Jansenistic traits that appeal directly to the Protestant's religious tastes. "It is very noticeable," says the critic, "that, though religious services abounded at Port-Royal, the children, both boys and girls, were never forced to attend. They were not even begged to go to the services unless they felt a real inclination to do so. Above all things, hypocrisy was to be avoided." Exactly! Hypocrites are ever so sensitive on the subject of hypocrisy. He continues: "And further we find Sainte-Euphemie (Jacqueline Pascal) stating that 'the little sisters make their own prayers, according to their devotion and as God inspires . . . we do not burden them with a great number of oral and mental petitions.'"

These poor little girls must have been advanced contemplatives. The Our Father, the Hail Mary or the Beads would have been too common for this religion—vulgar perhaps in the suggestiveness that their souls were not aristocratic enough in the kingdom of God. The same hypocritical conceit revealed itself in the infinite care with which all signs of approbation were to be withheld from the children—all rewards, all incentives to emulation—lest their hearts should be touched by vanity or self-conceit.

II

Started as an educational system at Port-Royal des Champs, near Versailles, in 1643, the Jansenistic method operated, in the course of its protracted existence, upon the very extraordinary number of not more than fifty children, boys and girls all told. This extraordinary number of not over fifty, according to the testimony of Sainte-Beuve, was distributed in four or five establishments of which Port-Royal was only one. The classes of boys contained only five or six pupils each; those of the girls still less. And the protracted existence, to which we have alluded, extended over the very considerable period of "less than seventeen years." In 1660 they passed out of existence. It were worthy of a philosopher's mind to discover the secret by which an insignificant parasite, such as Jansenism, could manage to get itself mounted in the museum of history with greater splendour and in a more prominent place than the whole body of the Catholic Church, with all the limbs and members of her religious teaching Orders taken together. Perhaps because it is dead. But in fact Jansenism is not dead; it lives in a prolific posterity. And this

is precisely the reason why it is so splendidly mounted. As the Romans of old did with the statues of their fathers in funeral processions when they marched out from under the hills of eternal Rome, and vaunted the glories of the multiple generations already buried while they interred the latest, the melancholy train of free-thinkers and innovators, of sceptics and revolutionists, wind round under the shadow of the Catholic Church and her institutions, and they bury and are buried, and there is no end to their dead idols or their processions.

In this respect the graces of Jansenism coincide very much with those of J. J. Rousseau. This philosopher had never been at school himself, and had never had a child to send to school. Hence, neither as son nor as father did he know anything of education. Yet he has become the legislator by excellence for all schools; and the revolutionists of the Convention decreed the honours of the Pantheon to his ashes, because he was the legislator of "the only code of education sanctioned by nature." It was very much the same with Port-Royal.

Having no other consistency than that of a theological club, or a vestry of souls altogether *élite*, Port-Royal was always essentially a centre of opposition —its doctors and its nuns alike. It meant opposition to the Pope in point of religious subordination and doctrine; opposition to the whole hierarchy of France; opposition to the Government. It was a focus of resistance and "independence"; and it has been canonized by all free-thinkers and secularists ever since, who forgive the Jansenists the Catholicity which clung to them personally, in view of the sublimer gifts of "independence" and rebelliousness, which have since been wonderfully perfected by evolution. This theological vestry cultivated a breed of notions

which, like a plague of insects, it sent over a Christian nation to fly chiefly by night; or, if any flew by day, they were to do so in profound secrecy, and were to be made known as profound secrets. "I have lent to our poor children of Sainte-Marie," writes the Jansenistic lady, Mme. de Sévigné, "a book with which they are charmed: it is *La Fréquente* [*the book on Frequent Communion by the Jansenist, Arnaud*]; but it is the greatest secret in the world!" Abounding in the gift of mutual admiration, they cried: A miracle! at every production of the two gifted men belonging to the sect, Pascal and Nicole, and at productions of the rest of the *coterie*. Eyes and ears, particularly those of women, were at once directed to the meteoric splendour, or intellectual harmonies of any new lucubration—especially as it was all so secret, and the meteor was to be seen by peeping at it in the dark, the women going into ecstasies. Though condemned officially by the Church in France, Jansenism attracted the sympathies of all the parliaments in France, and, for that matter, of all the ecclesiastical Gallicanism of France, that is to say, of the nationalism which, whether parliamentary or clerical, was ever anti-Roman, anti-Papal. In its infinite piety and profound reverence for the Sacraments, it objected to their being profaned; it manœuvred to have them neglected; and so fell in line with all libertinism. Devoted to innovations in every line, it contended at every point with the Jesuit methods of education, and so won a special party of adherents, whom a common hatred bound together, if not any mutual love. Standing in need of the crowd as well as of the women, it brought theology and the most abstruse questions of controversy out into the arena of everyday literature, as St. Gregory of Nyssa reported of the Arians, thirteen centuries before, that they had

dragged theology out and down into the glare and glories of the shop, the market and the forum of private judgment. Original in nothing, except its solidarity and secret methods of practising insubordination, it poured out from the press new works in French prose, from the common Latin treasury of Catholic literature; and translating the thoughts of other men into French, without acknowledging the source, it was thought phenominally erudite. In particular, with regard to French style, De Maistre remarks, that the Jansenistic school wrote in the infancy of French prose, and thus found it quite easy to get among the first in merit, when they were among the first in date—as Elizabethans could do with English prose.

Puritanism under Cromwell begat licentiousness under Charles II. The same occurred in France, with the Puritanism of the Jansenists. But it operated in a more organized fashion, being more of a constitutional disease, which reached to the heart of the nation; and it prepared a more terrific result in that general subversion of society which was to ensue. We have not space to follow out the process by which a new educational policy, that of mathematics and encyclopædism, supplanted classical and ecclesiastical studies; the process by which the *philosophes* of the eighteenth century, taking pagan notions out of their classic authors, undermined therewith the entire method of classical education and a solid formation of the mind. The fact is that, as the eighteenth century ran its course, speculative philosophers of the pagan type added their strength to Gallicans and to Jansenists, to parliaments and to revolutionists, and would have everything reconstructed anew.

It is sad to think that the secluded religious life itself did not escape the virus of Jansenism; and

only some three Orders are noted by Montalembert as having escaped the action of an inevitable decline. And decline meant the loss of their influence on the passing generations. The ascendancy of the ninety Jesuit colleges was bitterly resented, until they were swept away. A multitude of private schools, now called " academies " for the first time, were conducted by private irresponsible individuals, who offered as a programme of studies a system completely inverting all traditions of Catholic teachers. Physical culture and the social accomplishments held the first place in the programme ; there was riding, fencing, dancing, polite manners, with mathematics, history and geography. Every light accomplishment and pedagogical dissipation took the place of strict discipline, of order and the practice of thoroughness in mental formation. The young exquisites who were brought up in these private domiciles did what they liked under the immediate care of governors, whose authority was little and morality dubious. In short, they received neither the solid education heretofore professed in the religious houses, nor that masculine temper which was imparted by the public education of the universities, conducted then, as always hitherto, under ecclesiastical supervision. It was clear that a generation was growing up in whose culture a revolution would find apt material to assimilate, and in whose mental and moral helplessness the reign of anarchy would run through a splendid cycle of existence.

The chemist Chaptal, in his report to the First Consul Napoleon on the condition of public education, stated that among the causes of irreligion was the " philosophical spirit, foreign to the colleges, which had developed itself boldly, in the numerous private schools, in the academies, in the reunions of free

thinkers, who propagated, in spite of the Government and priests, the terrible principles whence issued atheism and anarchy." Now atheism alone, as De Maistre remarks, is a very inert principle; "it rots in silence and scarcely attacks authority; but . . . being united in our age with a principle eminently active, the revolutionary spirit, this formidable amalgamation has lent it an air of activity." Atheism and revolutionary agitation combining together explode in the most terrific form of that fanaticism which Donoso Cortes characterizes well when he says: "Fanaticism always advances by the suppression of all opposing forces; philosophical fanaticism suppresses ideas; historical fanaticism suppresses facts; political fanaticism suppresses men.

III

Educational fanaticism suppresses the rising generation. It does so under the pretext of enlightenment and liberty. Whether disapproving or not the policy of a blood-red revolution, it carries into effect identical principles. "It is necessary to form free men for the Republic; above all, men who are friends of equality; it is necessary to protect young minds from the impure breath of prejudices. . . . Now the youth of France will not be completely broken to the yoke of equality (*faconée au joug de l'égalité*), except in a system of education uniform and common." So spoke Duplantier, one of the orators under the Directory; and he developed his plan of forced or compulsory education (*de l'éducation forcée*).

We have advanced far beyond the Revolution. The spirit of these times, in education at least, was altogether tame compared with the spirit dominant in our days.

"Fanaticism suppresses ideas; suppresses facts; suppresses men." The tyrants of the Convention and of the Directory could with only the utmost difficulty bring themselves, and a Christian people, to adopt even a small portion of an educational system, which in the course of a century's incubation of revolutionary ideas has become so natural that we scarcely notice its complete disagreement with the primary ideas of Christian enlightenment and liberty. We are in the age of secularism, mature, settled and systematic.

Let us sketch briefly the features of this educational organism in embryo. The likeness is striking between its embryonic promise and its fulfilment in maturity. The main lines are: A department of public instruction, compulsion, official normal schools to turn out the true breed of teachers, centralization, monopoly. As somehow Catholic schools have never been successfully suppressed, the plan of campaign has aimed at the reduction of Catholic education to the level of a repeating agency—repeating methods, plans, programmes, examinations, terminology and, if possible, repeating the immorality too, though the results on this last score have never satisfied expectations.

In 1791 the notorious ex-Bishop of Autun, Talleyrand-Perigord, made a report to the Constituent Assembly. He spoke in the name of the Committee of the Constitution. He said: "The public powers are organized; liberty, equality exist in the safe keeping of the law; property has fallen back on its proper basis; and yet the Constitution might seem incomplete if there were not attached to it, as a conservative and vivifying part, *public instruction*." Here was a momentous word which was to resound with thrilling reverberations in bureaus, ministries,

departments, all through the coming nineteenth century. The speaker proceeded to cast a glance, rapid and terrified, at the "nullity or the innumerable vices of what hitherto had been called instruction; at those blind and barbarous prejudices which, ever throwing us back to that epoch when all knowledge was concentrated in the cloisters, would seem still, after more than ten centuries, to destine the universality of citizens to dwell in monasteries." He would have the constitution and the declaration of rights be the basis of all instruction. Still, as the last proposal in a long programme, he laid down the principle of freedom of education, that is to say, of liberty for persons to teach, and of scholars to be taught, as people thought fit.

The National Assembly in 1792 listened to the philosopher Condorcet. Everything was to be new in the project, which he brought forward. Physical science was the one element indispensable, even in primary schools; "were it only to save the population from sorcerers and the inventors or narrators of miracles." He would have a representative form of government established in the schools of children. He admitted the necessary independence of all educational establishments; nevertheless it was necessary that primary grades should be entirely in the hands of the public authority. This was astute enough. For, if children are once corrupt, they can safely be allowed to go anywhere afterwards; and not even corrupt teachers are necessary adjuncts in the vocation which is common to both.

But all this was going ahead too rapidly. Nothing whatever came of these dreams.

The Convention followed, and the reign of terror. Petit cried that schools of republicanism must be set up for the fathers, before we think of the children;

since republicanism must begin in the embryo of the species. Ducos called out for an education which should be common to all and forced upon all, that is, the education of liberty; for, said he, "We have to choose between home education and liberty. . . . As long as a common system of education has not brought rich and poor together, it is vain for the laws to proclaim holy equality." But all the oratory came to nothing. The new Constitution of 1793 guaranteed perfect liberty "to open courses and private schools in all parts of public instruction, and to manage them as people thought fit." However, soon Robespierre and some others again sounded the note of common and compulsory education. This was in the glorious Year I of the Republic.

In the Year II, as it was clear that liberty of education was a menace to all other liberties Danton contended, with all the force of his logic and his lungs, that it was time to recognize the great principle: "Children belong to the Republic before belonging to their parents. . . . We ought to say to parents: We have done enough for your affections; we do not snatch your children from you; but you cannot withdraw them from the national influence."

There was no end to reports and orations on the part of the Committee of Public Instruction; and no end to the advances, retreats, the aspirations and defeats of the embarrassed chamber of homicides, who, though they could guillotine the parents wholesale, could not manage to get at the children. In the Year III it was determined to abandon the fathers and mothers as incorrigible; "brought up well or ill," it was sagely decided to leave them as they were. But, as a middle term of compromise for getting at the young generation, without whom the Revolution would be put back half a century, a proposal of

Lakanal was gratefully accepted. It was to raise the right breed of teachers. Such was the origin of the official *normal schools*. The first essay in the line of this brilliant idea was not so happy. Fourteen hundred citizens, already properly tempered and of tried patriotism, attended the new institution, or normal school; but, after three months, fourteen hundred citizens clamoured for their passports and the payment of their travelling expenses home.

The official *Moniteur* declaimed: "Every one shall be republican in our Republic. We will punish the traitors who profess their hatred; and we will demand that every one shall profess love. Teachers, you shall make it germinate, or we will snatch from you the sacred deposit of the children of the country." It was decreed that no one should teach, unless married or a widower. This was to exclude priests and religious. In particular, woman teachers were to be won over to the republican doctrines; since the Republic could never stand if the minds and the hearts of French women were not conquered. "Cry, if you will, Oppression! Inquisition! What matters it, since these are but the cries of the enemies of our political regeneration!"

However, years pass by. The twelfth year of the new era has come. The atheistic schools are vacant; no teachers are available; the Catholic schools, suppressed in one quarter, spring up in another, and are thronged. With the utmost industry in applying circuitous methods, urging tortuous arguments, constantly repeating the same debates, and proposing new schemes, the idea of compulsory and of common education is still being hammered into the heads of the legislative body by the more progressive members. And, at length, a great figure appears on the scene, that of one who, himself a child of the Revolution,

brings a genius and a power of his own to accomplish the work of the Revolution. Napoleon Bonaparte will do with his educational code what he effects with his code of civil law—he will set up in practical working order an ideal rule or law, which other nations will embody in their life or will copy. First, he centralizes and monopolizes all education in his Imperial University. Then, as even he does not succeed well—for the private and ecclesiastical schools in which the Catholic laity and the clergy are brought up will not be put down—he tolerates them ; but he makes them mere annexes of his own system, and so corrupts them.

The Imperial University was an institution without example so far in the history of the world. But all Bureaus, Ministries, Departments, Boards of Education or Public Instruction in the present century represent with more or less efficiency its essential idea. The first article of its Constitution, as presented to the Legislative Body of the Empire by Fourcroy in 1806, reads thus :

" Article 1. There shall be formed, under the name of Imperial University, a body charged exclusively with the public instruction and education of all the Empire."

In his explanation of the project, the orator explained that the purpose " was to consolidate the new institutions, to bind their different parts together ; which necessitated the formation of a teaching body for all the Empire ; and a single head should have the entire superintendence and direction."

Then, in 1808, followed an imperial decree establishing the monopoly as complete as that of salt in Italy or Bengal ; and it contained the following articles, disfranchising private or ecclesiastical schools :

" No school, no establishment of instruction, whatsoever it be, can be formed outside of the Imperial

University, and without the authorization of its chief.

"No one can open a school, or teach publicly, without being a member of the University, and a graduate of one of its faculties."

There were no half measures here. In the Convention and National Assembly, in the Legislative Body under the Directory, there had been question only of a national conscription of the children: "You do not hesitate," pleaded one of the orators with them, "to levy the youth of the country and send them forth in arms for its defence; then why do you hesitate to levy the children of the country into the schools? There is a greater cause at stake here!" They had played with projects of elementary books, and catechisms on the rights of man and the constitution, and what not! But now their scheme is a great imperial fact, a drag-net thrown round the whole nation from which escape who can!

The *fonctionnaires*, or public employees, were the first to report. They filled the new *Lycées*, and occupied all the free burses with their children. They were the first, and practically the last. So villainous and notorious was the corruption of the youth in the imperial schools, with new development of student life not heard of before, secret societies, suicides and forms of crime, the like of which, a grave author says, had not been known even in pagan antiquity, that the private schools and those under ecclesiastical management grew, multiplied, flourished. Bonaparte had established the monopoly, but it had failed, because of his duplicity; he had been trying at the same time to act the part of a Catholic sovereign, restoring religion and the Church in France. Now he threw off the mask, as he had reason to do, for he had the Sovereign Pontiff in prison.

An imperial decree of 1811 wiped out the line of demarcation which separated private from public schools, levied a tax in the shape of children on the private schools to fill the ranks of the others, and settled by a stroke of violence what was impossible through any other means: "The chiefs and faculties cannot keep any boarders in their houses above the age of nine years, as long as the number of boarders required by the *Lycée* or College established in the same city, or place of residence, is not yet complete. The chiefs and faculties shall be considered only as repeating the instructions of the *Lycées* (*comme des répétiteurs de l'enseignement des Lycées*), to which they will be required to send the boarders who remain with them. These boarders shall wear the military uniform of the *Lycées*." Thus one hundred municipal centres were reduced to subjugation by the despot. Other institutions, beyond the reach of these centres, were reduced in another way; they were forbidden to reach at all above a certain low grade. Similar measures, and even more severe, were taken with ecclesiastical seminaries.

It was high time for the tyrant to be overthrown and sent to Elba. But the system was not overthrown. The few stray lines we have drawn of the first scene in a most interesting modern drama show the unmistakable characteristics of a policy to which in our day we have grown habituated and callous. The spirit which engendered these developments, and the developments themselves carried on to a much higher degree of perfection, have become the history of an entire century. The decadence of the religious sentiment has facilitated the increase of new kinds of educational tyranny, whether exercised by the dominant will of imperialism or the equally dominant will of an intangible multitude. Compulsion and secularism,

centralization and monopoly, have mingled as native ideas with free, liberal and progressive thought at the close of the nineteenth century. And perhaps one of the most distressing circumstances that we have to note is the apparent helplessness with which our Catholic schools in divers countries, whether under compulsion or not, have come to *repeat*, like mere echoes, the systems and methods and programmes and terminology of an irreligious and false pedagogism, "national" or amateur, as if we had anything to learn from it, or had learnt nothing from our own ancestry.

Bowen, H. Courthope, *The Jansenists and their Schools*; cf. *Educational Review* (New York), December, 1893.—De Maistre, J., *De l'Eglise Gallicane*, ch. vi.—Montalembert, Le Comte de, *Monks of the West*, Introduction, ch. vii, "Decline."—*Documents concernant la Compagnie de Jésus*, III, "*De l'Université Nouvelle, Fille Ainée de la Révolution*"; 1828.

For the progress of compulsion in the United States, see the original article.

IX

A BABY'S FOOTPRINT AND OTHER VESTIGES [1]

A Review of high standing has recently permitted a physician to show how the footprints of a very young infant exhibit vestiges of the arboreal habits in its ancestors; and again, how the child's grip substantiates the same conclusion.[2] The last August meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science presented quite an animated scene on "Monkey Day," when, in the Anthropological Section, the same doctor entertained his admiring listeners with further particulars of his admirable researches.

It is well known that the scientific theory of evolution has been based, from the beginning, on the existence in organic beings of a universal analogy or likeness, which is certainly quite demonstrable. Hence, the theory has also been proposed as demonstrable that, given a resemblance between two or more beings, their origin must have been the same; and, given a universal analogy in all organic nature, all organisms must have had the same origin, either descending from the same ancestor, or somehow from one another. Thousands of years ago this argument had been used by Anaxagoras. But then the application of such premises to draw such conclusions was sporadic; nor

[1] From *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January, 1893 (vol. XVIII), pp. 19–41; abridged.

[2] *The Nineteenth Century*, November, 1891; May, 1892; Dr. Louis Robinson.

had it to wait for Christianity to weed it out of philosophy. Aristotle could see that resemblance between beings did indeed mean a plan common to them. But oneness in the plan did not, of necessity, mean a mutual or common descent of one species from the other, or of all from an identical stock. One plan simply meant one mind to conceive it and to execute it. Nevertheless, an identical theory of no creative mind having conceived, planned and executed, but of organisms having grown and differentiated by some chance, functions and uses proceeding fortuitously, is the deliberate culture to-day of exact scientific thought. The fund of demonstrative proof is still the same as that which Darwin invested in the enterprise. The fund of proof is simply the likeness of all organisms in certain fundamental principles, and some bare possibility, not substantiated in fact, that individual variations may have originated all the profound specific distinctions.

The state of mental conviction arrived at in the course of demonstration is not yet so absolute, but that "belief" may be allowed some play; and it is judged to be quite consonant with the exactions of strict science. In fact, it is candidly urged in favour of "belief" that it is all we can bring to bear upon the subject, and therefore belief is conviction! So Mr. Romanes, in the last section of his latest work, writes thus: "In popular writings, we often find it taken for granted that any scientific doctrine is then only regarded as scientific when it is demonstrated." [1] We must admit that we had been labouring under this impression. He goes on to warn us that, although, "we should ever strive for the attainment of better evidence, scientific caution of such kind must not be confused with a mere ignorant demand for impossible

[1] Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Man*, ch. xvii, p. 437.

evidence." Then he proceeds: "If, as Bishop Butler says, 'probability is the very guide of life' [*Yes, of life*!] assuredly no less is it the very guide of science; and here, I submit, we are in presence of a probability so irresistible that to withhold from it the embrace of conviction (!) would be no longer indicative of scientific caution, but of scientific incapacity." This pathetic pleading, translated into common language, signifies that since he, a capable scientist, has devoted four hundred and thirty-seven pages to the proof of Man's "Mental Evolution," without succeeding in proving it, and without hope of doing any better, then if you will not accept it after all that, and believe it with an absolute conviction of its truth, you are scientifically incapable. It is you that are stranded; not the theory.

We intend, however, to use a little philosophy and logic, or what we may call some philosophical criticism on the merits of the case.

I

Most of the lines of special investigation, or, as we should rather call it, of very general and loose illustration, converge to-day on the human infant as an intermediate term in the progress of specific development from the brute up to man. In whatever direction we look, we find the hapless infant pursued and held down as an indispensable intermediary between man and the brute. It used to be the savage who enjoyed the exclusive right of entertaining science, as at a half-way house. But his demands have proved exorbitant; and the infant, a poor harmless creature who cannot speak for himself, has been installed along with him. The savage has shown

himself so hard-headed, his brain is so big, and altogether his frame is so far gone in humanity, that a complaint is now being raised, and a longing expressed for the "genuine" savage, who—it is plaintively put—is fast disappearing from the world. Thus one specialist expresses himself: "In Africa, as well as in Asia and America, native races are in danger of losing their primitive characteristics, if not of total or partial extermination, and there the anthropologist and naturalist must take the earliest possible opportunities for their researches." [1]

As competent authority induces belief, and, according to Mr. Romanes, belief is scientific conviction, let us listen for a moment to the most distinguished of authorities, speaking at the latest Anthropological Congress in Vienna. Professor Virchow spoke thus on the occasion:

"Since the Darwinian theory of the origin of man made its first victorious mark, twenty years ago, we have sought for the intermediate stages which were supposed to connect man with the ape. The proto-man, the pro-anthropos, is not yet discovered. For anthropological science the pro-anthropos is even a subject of discussion. At that time, in Innsbruck, the prospect apparently was that the course of descent, from an ape to man, would be reconstructed all at once; now, we cannot even prove the descent of the separate races from one another. At this moment we are able to say that, among the peoples of antiquity, no single one was any nearer to the apes than we are. At this moment, I can affirm that there is not upon earth any absolutely unknown race of men. The least known of all are the people of the central mountainous district of the Malay Peninsula; but otherwise

[1] *Scientific American Supplement*, August 13, 1892, p. 13857; from Mr. John Evans, F.R.S.

we know the people of Tierra del Fuego quite as well as the Esquimaux, Bashkirs, Polynesians and Lapps. Nay, we know more of these races than we do of certain European tribes—I need only mention the Albanians. Every living race is still human ; no single one has yet been found that we can designate as simian or quasi-simian. Even when, in certain ones, phenomena appear which are characteristic of apes, e.g., the peculiar ape-like projection of the skull in certain races, still we cannot say that these men are ape-like."

The savage being thus found an unconscionable truant, the innocent baby has been impounded. He is the nearest human being to what the savage ought to be, and to what the brute is. Mr. Romanes' work, on *The Mental Evolution in Man, or the Origin of Human Faculty*, turns mainly upon this point.

The Darwinian, then, endeavours to show that there is a perfectly continuous line of development from brute intelligence to infant intelligence, and thence to the adult human intellect. By way of a frontispiece he adorns his book with a diagram in which human life is seen parallel with lower organic life. There we may see the individual existence checked off into various stages of progress, or into what is called "ontogeny" and "ontogenetic development." It begins at a stage corresponding to mere protoplasm, with movements only protoplasmic. Thence, an advance is made to non-nervous, and then to partially-nervous adjustments, corresponding to the stages of divers unicellar organisms, and those other creatures which owe their genesis to Professor Haeckel's intuition, viz., "unknown animals." This valuable, and we might say indispensable element is soberly put down by Mr. Romanes in his diagram thus: "Unknown animals, probably cœlenterata, perhaps extinct." Such words would be remarkable if they were less

familiar. But, if the vulgar mind cannot comprehend such terms as "unknown," "probably," "perhaps," in a solemn chart which sums up, not only dogmatically but diagrammatically, the creed we are to believe, then such a feeble mind is "scientifically incapable," for want of two essential qualities in a successful evolutionist—one, that of grasping facts which are "unknown"; the other, that of grasping them as certain, when they are covered by the terms, "probably," "perhaps."

The diagram continues: "The infant's life advances through no less than twenty-eight stages before emerging into human life at the advanced age of fifteen months. During its "ontogenetic" progress of actual individual development it has passed successively through the somewhat slimy companionship of echinoderms, mollusks, birds, elephants, apes, dogs. And it is only by graduating through all these organic and intellectual steps of equivalence that it becomes organically and intellectually of the human kind. Now, it is argued that there has been no break anywhere in this march of equivalence, or, let us say, analogical resemblance, to various orders of the brute creation. There has been no gap whereby, at any given stage, it was separated from the next. The infant just merged into the next, or emerged. And all this was in correspondence with species in the lower creation, each individual step or stage of "ontogeny" in the single creature corresponding with some specific step in the general world, or, as Professor Haeckel has it, with some stage or species of "phylogeny." Neither, when it enters on the human sphere, properly so called, does it do so by any leap over a chasm to become a distinctively human being. Therefore the conclusion.

There is a twofold conclusion. One was settled long ago by Professor Haeckel, when he formulated

the law of " biogenesis," or life-development generally, that species have evolved from one another (" phylogeny "), as we see any particular organism evolving in its own individual life (" ontogeny "). According to him the reason for this is, because each individual's life, he says, is an epitome of all the successive specific changes that its ancestors went through to reach the level on which the modern individual now stands. We pray the reader not to ask for any more reasons at present.

The other conclusion is, that the infant passes from " the zero level of mental life " to the fullness of human intelligence, and, therefore, in the infant we have " the passage from one order of psychical being into another," " without any sudden leap of progress." In short, the baby is representative of an intermediate phase of intelligence between brute and man. He ranks with the savage. It is on this thesis that Mr. Romanes, the devoted disciple of Mr. Darwin, expends a work of four hundred and thirty-nine pages—*The Mental Evolution of Man.*

Let us, by all means, fix our attention on the savage and the baby as representatives of " the intermediate phases of intelligence " between the brute and human creations. Our prejudices should not make us reluctant to look with a calm eye on whatever conclusions an irrefragable science enjoins. Such prejudices could be based only on certain prevalent opinions, like that laid down by Dr. Kidd, who says that, if any state " could be pre-eminently called man's natural state, it would be that of civilization " ; and this for many reasons.[1] And there is another opinion widely prevalent, that every organism, no matter of what kind, is to be judged of by its normal and developed condition, not by its state of

[1] *Bridgewater Treatise*, Introduction, § 1.

incipiency—which has no meaning, except with reference to the end toward which it is tending. It is from such opinions as these, no doubt, that the prejudiced habit of thinking is formed, which declines to look upon the infant as typical of anything, and as intelligible only in the light of his future adult manhood; and declines to regard the savage as anything else but adult man, who has degenerated from civilization, and happens to lack the opportunities of returning to that state. Hence have arisen the objections to accepting the infant and the savage as "intermediate phases of intelligence" between themselves, truly men, and the brutes, which neither degenerated from manhood nor will ever develop into it.

But, with a stroke of his pen, Mr. Romanes cancels these objections, or prejudices. He says that, if you insist on contrasting adult civilized man with the brute you can never prove evolution; the difference is enormous—possibly he means it is a difference of kind; but if you take the savage and the baby, the difference will not appear so enormous—you may pass it off as one of degree. Therefore, in almost the last words of his book, he craves your indulgence pathetically, and takes dogmatically savage and baby to be intermediate phases.[1]

But at the very beginning of his book, he had made a postulate of this, which he was going to ask for as a grace at the end, to wit, that the baby begins as a brute, at what he calls the "zero level" of intelligence, and ends as a man. He said: "It is unquestionable that human psychology, in the case of every individual human being, presents to actual observation a process of gradual development, or evolution, extending from infancy to manhood; and that in this process, which

[1] Romanes, *The Mental Evolution of Man*, p. 438.

begins at a zero level of mental life and may culminate in genius, there is nowhere and never observable a sudden leap of progress, such as the passage from one order of psychical being to another might reasonably be expected to show. Therefore it is a matter of observable fact that, whether or not human intelligence differs from animal in kind, it certainly does admit of gradual development from a zero level. This I posit as a second consideration." [1]

Here, then, on the threshold, he requires us to admit as a postulate what is the thesis of his whole book: that the "zero level of mental life" in the infant may be the same in kind as mere brute intelligence; and, since there is a gradual progress, therefore mental evolution in man has been gradual from the level of the brute. Upon this postulate and three others, similar in kind both as to matter and as to logic, he "proceeds to consider, as carefully and as impartially as he can, the arguments" to be adduced in behalf of his thesis.

It is quite superfluous labour, as he seems to imply. For these postulates create, he says, "so immense a presumption on *a priori* grounds" that, like other wise evolutionists, he could have postulated the whole at once, and have confined himself to merely illustrating his assumption with diagrams—an occupation which would have been less ambitious and more entertaining.

Now, what has all this to do with "vestiges"? Why, on this theory, the infant is a bundle of vestiges, not only in his footprints, which Dr. Robinson will now illustrate, but in all his frame and intellectual development. The word "vestige" means a footprint of someone who has gone that way before. Here it signifies a residual trace, in the human frame

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

and intelligence, of some stage they have passed through to become what they are.

II

A Dr. Louis Robinson has contributed, as we noted before, some original researches to the *Nineteenth Century*. He shows us views of a baby's footprint, and adds some views of his own intelligence. With the help of the latter he makes the former quite interesting. He finds that the soft and tender cartilages, and the very pliable joints of an infant's foot make it much more supple and limber than the foot of an adult. Hence in the footprint, which with considerable art he has stolen from the little innocent by the instrumentality of some unholy mixture of soap, lampblack, syrup and blue-black ink, he discovers certain creases which he characterizes as remarkably similar to those of the hand. We already begin to apprehend the very recondite character of these researches. For, of course, it could never have occurred to anyone before that the five toes of a foot were analogous, some way or other, to the five fingers of a hand, that the great toe and thumb might possibly suggest a metaphorical resemblance, and that the sole and other parts of the foot were somehow homologous to the palm, etc., of the hand. If these analogies in nature had occurred to anyone before they would have stimulated only poetic imaginings. It takes a specialist of this kind to extract scientific conclusions.

He concludes that the foot is a hand. He sees the footprint, not of a foot, but of a hand which has become a foot. He reads there the " vestige " of a grasping power which that organ had when it was a hand. The creases prove it.

He lays stress on certain muscles there, called the *lumbricales*. He can find no use for them, unless they are the result of a long-continued practice of clutching twigs, when the baby's ancestors climbed trees and ran along the branches. The same muscles appear in the hands. There too he fails to find any explanation for their presence, unless it be admitted that they were the outcome of the same ancestral habits—vestiges of monkey movements. In point of fact, these muscles are very fully developed in some of the anthropoid apes, and especially in the most bulky of them, the gorilla! Could any demonstration be more satisfactory!

The grasping power of the foot is not conspicuous in adult civilized man; the organ is not remarkably prehensile. This is easily explained. Civilized man has taken to wearing stiff shoes. Just as nature has provided purely terrestrial animals, those called "ungulates," with hoofs, man has gone about "protecting his feet with a stout covering like a hoof." Here the investigator becomes irresistibly witty. In presence of this exhibition of self-mutilation on the part of man, in getting an ungulate's hoof instead of keeping his simian claw, he suggests that "we might with some justice style him an *amateur ungulate*"—that is, a hoofed animal by predilection.

Having been facetious, the scientist grows severely scientific. If you do not accept his explanation of the origin and use of this elaborate muscular system —the *lumbricales*—in the human hand and foot, you commit yourself to a great absurdity. What may that be? It appears that the *lumbricales* in the human hand have been called by the older anatomists *fidicinales* ("fiddle-muscles"), because they enable the violin-player to bend his fingers with great rapidity

upon the strings of his instrument. Now, if you do not admit the doctor's explanation, you are probably one of those people who assert the existence of such a thing as design in nature. What design could you find here, except, forsooth, that of enabling man to play the fiddle? But this is very absurd. Hence they have merely grown, because our ancestors merely climbed trees.[1]

This is a good specimen of the merits of this school in the matter of logic. It cultivates successively the facetious, the scientific and the ridiculous.

There is still another point on which this writer dwells. It is the grasping or prehensile power in the baby's hand. It is well known that the infant tries to clutch everything. Grasping, almost as much as feeding, is a predominant passion with him. Now the physician calls our attention to the strength of the infant's grip. He tells us that a baby less than an hour old can lift himself by his hands and remain suspended on a stick or a man's finger; and that several babies three weeks old kept suspended thus, supporting their whole weight by the grip of their hands, during more than two minutes and a half. He challenges his readers to perform that feat of "muscular strength that would tax the powers of many a healthy adult!" Behold then in the infant a distinct vestige of his ancestor's climbing habits.

We will now take a recent summing up of evolutionary proofs from the side of anatomy. A writer has just presented to the public a *résumé* of the demonstration that man, but a short while ago, was a quadruped, and quite recently—he does not give the date—assumed the upright posture. The title of his article is "Man's Upward Struggle; a Résumé

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, May, 1892, p. 801.

of the Anatomical Proofs of Our Former Quadrupedal Character." [1]

He tells us that, in the body of the adult, the vestiges which he finds "speak quite as plainly of the comparatively recent acquirement [*by the human race*] of this ability [*to walk upright*], as do the efforts in this direction which lead finally to that power [*of walking upright*] in the creeping child!" The child first creeps, then walks. The race quite recently went on all-fours, and now walks.

He begins to prove his point by taking it for granted —he "recognizes" it! Then upon this supposition he proceeds to build up his exposition.

"In both man and the bee," he says, "we recognize [!] the late acquirement of self-reliance and the full powers of locomotion, as indicative of a higher final [*biped*] status in the animal scale, and as pointing to the fact that these powers have for long been of less value and lower rank in preceding generations," which went as quadrupeds. "Naturally, if this be the fact"—observe this formula, which is always a solid basis for further development and demonstrations, and requires no proof itself—"if this be the fact, we shall have no trouble in finding unmistakable indications of it within the human structure. And this we find upon a very cursory examination of the case." Here the reader would do well to observe this other formula, "a cursory examination of the case." It generally indicates, as with Professor Huxley, that the effort to prove is simply dispensed with. How unmistakable now are the indications of the vestiges which he most cursory examination reveals, showing that if man was a quadruped once, he has become a biped since, and that recently, we now desire to place on record.

[1] Dr. Aaron, *Scientific American Supplement*, August 13, 1892, 13856.

We are told that if a bear remain on all fours he can with difficulty be seriously wounded by the hunter; whereas, if he assume the erect position and gets up on his hind legs, as man has done, he will leave exposed, but a short distance under the surface, a number of most vulnerable points of his vascular system—the heart, for instance. Therefore, "the human vascular system, like that of our four-footed distant relatives, is best adapted for quadrupedal motion." This is the first proof of man's having been a quadruped and having become a biped, and that recently. Here the author does not remark that the habit of rearing himself erect on his hind legs is very foolish in our cousin the bear, especially when the hunter is pointing a rifle at him; and that it is in strict violation of certain assumed principles regarding the struggle for existence; and that for any quadruped to survive such reckless folly would be in violation of the principle regarding the survival of the fittest; and that, if any quadrupedal man thought of becoming a biped on such premises, he must have been killed off and eliminated long ago.

The gentleman goes on with his "proofs." There is a powerful system of ligaments required in the quadruped to bear the weight of the head projecting horizontally and to relieve the spine of an undue strain. This muscular system is called "*ligamentum nuchæ*." Now, he continues, the head being erect in human beings, and resting on the shoulders, needs no such powerful ligaments; and, in point of fact, they are found to be slender—sufficient, however, for the needs of the head. What does this prove? That man got erect recently. How so? Because this system of muscles "is no longer of much value in the erect position"; "unmistakable ruins of it" are found;

and, such as they are, " they are much more atrophied in man than in the gorilla and his congeners."

Again, the whole head and face of man is remarkably different from the same part in the apes. Man's head has an enormous brain capacity; the jaws do not protrude; the under jaw is particularly small; and the jaws and teeth, and the powerful muscles for using them, which are so characteristic of certain brutes as an effective apparatus for strife, are singularly deficient in man. Now, from the remarkable difference here between man and the lower animals, let us hear this demonstrator show that man got erect quite recently: " As the weight of the head with its enormous cranial capacity increased, the lower jaw has been forced under it and nearer the spine to aid in maintaining a better balance, and thus has resulted that decrease in the size of the under jaw which is the main characteristic of the civilized countenance," and, instead of teeth to bite our enemies with, our late civilization gets a big brain which will meet the needs of war in other ways. *Quod erat demonstrandum!*

Shall we go on? It will be useful, for the best in the literary and logical market of evolution is no better than this. The only point of difference between one exponent and another is that one brings a better style, or a cleverer way of cloaking fallacies, than another. The fund of logic and of facts remains the same in kind everywhere. Well, there are the molar teeth for grinding. There are vestiges of muscles for moving and wagging the ears. A lady in Philadelphia to-day can still wag hers, and has semi-simian, pointed ears besides. " She is thus seen," he says, " to be a partial reversion to an earlier type, though intellectually she belongs to the advanced ranks of her sex."

The vestiges thus far noted are either beneficial or at least harmless. There are others which are quite

inconvenient, in fact detrimental, remaining as they do when man, becoming a biped, has permanently assumed the erect posture. Had he remained horizontal, the blood would flow more regularly and safely, and some inert valves would come into play; the pumping of the blood up through one vein, and its descent through another, would be accomplished with more facility. Therefore this investigator concludes that man got erect recently. Most people have thought so too—that he has got up within the last twenty hours; and that when he is tired he will lie down again. Few persons have thought that man must be a quadruped in order to assume a horizontal posture, or that, because the whole vital system is under the strain of work while at work, man is out of his natural posture when he stands up to his business.

This is wearisome. But we will cite one "proof" more. He says: "The differentiation existing between the hand of man and the higher apes is too well known to call for more than a passing mention." That is to say, he admits as briefly as he can that they are altogether different. Forthwith he goes on to prove their original identity from their very differences: "The human hand is a rich field wherein to search for vestiges of the change that has taken place in an organ that, but a brief period back, was equally used with the feet for support, but which is now a purely prehensile appendage." That is all he has to say, and for once we agree. The human hand, being so entirely different from the ape's claw, is a rich field wherein to "*search*" for vestiges till doomsday, if one be so inclined; there is no voucher given that anyone will *find* them. The pleasure afforded by the occupation depends upon one's tastes. And so this learned scientific evolutionist closes his "hasty presentation," as he calls his thesis, by noting with erudite

fullness that because man's hands are hands, therefore his feet are feet. His way of putting it is this: "Their [*the hands*'] greater adaptation to the work recently assigned them [*of grasping*] has led to a coincident abortion of this power in the human foot [*which is not usually employed in grasping*], a power that is possessed in no mean degree by the monkey tribe." That is just what we had thought ourselves: hands are hands, and feet are feet, and claws are claws. But we are still waiting at the end of the "hasty presentation," as he calls his *résumé* of "anatomical proofs" for the original demonstration taken in hand that, whereas it is absolutely impossible for man to go as a quadruped on the ground or on the trees, either on all-fours or on four claws, or in any other way except as a walker, he became a walker, and that recently, and precisely because, according to Dr. Aaron, he was lately four-footed—a prowling quadruped—while, according to Dr. Robinson, he was lately four-handed—a quadrumanous climber.

The gentleman adds: "A recent article on the 'Decline and Fall of the Little Toe'[1] will be found interesting reading in this connection." We may follow his suggestion, when we have discussed a little the decline and fall of common sense.

III

We are not qualified to speak at all upon the subject. Mr. Romanes tells us so expressly: "The close anatomical resemblance that subsists between man and the higher apes—every bone, muscle, nerve, vessel, etc., in the enormously complex structure of the one coinciding, each to each, with the no less complex

[1] In *The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal.*

structure of the other—speaks so voluminously in favour of uninterrupted continuity of descent that, as before remarked, no one who is at all entitled to speak on the subject has ventured to dispute this continuity, as far as the corporeal structure is concerned.[1]

Gagged as we are then, we have only to let others speak; and we may slip in a word when not observed. While the "hasty presentation" given above, on a "very cursory observation," goes to prove that man's foot was once a hand, Professor Huxley's observation, as given in his book on *Man's Place in Nature*, has gone the other way, and shown him that the ape's hind hand was once a foot. "The most cursory anatomical investigation," says he, "proves that hind hand to be a foot." Here we have the spectacle, not altogether rare, of two evolutionists diverging, nor denying themselves the right of a very natural selection. Evolution has generally several ways to go, and sometimes it chooses all at the same time.

The ape has no foot. Neither has it a hand. It has four claws, neither more nor less. Prehensile organs they are, and splendid ones. Robinson quotes someone who calls them "grapnels." The one feature in the ape's prehensile organ which does bring it into close relation with the human hand is, we are told, the so-called "thumb"; but this, again, is not a genuine thumb: it is analogous to a human finger. The human thumb is without a parallel in nature. By it is secured, as Professor Huxley tells us, "the possibility of carrying into effect the conceptions of our mind."

The claw of the monkey is an organ of suspension rather than of touch; and it is not one of measure. Man's hand, on the contrary, is an organ of touch and

[1] *Mental Evolution in Man*, ch. i, p. 19, note.

measurement ; it is, as Blainville observed, " a sensitive compass with five points." Hence, when a monkey tests anything he does so by scratching it with his nail, not feeling it, as man does, with the tip of a finger. There are some indications in all this of a use which to the plain mind reveals a plain purpose.

As to those ligaments which Dr. Robinson noted had been called *fidicinales* we are not quite reduced to the sole alternatives of the forlorn dilemma in which he ingeniously left us. He had argued that we must consider the playing of a fiddle to be the fore-ordained purpose of this anatomical structure, or we must take his explanation—which seems to us slightly worse. Far better any purpose than none at all ; better believe that organic structures had some purpose, however obscure, than that they *grew*—that, not having any existence, they used themselves into existence and grew ! His dilemma rests on the very remarkable foundation that the older anatomists " called them *fidicinales* "—fiddle-muscles. Even Professor Huxley is a little broader in his views when he speaks of adaptations " to carry into effect the conceptions of our mind." " In the palm of the hand," says Sir Charles Bell, " and between the metacarpal bones, there are small muscles, *lumbricales* and *interossei*, which perform the finer motions, expanding the fingers and moving them in every direction, with great quickness and delicacy. These are the organs which give the hand the power of spinning, weaving, engraving ; and, as they produce the quick motions of the musician's fingers, they are called by the anatomist '*fidicinales*.' Attention to our most common actions will show us how the division into fingers, by combining motion with the sense of touch, adapts the hand to grasp, to feel and to compare." Quoting from Ray, Sir Charles continues : " Some animals have

horns, some have hoofs, some teeth, some talons, some claws, some spurs and beaks. Man hath none of these but is weak and feeble, and sent unarmed into the world. Why? A hand, with reason to use it, supplies the use of all these." [1]

So, in the foot, with its fifty-two bones, who does not recognize, by the force of his own personal experience, that some elaborate system of muscles can alone have adapted man to the various attitudes which are imposed upon him by the conditions of his industrial and social life, and are necessary for art as well as grace?

As to that brilliant specialistic observation that an infant wants to grasp everything, and that a baby three weeks old has such a grip as to hang suspended from a finger or a stick for nearly three minutes, it is of a piece with other foolish things which the learned physician adds about its taking a "curled-up position," while so hanging, or while sleeping—a position which, he has sagaciously observed, the young orangs and chimpanzees affect when sleeping. Not only is a vigorous imagination required to apprehend so many phrases to the effect that "it is possible," "it may be," "it might be," "it could, should, or would have been," but the double logical exploit is repeatedly performed of begging the whole question and of running round in a vicious circle. We only give an instance or two. The physician says: "Arboreal habits, either past or present, are to be predicated with absolute certainty, if there is any truth whatever in the laws of evolutionary development." Hence they are predicated with absolute certainty, on the strength of the supposition so postulated that evolution is true. Then he turns round, at the end

[1] *The Hand, Its Mechanism and Vital Endowments, as evincing Design; Bridgewater Treatise*, ch. iii, p. 60.

of the same article, and predicates the postulate with absolute certainty, on the strength of the supposition that arboreal habits were proved: "The cumulative weight of such facts as the presence in the human foot of the class of the *lumbricales* . . . and the persistence in the foot during infancy of many hand-like characters . . . impress on us the truth that, whatever our predilections may be, it is no longer possible to treat man as an exception in Nature's great evolutionary scheme." [1]

But a word more on some of the facts adduced. An infant's lips and tongue are the first organs exercised; the next motion is that of putting the hand to the mouth in order to suck it; and, no sooner are the fingers capable of grasping anything, than whatever they hold is carried to the mouth. The first office of the hand is to exercise the sensibility of the mouth.[2] If the child's grip is strong in supporting a weight, it is only proportionately so; that is to say because the body which it supports is still very light. It will not be so after a while. As Mr. Herbert Spencer tells us, the masses of similarly shaped bodies (for instance, that of the infant and that of the adult) vary as the cubes of the dimensions, whereas the strength, respectively, varies as the square of the dimensions. He says, suppose a creature which a year ago was one foot high has now become two feet high, while it is unchanged in proportion and structure, what are the concomitant changes that will have taken place? It is eight times as heavy; whereas the muscles and bones are severally but four times as strong as they were.[3] Hence when a man has grown to be five feet ten inches high, he can well afford to be staid and sedate; and not only be reluctant

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, May, 1892. [2] Bell, *ibid.*, ch. x.
[3] Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, vol. I, part II, ch. i, p. 12 .

to run about as he did when a boy, but also to hang suspended by a finger, as he might have done when an infant. Yet, says this wise scientist in a stupor of amazement, "a three-weeks-old baby can perform a feat of muscular strength that would tax the powers of many a healthy adult!" What he means is that a three-weeks-old baby can give an exhibition of bodily lightness which would tax the powers of every adult, whether healthy or not, to give. We agree. It would be very difficult for a ton to pose as a pound.

In the sense, then, of all science, the foot of man and the hind extremity of the anthropomorphic ape are two creations distinct and independent, each complete in its kind, and perfect in its accord with the invariable laws of mechanics and statics, whereby the ape is always a climber and man is always a walker. He is the only walker in the world bearing in his erect brow the sign of the aspirations which his reason entertains within. Other animals have four hands, or rather claws; or they have no claws, but paws; or they have hoofs and the like. Man alone is so built that he cannot go except on two feet. He can creep along as a child is said to go on all-fours. He might go on his knees and kneel—a function the infrequency of which in the scientific life has, no doubt, caused it to slip from the scientific mind. But by no possibility can he go as a quadruped.

If, to the materialistic mind, it is a scandal that there should be so striking an analogy among the species of living beings, unless we admit also a descent of one species from another, it is no stumbling block to the philosophic mind. All these "comparative" sciences that are waxing fat on the analogies of nature and catering to a materialistic sense, all this "comparative anatomy," "comparative physiology, or morphology, or psychology," only serve excellently

the purposes of a rational philosophy, which lays it down, as the Duke of Argyll has well said, that "never in all the changes of time has there been any alteration, throughout the whole scale of organic life, in the fundamental principles of chemical and mechanical adjustment on which the great animal functions of respiration, circulation and reproduction have been provided for. These are fundamental similarities of plan."[1] One plan! Reasonably. For a skilful designer not only has a plan, but he does not change a good one. And, if the designer is very wise, he conceives a plan very far-reaching indeed. So has the author of universal Nature done. He has conceived and executed a universal plan.

Robinson, Dr. Louis, "*The Nineteenth Century*," November, 1891; May, 1892.—Romanes, G. F., *Mental Evolution in Man, or the Origin of Human Faculty*.—Huxley, *On the Study of Biology; Man's Place in Nature*.—Kidd, Dr., *Bridgewater Treatise*, Introduction.—Bell, Sir Charles, *Bridgewater Treatise, The Hand, Its Mechanism and Vital Endowments, as Evincing Design*.—Spencer, Herbert, *Principles of Biology*.

For the speech of monkeys and their arithmetic, see the original article, here curtailed.

[1] Argyll, *Reign of Law*, ch. v, p. 269.

X

ANTHROPOLOGY: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH[1]

I

THE Greek word "*anthropos*" means man. Anthropology, then, is the science that has man for its subject, or at least undertakes to treat of man. The undertaking has been enough to confer on the Darwinian theory the dignity of being considered anthropological, although we shall have more than reason enough to see that Darwinistic science is indeed about man, but with man left out.

Taken in its broad and proper sense, anthropology is a branch of philosophy older than Aristotle. The study of man's living self, always the most interesting of investigations for the human mind, was placed by the Greek philosopher in his Physics. It was the substantial being, as visible, tangible and conscious, that was taken by him as his subject, and in this substantial being a substantial soul or psyche was included. The soul was no abstraction, nor was it any unknown force; still less was it any portion of the body. Rather, it was held that by the soul, in the first instance, was the body constituted as body. It was the immediate and adequate principle of all visible and tangible effects in the human compound.

The scholastic philosophers of the Catholic Church,

[1] From *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, July, 1893 (vol. XVIII), pp. 604–627; abridged.

when treating the same subject, expounded their doctrine about it under the title, *De Anima*; and this treatise, because it explained an ultimate constituent of a primary substance, was ranged under the dignified head of Metaphysics. Modern philosophers have treated the science of the soul in precisely the same was as the older scholastics. "Psychology" is the science of man, because the soul (*psyche*), if understood, explains all else in the human compound. It explains man as a vegetative or growing organism; it explains him as endowed with animal sensibilities; it explains him as an intellectual being capable of thought.

In recent years Scholastic philosophers, such as Sanseverino and Palmieri, have employed another term, Anthropology, or the "science of man," to denote the same department of Metaphysics; nor would the designation be incorrect if only it had prevailed. But, unfortunately, a singular, restricted and mutilated use of the term has now foreclosed any other employment of it, and it would appear that, from henceforth, true philosophers are debarred from designating Psychology as Anthropology. For what is now the prevalent meaning of the term? In Huxley's language it is "the study of man as a genus and species of the animal world, conducted with reference to no other considerations than those which would be admitted by the investigator of any other form of animal life."[1] Here it is evident that, as no other form of animal life has a spiritual or immortal soul, or is considered to lay claim to it, no human soul need be looked for in a study of this kind. It deals only with "considerations that would be admitted by the investigator of any other form of animal life."

[1] Huxley, *The Advance of Science in the Last Half-Century*, 1887.

In fact, to pick up at random some illustrations of the scientific fashions in vogue, one gentleman, an anatomist of Lyons, poses the very ample question: What are we? Whence? Whither? And then, replying to them, invites his audience to retire with him to the sacred retreat of a laboratory in the planet Saturn. There, apart from the biasing influence of passion and predilection, far removed from the clouds of such things as religion and revelation, he dissects human bodies, which in "the name of modern anatomy" he desires to place with scientific precision in the universe of things. And, as the final conclusion, this genuine disciple of the German, Haeckel, enunciates the proposition, that "man is a vertebrate animal, of the order of primates, of the family of *Hominiens*, the last product of evolution, latest link in the long genealogical chain that extends backwards even to those protoplasmic masses, whereof the Bathybius, so minutely described by Huxley, offers us one of the best specimens." It seems to make very little difference to originality and logic of this type that the Bathybius, thus posited as representative of the original link in the whole biological chain, should have been repudiated ten years earlier by its own progenitor, Huxley, as an unfortunate figment, which failed to make good the promise of its youth. But motes of that kind do not obscure the glorious vision of science down the unknown vista of unverified time. Again, a physiologist of Nancy opens his course with an erudite exposition of nervous evolution, and succeeds in explaining thereby "the transition of the microscopic drop of protoplasm to the human brain and to—thought." [1] All this indicates with sufficient clearness what is taken to be the scope of Anthropology, and how many sciences may be

[1] *Revue des Questions Scientifiques*, xxv, 358; 1889.

impressed into its service. It is the great "philosophy" of the latter end of the nineteenth century.

To make the matter clearer still, we shall give here the very satisfactory account of Professor Otis T. Mason.[1] He says: "A complete syllabus of Anthropology would include—first what man is, and secondly what man does." This division of the science about man is complete if the first member, "What man is," includes the question whence he comes, and if the other member, "What he does," includes whither he goes. Thus taken—and it is the sense of the syllabus that follows—Anthropology is seen to be commensurate with all philosophy and more.

Now these two members of the division the writer denotes by suitable appellations: "What man is, may be denominated structural anthropology; What man does, functional anthropology." This nomenclature is unfortunate from a logical point of view; for the terms, as derived from common usage, are altogether inadequate to cover the range of ideas conveyed. Structure is an attribute of an organized body only; function an exercise of merely organic activity; one anatomical, the other physiological. This is all that the terms denote, and it is all that the writer comes to mean in fact.

However, if the meaning and terms are alike inadequate to express the range of the science, they are perfectly adapted to determine the range of vision within which scientists confine themselves. The new science gives absolutely no place to the essence of man; and it omits accordingly the highest faculties of man—intellect and will. Nor does it omit them merely; it conveys a denial of them; since the names of the sciences that should denote them are studiously

[1] *Smithsonian Report*, 1890, "Progress of Anthropology in 1890."

diverted to senses that completely ignore them. The names of Religion, Philosophy and Science are dragged down to express phenomena of matter and force.[1] Such, then, is the new science of Anthropology; such the meaning made perforce to underlie its name. It includes philosophy, ethics and religion, without giving us a vestige of any. On the lines thus marked out, we may count in any current year, at present, as many as thirteen hundred works published of all sizes and in all languages.

II

The gross results of the pursuit thus conducted are precisely those which, looked at prospectively by Charles Darwin and his supporters, moved him to originate it and impelled them to follow it. Darwin's school have attained by means of this scientific fashion the end to which they aspired. That is summed up in the word Evolution or the development of all things from matter. Matter makes up man, it makes up the lowest form of rudimentary life, it constitutes the inorganic world that has no life, away to the stars and beyond; and it was before the stars were. It is all matter—arranged diversely everywhere. Regarding man particularly as compared with the animal life beneath him, the statement is peremptorily made: "The ingredients being the same, the difference must lie in the mixing."[2] Man is mixed just a little differently from the primeval living "moneron"; and in turn that protoplasmic speck is mixed a little differently from the gas in the sun and stars.

The line of development, from one extreme to the

[1] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 528.

[2] Edward Clodd, *Story of Creation*, ch. vii.

other, is traced with all the devotional fervour that throws a glow about the shrine and ceremonies of a new cult. We are given tables of cosmic evolution covering inanimate nature, and of biological evolution comprising all life, vegetative and animal. There, where the lower animal is seen to approach man, we are addressed by the eloquent menagerie of the monkeys. Monkey to monkey is seen passing on the spark of life, till man gets it and, behold !—he is. In him, no exhibition of vitality is exempt from this filiation, no function, however noble, no faculties however delicate. His most refined emotions are, surely, analysed with the most delicate consideration when a lady holds the scalpel ; and thus Madame Royer delivers judgment : " *L'ânesse doit certainement trouver du charme au braiement de l'âne.*" [1] The make-up of the protoplasm in the ass is a mill that turns out one sort of grain ; that in a man turns out another ; we call the product differently, a donkey's emotional bray or a man's sentimental compliment ; but the mill is the same.[2]

There were evolutionists before Darwin, even in the sphere of biology, where his lucubrations and conclusions came to rule supreme. But his precursors, Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck, Robert Chambers, while exciting much comment and attracting even scientific attention, struck no deep root in the scientific mind. There have never been wanting men who wanted no God ; men whose theology denotes merely, as Edward Clodd seriously puts it, " Man's relation to the god or gods in whom he believes." [3] The scientific mind, in fact, seems to resent the thought of God as an intrusion on its individuality, and an interference with

[1] *Revue des Questions Scientifiques*, xxv, 364.
[2] Cf. *supra* here, p. 152, *seqq.*, " A Baby's Footprint."
[3] Clodd, *ibid.*, ch. xi.

its well-being. Either ignorantly or maliciously, it travesties the idea of a Creator as that of an agency applying every creature to its work and leaving it nothing to do of itself. This supposition is a gross one, and yet it is universal in the presentments of science. It is gross, for the most elementary idea of God, as Creator and provident Governor of the Universe, conceives of Him as making things to be, and making them causes also, each in its own sphere. It is only when they are incompetent to act that He acts directly, as in the creation of a spiritual soul. It is for special and exceptional purposes that He ever chooses to override them, as in the operation of a miracle.

But, first, let us consider what the just study of Darwin led him to. He observed with great minuteness what every one knows in general, that there is a tendency in animals and plants to change, to modify their structures, features and form, according as change of environment, or other cause, operates on them. Hence the varieties and races in vegetable and animal life. Again, in reproducing their kind, they tend to multiply their stock on what is called a geometrical state of increase, so that any species of the lower organic world, if left to itself, would speedily overrun the earth, the air or the waters, and eat up all the sustenance that is provided for other kinds. Since, in the ordinary course of nature, only a due proportion of each kind survives, Darwin considered that some discrimination was practised by nature. He took it that the best survive and that nature selects the best. Hence this discrimination he spoke of as "natural selection"—a word that has caused his school infinite trouble; for neither does his theory of fortuitous adaptation to environment allow of any provident selective principle, nor do the facts warrant any such

element as a positive selection in nature. However, Darwin inferred that the "best," for the time being, survive; they become ever better and better by some fortuitous process; until they may, at last, become the best absolutely. Now, besides all this, it is certain that great geological changes have taken place on the earth's surface; and these changes he could pleasantly invoke to account for any other unknown alterations in organic life; he could charge geology with having effaced the record of what, according to him, ought to have been. Hence, by a genuine Darwinian process of logic, his "conclusions" stood forth—that species, as we see them, originated in lower species. This is the whole argument of the famous book *The Origin of Species*.

Darwin did not argue much. He was not capable of it. He clubbed facts together, as the Hebrew clubbed words, and left you to understand that one was a nominative and another a genitive. Men, in the ordinary affairs of life, associate notions together just in this way, without committing themselves to what they mean; and what they mean is clear, yet they are not indictable for libel.

Men were just prepared for such a thesis as his, if presented cleverly. They would have preferred it to be clearer; but, what he left unsaid at first they said clearly enough for him, and with audacity. War was declared, in the name of accurate science, on all Scripture, theology and every science that was. As to the scientific merits of Darwin's thesis, we may remark that not a single one of the ideas put forward by him remains in the state in which he left it. All accept and commit the substantial fallacy of the system, that of ignoring or whittling away specific distinctions or impassable barriers between true species. They fly for refuge to the "unknown," to

what "may have taken place," though to do so they have to fly in the face of their own pet principle of uniformity in nature's laws. But, beyond this fundamental article of agreement, in slipping over specific differences and affirming the possible transmutations of species — a tenet on which every evolutionary theory must stand, if it is to stand at all—the Darwinian theory that was coincides exactly with no evolutionary theory that now is. Selection, survival, heredity, the effects of use and non-use—all the Darwinian landmarks have shifted, and there is a process of disintegration going on that gives infinite occupation to Darwin's followers.

III

Geology, moving on parallel lines with Darwin's biological investigations, deserves a very special notice. The author of *The Antiquity of Man*, Sir Charles Lyell, serves as a pathetic instance of how this creed broke down the barriers of religious sentiment and belief, even while he himself regretted the subjective change of which he was conscious. By his thesis of a very remote geological antiquity, as regards both world and man, he gave the most material assistance to Darwin's conception of the slow and fortuitous transformation of species from one brute form to another. Yet he fought against this doctrine when applied to the brute as evolving into man. At length, with reluctance, he gave in, and, writing to Sir Joseph Hooker, referred to his subjective difficulties in these terms: "I plead guilty to going further in my reasonings towards transformation than in my sentiments and imagination, and perhaps for that very reason, I shall lead more people on to Darwin and you,

than one who being born later, like Lubbock, has comparatively little to abandon of old and long-cherished ideas which constituted the charm to me of the theoretical part of the science in my earlier days." And to Darwin himself he wrote regretfully: "The descent of man from the brutes takes away much of the charm from my speculations in the past relating to such matters." [1] But, however a conclusion might grate on Lyell's religious sentiment, his contribution towards the structure of the argument was noteworthy. His was the theory of Uniformitarianism. It may be spoken of as belonging to a date gone by, for science has been rude in the handling of it.

In its broadest field, wider than Lyell's special study of geology, the theory of uniformity posits the maxim that there has never been any change whatever in the action of causes that operate in the universe; that what is going on now has always been going on, by the same causes, and in the same manner as now. So much is the present the result of the past, that in the present course of nature you see the entire series of processes in the past; and, without a break in the continuity or uniformity, you may go back and reach the beginning of things, and explain the very genesis of the universe. In this widest, crudest form it disposes of the first beginning of nature by supposing that things began in the same way as we see them now continuing. Matter and force, somehow disposed the right way, grew up to be a pony, and the pony grows up to be a horse. Well, but how did matter and force come to be at all? Why—they grew!

Uniformitarianism in geology was the special thesis of Sir Charles Lyell. He published his *Principles of Geology* in 1830, and he laid emphasis on the fact that

[1] *Charles Darwin*, by Grant Allen; No. 128.

natural causes, now at work, and at the same rate at which they now work, are competent to account for the phenomena that occur in the gradual depositing of the stratified rocks. But his love of uniformity led him into the computation of years and periods, which, as bearing on the age of the human race, have been subject to rectification on all sides; and school-boys can now cite facts from their books, and refer to phenomena in the rivers, lakes and mountains, which assail the principle of uniformity and dismantle Lyell's conclusions. The manner in which he served the interests of the evolution of species, yet to be propounded by Darwin, is thus explained by Professor Huxley: "The publication of the *Principles of Geology*, in 1830, constituted an epoch in the modern history of the doctrine of evolution, by raising in the mind of every intelligent reader this question: If natural causation is competent to account for the non-living part of our globe, why should it not account for the living part also?"[1] That is aptly stated. For it means: If the natural operation of brute forces is competent to account for the depositing of brute inanimate matter in the form of sedimentary rocks, why should not the same operation of brute forces account for the organization of living matter, which is not brute inanimate rock? The evident answer to this is: Why should it?

The geological question, which concerns only the antiquity of the earth, moved on with the help of archæology to the question of the antiquity of man. Bone caves and the industrial remains of ancient races were found by antiquaries, and these, with the relics of extinct animals, like the mammoth and the cave bear, were referred to the date of their beds in geological deposits, which on the theory of uniformity must be

[1] *The Advance of Science in the Last Half-Century.*

very old indeed. Hence, instead of dating man's origin back a trifle of six thousand years or so, it was deemed necessary to rectify the tables, and so his origin was relegated to the trifling distance beyond this of one or two hundreds of thousands of years. And thus, three years after Darwin's *Origin of Species*, Lyell's new book on the *Antiquity of Man* came to supply a kind of historical background to the eternally slow, infinitesimal changes, which the evolution of animal life required, on the theory of natural selection.

Now, geology is very like Egyptology, Assyriology and other advancing sciences which deal largely with the mythical. The interpretation depends very much on the bent of the interpreter's mind. And there is a fair field for genius. Again, they resemble one another in the family trait of uniformitarianism, which means that there has been the strictest consistency, up to now, in saying and unsaying the same thing; in positing "conclusions" and then gainsaying them; and on the wreck of their dead selves mounting up to higher things. But, till they are fairly mounted, anyone who wishes to establish a thesis of his own has only to make a selection of those authorities that make for him and omit the rest. One most eminent Orientalist has "inferred," another profound Egyptologist has "concluded," the first of geologists has even "suggested"; and, lo! scientific logic clinches the argument.

Geology, in relation to history, knows only one thing, and that is the *relative age* of one deposit compared with another; from which, anthropologically, there issues one conclusion, and no more than one. It is, that if man lived contemporaneously with the deposition of a given stratum, he is as old as that stratum, neither older nor younger according to

the testimony of that layer; he is younger than an older layer, older than a younger one. To this degree of profundity can the geological argument reach. Beyond that geology has not reached; it does not penetrate the thinnest crust of the question.

Is there no determining the *absolute* historical date at which that deposit was laid? Uniformity in the rate of the deposition will not do it; for that assumption, taken baldly, would be a gratuitous postulate. Perhaps, with the help of other sciences, a date may be extracted? So it may. What are those helpful handmaids to this noble chronicler of "secular changes"? They are only the following, and all of them must work together: astronomy, meteorology, geography, natural physics, terrestrial physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, physiology, comparative anatomy, mineralogy, and perhaps one or two more, such as documentary history. When all these work together, it is not geology that is operating in its own field, but it is a general co-operative agency that is pulling at a quasi-philosophical tenet of evolution. The one special good turn they do the geological stratum is that they may enable the relative date of a certain deposit to be transmuted into a historic date—so many thousands of years ago. This co-operative agency of all sciences required for the thesis of evolution makes of Darwinism a universal science of induction, which, to establish anything, must base itself on all orders of facts, and on all the laws that reveal themselves in the boundless field of nature. When it shall have accomplished this gigantic feat, we are credibly informed that the result will be found to accord with Genesis—the one reliable historic monument in the world. If so, we are content, in the meantime, to keep the sacred record entire and intact. And we say

besides: Give us premises, not foregone conclusions. Any child can draw conclusions when the premises are clear.

IV

The elder Agassiz would never admit the evolutionary theory; yet he rendered the new doctrine a service that enabled the fertile imagination of Ernst Haeckel to build up almost a new science. He noted with accuracy the progressive advance in organization which characterizes the various species occupying the earth at successive geological epochs; and in this organic improvement he discerned an analogy with the different stages by which the embryo develops to the adult condition in the higher organized forms. "In fact," observes Professor Huxley, "in endeavouring to support these views he went a good way beyond the cautious interpretation of the facts then known." [1] On this basis of mere analogy, Haeckel has constructed a portentous theory called "Ontogeny and Phylogeny" as if every embryo were a kind of secret cypher, revealing to those, who know how to read, the past history of all the ancestral races that were the grandfathers and great-grandfathers of the race to which it belonged, back to primeval protoplasm.[2] A fair example of this how men jump at conclusions first, and build sciences out of them before the premises are proved!

Zoology and botany, or the sciences that deal with the laws of living beings in the animal and vegetable world, though not brought into line with Lamarck's materialistic conceptions of the development of species, were being highly elaborated. And this was the field, as on his own proper ground, where Darwin

[1] *Loc. cit.* [2] See *supra*, p. 154, "A Baby's Footprint," etc.

broached the great theory of man's evolution from the brute. It was the field of biology, and here, we say, he was on a vantage-ground. Biology, or the general science of life, led of its own nature to human life. It was made to include human life, so that biology should include psychology. And anthropology, which, as we noted before, might be taken as another word for psychology properly understood, is now taken to signify psychology as steeped in materialistic biology. Man, however degraded in conception, is still the centre of the visible universe. And so anthropology is the centre towards which every other science converges; it is the term of every evolution theory; it leaves nothing beyond itself to desire; if even a deity is wanted by anyone, man evolved can evolve his own deity. Thus, the "evolution of theology" figures in an obscure part of the theory, and seems to be thrown in just for the sake of erudition. Theology signifies, as Professor Otis Mason tells us, the mental attitude that man chooses to assume "in presence of a spirit world," in which he chooses to believe.

This little theological by-play was the cause of all the sensation that made Charles Darwin famous. He touched a chord in the Christian sentiment of the multitude. Even if ecclesiastical forces had not come out in array against him, the sentiment of the multitude would have vibrated all the same. This was the secret of his notoriety, and, owing in part to his notoriety, of his success. Profoundly true was the popular Christian instinct; and true the anti-Christian instinct. All the lame theorizers of half a century had been moving on with a halt in their gait, from whatever starting-point they came, and when Darwin came, walking straight to the land of promise, the sensation was superlative and the glory immense. Personally he held back, at first, from

stating quite clearly what he meant. But others who took up the word, like Vogt and Huxley, rang it forth with an arrogance and impudence not to be mistaken. Three years after the appearance of the *Origin of Species* came Professor Huxley's *Man's Place in Nature*. In this work, the Professor, not pretending to prove his point that man came from the monkey, indicated the "evidence" that bore upon it. His frontispiece exhibited his famous series of apes, all in a row—the gibbon, orang, chimpanzee, gorilla, man. In the book he made the proper reservations, as became a rigidly scientific man, but in the picture there were no reservations. After this, when Mr. Darwin published his *Descent of Man*, he said nothing that had not already become familiar to the world through the energetic propagandism of his lieutenants.

As to his own deeper sentiments in this line we are not left in doubt; and this leads us to the philosophy, metaphysical and religious, which underlies the whole revolution. It is always the action of philosophy, or the reign of ultimate ideas in men's minds, that controls the course of events, with far more power than the marching of armies or the agitation of politics; for armies and politics are themselves moved by the motives of final causes and the conception of first principles.

Darwin tells us that "a man may be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, though not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen, though not originally placed there, may give him hope for a still higher destiny in the future." In his speculations he at first used the word "Creator." Thus, in the last sentences of the *Origin of Species*, written at a time when his respect for established beliefs did not allow him to say anything offensive, he delivers himself

of this thought: "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms, or into one." Here the simple Christian reader might incautiously infer that biological evolution, in the mind of its evangelist, was compatible with the truth of creation. No such thing! Writing to his friend, Sir Joseph Hooker, in 1863, he says: "I have long regretted that I truckled to public opinion and used the Pentateuchal term of creation, when what I really meant was 'appeared' by some wholly unknown process." So the popular instinct had not been mistaken. Catholics in particular need not be mistaken as to their own home interests in the matter of evolution, and in the minds of evolutionists. Thus in an article, "Mr. Darwin's Critics," Huxley writes: "In addition to the truth of evolution—indeed one of its greatest merits in my eyes—is the fact that it occupies a position of complete and irreconcilable antagonism to that vigorous and consistent enemy of the highest moral, intellectual and scientific life of mankind—the Catholic Church." [1]

Thus, then, we arrive at a new definition of anthropology, as well as at a personal analysis of anthropologists. We define it thus: "The science about man's place in nature." This definition we take to be perfect in its generic note and in its specific difference. But every word needs an explanation.

We call it a science by courtesy, for it is no science at all. It leaves out all ultimate causes, and refers to no other science for what itself leaves out. It merely posits the "unknown" all round about; and the unknown is the light in which everything is to be clearly seen. It is therefore properly only a craft for managing something.

[1] Edwin Walmesley, *Month*, lxii, 386.

That something is "man's place in nature." The craft has nothing to do with man, for it leaves out his essence, his soul, intellect, will; it busies itself only with the place that man shall occupy.

The place is that which he shall occupy in nature. But it is not universal nature that is in question, for God is left out. Nor is it universal created nature, for, like man's spiritual nature, so also angelic essence is left out. Nor is it universal material nature, for the essence of all things are left out; they are bundled up in the "unknowable" of "agnosticism," or, what comes to the same thing, they are called "atoms" or "molecules." The "nature" that is in question is the visible order of things, tangible, measurable, ponderable, subject to chemical analysis or nervous impulses; it is nature geographical, geological, technical. Anthropology, then, or the science about man's place in nature, is the craft for sinking a human being over head and ears in brute matter.

From the elements already given, we proceed to formulate a similar definition of the men who are adepts in this anthropological craft. The definition has already been formed, and we cannot do better than repeat it exactly. They are men "without Christ, being aliens from the conversation of Israel, and strangers to the Testament, having no hope of the promise and being without God in the world (ἄθεοι, *athei*)."[1] And, since God is deposed, of course man is neither the end nor the glory of this visible universe; he is a mite upon this little globe; there is a plurality of worlds, and those big stars beyond have their own little mites and grovelling parasites—all unknown.

Let us listen to Grant Allen, a most devoted adherent of Darwin: "The general acceptance of

[1] 2 Ephesians, ii, 12.

Darwin's theory, which we may watch progressing around us every minute to-day, implies a complete *bouleversement* of anthropocentric ideas [*i.e., of Christian and rational ideas which make man the centre and end of this world*], a total change in our human conception of our own relation to the world and the universe, which must work for ever increasingly wide-reaching and complex effects, in all our dealings with one another and with the universe at large. There is no department of human thought and human action which evolution leaves exactly where it stood before the advent of the Darwinian conception." [1]

Candidly, we do not think that this is an extravagant boast for the enthusiasts to indulge in. They have met with remarkable success in shutting off the light of reason from God, the soul, immortality and morality. No wonder the popular instinct felt there was a scandal somewhere, and the popular passions came under the spell of a powerful charm. Darwin himself was surprised at his success.[2]

V

A philosopher was called for and there he was, at the call. Herbert Spencer had already been elaborating his *Synthetic Philosophy* when Darwin came forward in the biological field with the *Origin of Species*. Philosophy and logic were Spencer's profession; and the result of other men's observations, raked in, and heaped up immoderately, furnished him with the materials. Observation, on the other hand, was

[1] Grant Allen, *Charles Darwin*, ch. xii, n. 198.

[2] Carlyle tells us that unbelief had got into the Darwin blood, grandfather, father and son all being atheists.

Darwin's profession, and logic was a kind of gum or solder, with which he pieced his facts into a pattern. In brief, the philosophy involved in the whole theory is that of a concept framed to suit the aspirations of a mind materialized. Observe, it is only a "concept," and therefore needs no premises; just as if a dog wants a bone he calls for no premises to introduce him to the idea. Says the eulogist of Darwin: "Evolution, as now commonly understood, may be considered as a mode of envisaging to ourselves the history of the universe, a tendency or frame of mind, a temperament one might almost say, or habit of thought rather than a definite creed or body of dogma." And speaking of the fight with the theologians the same writer tells us how a "concept" swept the enemy from the field: "The 'argument from design' had been immemorially regarded as the principal buttress of orthodox thought [*to prove the existence of God*]. Theologians had unwisely staked all upon the teleological dogma, and could ill afford to retire without a blow from that tenaciously defended buttress of their main position. Hence, the evolutionary concept had its hardest fight to wage over the biological field; and, when that field was once fairly won, it had little more to fear from banded preconceptions and established prejudices in any other portion of the wide territory it claimed for its own." [1]

One might ask whether, now that science feared neither God nor man, neither theology nor philosophy, it had not reason to fear itself and its own "sound" facts? Rudolph Virchow, whose authority is unimpeachable in the school, will tell us: "Let me remind you at this point that natural science, as long as it remains such, works only with existing objects; a hypothesis may be discussed, but its significance can

[1] Grant Allen, *loc. cit.*, nn. 180, 190.

only be established by producing actual proofs in its favour, either by experiments or by direct observation. This Darwinism has not succeeded in doing." Later on, in the same address, he continues: "Twenty years ago, many things were supposed to be known, when people were really ignorant of them. We have made this supposed knowledge the object of scientific tests, and natural science has now really taken possession of its wide domain; and we can say that much of what was formally asserted as true is no longer admissible. It was supposed by faith, but it never belonged to science." [1] If we take an eminent French anthropologist, we find the same ominous cloud overhanging the bright prospects of the Darwinian theory. There is no mistaking Dr. Topinard's creed. He says plainly: "Let us not blush for our ancestors; we have been monkeys, as these formerly were reptiles, fish, nay, worms or crustaceans." These are the last words of an address in which he pits against each other the conflicting opinions of Haeckel, Gaudry, Cope, Vogt, and the opinions of Vogt in particular, who conflicts liberally with himself. Dr. Topinard's own conclusion is this: "The philosopher has said truly: 'Man is an intelligence [*he means only a thinking brain*] served by organs.' We have descended from the monkeys, or at least everything appears as if we had descended from them. From what monkey, known or unknown? I do not know; no one of the present anthropoids has assuredly been our ancestor. From several monkeys or a single one? I do not know; and also do not know, yet, whether I am monogenistic or polygenistic [*i.e., from several lines of ancestry or from a single one*]. . . .

[1] Virchow, Address to German Anthropological Association, Vienna, August 5, 1889. See Smithsonian *Report*, 1889, pp. 563, 569.

Whatever may be the origin arrived at, that place, believe me, will be as enviable as you could desire. At the origin, towards the beginning of the Miocene perhaps, monkey and man were but one; a division takes place, the fissure has grown, has become a crevasse; later, an abyss with talus more or less scarped, like the canons of the Colorado—an abyss which widens every day under our eyes." [1] This means that every day man is seen, with greater and greater distinctness, to be far off from the brute. Thus we see that his evolution has settled down to be, without qualification, an exercise of materialistic faith having for its motive of credibility the indomitable appetite for a materialistic life. And as to organic evolution farther down in the scale, or the development of living plants from non-living brute matter, that fond concept has never yet pretended to be emancipated from the servitude of blind belief; no, not belief, but impotent "expectation," where Professor Huxley left it years ago: "If it were given me to look," he said, "beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time, to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical and chemical conditions which it can no more see again than a man can recall his infancy, I should expect to be a witness of the evolution of living protoplasm from non-living matter. . . . That is the expectation to which analogical reasoning leads me; but I beg you once more to recollect that I have no right to call my opinion anything but an act of philosophical faith." [2]

[1] Topinard, Lecture in the *Ecole d'Anthropologie*, Paris. March, 1888. See Smithsonian *Report*, 1889, pp. 693–4.

[2] Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*; "Spontaneous Generation."

VI

One more point remains, and that is the place of anthropology in education. Some have claimed, and truly, that the art of education has felt "its progressive influence." And we have been told by a Catholic biologist of eminence that the clergy should be versed in biology.

If the science be taken in the sense of being a specialty, then, as a matter of course, anyone who has time and taste, whether he be lay or clerical, has the franchise of this study as of every other. Great talents of irregular formation have been squandered on the pursuit; and it is to be hoped that great talents will not be wanting in the cause of truth and divine faith, which, "*purificans corda eorum*," cleanses and elevates the hearts and minds of men. Among the men of our day who are gifted with a scientific bent almost all have gone astray.

But in no sense, whether for clergy or laity, can biology be recommended as an integral element of general education. It has not the educational virtue required. It is not exact, definite, formative of those habits of thought which will persist in the useful and professional occupations of life. There is nothing more inexact and wavering, yet withal more exacting on the time and genius of a mature specialist, than the biology and anthropology of the present epoch. When these sciences shall have passed through the vagaries of a very wild youth their results will be seen to coincide with that well-established anthropology which is laid down, distinctly and consistently, in the Sacred Books.

Let the words of Professor Huxley be the epilogue to our historical sketch. Enthusiast as he was for his craft and its interests, he has recanted not a little in

favour of art and letters as the true educational powers for the human mind. Speaking at the Royal Academy banquet in 1887,[1] he recognized the " great truth that art and literature and science are one, and that the foundation of every sound education and preparation for active life, in which a special education is required, should be some efficient training in all three. . . . I see great changes," he went on to say ; " I see science acquiring a position which it was almost hopeless to think she could acquire. I am perfectly easy as to the future fate of scientific knowledge and scientific training. What I do fear is, that it may be possible that we should neglect those other sides of the human mind, and that the tendency to inroads, which is already well marked, may become increased by the lack of the general training of early youth."

Huxley, *The Advance of Science in the Last Half-Century*, 1887. *Man's Place in Nature. Critiques and Addresses*; " Spontaneous Generation."—Darwin, *The Origin of Species. Descent of Man.*—Clodd, Edward, *The Story of Creation, a Plain Account of Evolution*, ch. vii, " The Origin of Life " ; ch. xi, " The Evolution of Theology."—Lyell, Sir Charles, *The Antiquity of Man.*—Allen, Grant, *Charles Darwin, His Life and Work.*—Virchow, Rudolf, Address at Vienna, August 5, 1889; see Smithsonian *Report*, 1889, pp. 563, 569.—Topinard, Paul, Lecture at Paris, March, 1888 ; see Smithsonian *Report*, 1889, pp. 693, 694.

On the subject of this essay, cf. the *Principles of Anthropology and Biology*, four lectures, by the same author, Rev. Thomas Hughes, S.J., second edition, Benziger, New York, 1890.

[1] *Nature*, xxxvi, p. 14; 1887.

XI

SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION, EXACT AND INEXACT [1]

THERE is a general process of instruction for the young which is rather ostentatiously paraded as a "scientific education." Beyond the fact that the courses are really derived from the subject-matter of the sciences, there is little that is scientific about it. As an education, it is utterly unscientific. Even as a qualification for entering upon some useful career in life it is dubiously useful in one way, and is positively harmful in another.

For a commercial life, merchants tell us that mere apprenticeship will not serve the purposes of modern business; since, in the ever-changing conditions of trade nowadays, there must be a much higher degree of mental culture brought into service, better capacities for reasoning, and a wider power of observation than mere technical lessons, or any form of apprenticeship, can supply. For the higher courses of sciences we hear it averred by medical authorities, by mathematicians, chemists and astronomers, that a preparatory training in chemistry, mathematics, and other such courses, to the prejudice of literary and classical training, throws into their advanced classes a set of unformed, unawakened minds, those of young men who are quickly left behind by other students, not "coached" for these specialties, but educated "all round." For the more advanced courses of literature and philology the same incapacity

[1] From *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, April, 1894 (vol. XIX), pp. 297–319; abridged.

results from so-called "scientific" education. And it is evident that, for literature in its proper sense, for the art of writing and of speaking, for the cultivation of taste and of criticism, there is no training whatever in such a system, while the talents for philosophy and theology are out of the question altogether. Hence it appears, on the strength of concordant testimony, that the "scientific" method of education is but dubiously useful as an introduction into any of the "useful" careers of life.

But it is positively hurtful in many ways. It takes up the time and place of a genuine system of culture. It narrows the field of vision and cramps the faculties, so that when the expansive and elastic period of life is passed and youths have become men they cannot, however much they desire it, pick up the lost culture and acquire a liberal way of thinking; nor can they even possess themselves with credit of the fruit of other liberal minds. The inquiry is made sometimes: How can I supply the want of a liberal, a literary, a classical education? The answer is: You cannot; it is too late. How can I befit myself for logic or philosophy? The reply must be: An apprentice who has merely graduated into a mining-school, or a chemist's laboratory, or into the office of a civil engineer or an architect, cannot handle logic or philosophy; for the rest of his life he must drift helplessly about among the theories of newspaper-scribblers and review writers, and take his chance there where his lot has been cast.

I

We have before us several expositions of the modern method. The title of the first explains itself: *The*

Culture Demanded by Modern Life, a series of addresses and arguments on the claims of scientific education, with an introduction on mental discipline in education, by E. L. Youmans, 1881. The choice part of this volume undoubtedly is the introduction written by the editor. Mathematics, which forms the purest form of true science, he rails against because it has always held a place of honour in traditional systems of culture. Metaphysics is so far within his ken that he knows its name to buffet it. Logic he is innocent of both in theory and practice. But, in all the odd gymnastics which his polemical vein leads him into, two things stand out with marvellous plainness: one thing which he does want, and another thing which he does not want. He wants no grammar nor literature. He does want biology and chemistry. His book is an admirable product of the modern instructed mind. It is fluent and disconnected; it skims subjects and skips over difficulties, and it appears wondrously profound; at due intervals he turns round and contradicts what he said before, and above all, he revels in the vague. If it merits notice, that is only because it is a sample of much that circulates.

The system he advocates, as summed up by him, stands forth in this guise: First, object-lessons for the child as the means of developing a faculty of observation, by getting into the mind a set of facts from without. Then mathematics, not as a mental discipline but as a mere key to universal "science"; or else physics, which cultivates the reasoning faculty to the practice of broad inductions, including, he says, "generalizations, by which wide-reaching principles replace or represent an infinitude of details"; or else chemistry, which, with physics, not only cultivates in the child the faculty of wide inductions, but also, like physics and mathematics together, "affords a discipline

in deductive reasoning." Then we pass on to the study of the biological sciences, botany, zoology, physiology, geology. Here the theorist becomes eloquent and glows with his subject. For here we have passed out of the range of the exact sciences, and have entered on the inexact. Experiment, or active observation, which played so important a part in physics and chemistry, and enabled a broad, deductive mind to "compel a revelation of nature's secrets," is now greatly limited; and, says he, "sources of error become more numerous and fallacies more insidious"; and hence "a subtler exercise of the reason is demanded —more circumspection in weighing evidence and checking conclusions, and a severer necessity for the suspension of judgment." Thus, "reasoning from analogy is practised, a powerful but perilous mode of proceeding; one which we are compelled constantly to adopt in our mental treatment of the concerns of life, and for which biological studies are eminently adapted to give the requisite discipline. Another advantage of these studies is the comprehensiveness of their classifications." To meet the manifold emergencies of our social existence we need "such a training in the fundamental organic sciences as shall constitute a thorough biological discipline."

This, according to him, is a true liberal education for the boy's mind, which is now rendered able to cope with higher studies. "The discipline and the knowledge conferred by study of the preceding group of sciences form the true preparation for that higher class of studies, mental, moral, political and literary, which completes the course of true liberal education." "Physiology passes insensibly into psychology, the central science, upon which hinge logic, sociology, political economy, history, ethics, æsthetics and literature."

In all this vast scheme of science proposed as a pedagogical training for the young, there is no overloading of the mind, says he, because "the student is not expected to grasp the details of the various sciences but only to master their leading principles. At least one science, however, should be thoroughly acquired by every educated person—should be carried into detail, acquired experimentally and pushed to its boundaries." That is to say, every well-educated person should be a chemist, or physiologist, or physicist, or the like. Secondly, this scheme is "not too extended because its arrangements economize mental power in the highest degree." This is an interesting statement; for it means that the mental discipline afforded is copious and well-conceived. He explains it therefore: "Wasting no force for mere discipline, it gives the entire energies of the mind to the direct attainment of knowledge." That is to say, it affords no mental discipline whatever but merely busies itself with heaping up facts in the mind.

And what about language in all this? Ah! that is only a vehicle of thought, a mere tool. And "the sensible mechanic remembers that his tools are for nothing but use, and hence spends the least possible time in grinding and polishing them." That is true, when the man has the tools and is using them. But how is the young scholar to get his tools, this vehicle of thought, this art of arts, this power of expression which reacts, so logically and so artistically, on the development of thought itself, that a finished style is thought to be the accomplished expression of a finished mind? Not a word in reply, except this piece of vagueness: "So much of the study of languages, and in such forms as are necessary to its intelligent use, is demanded in education; but, while this places the study upon explicit grounds of utility, by the principle

of utility should it be limited." Hence, the student is to get it where he can ; but above all things he is to use it ; for it does really seem that this professor acknowledges language to be somehow useful and necessary ! But it is nature that educates—chemistry and biology. And he indulges in the usual hopes : "When nature becomes the object of study, the love of nature its stimulus, and the order of nature its guide, then will results in education rival the achievements of science in the fields of its noblest triumphs." And so forth. His own achievement he calls *Mental Discipline in Education.*

II

After this sample of the results of scientific education on a modern mind, we proceed, in the next place, to a much wider field, and mean to exhibit the outcome of such pedagogics in popular education. This we shall do in a moment with the help of another modern mind, that of the President of Harvard, who has unbosomed himself recently on the topic : "Wherein popular Education has Failed."

But, first, we observe that the true notion of science is the knowledge of things by their principles or causes. Thus, leaving philosophy and logic aside which treat of the ultimate principles of all things mental and physical, we notice that mathematics is the only perfect science, because from a few self-evident axioms regarding quantity it deduces, by perfectly rational steps, an endless number of relations and properties affecting all forms of quantity. Every step is perfectly intelligible to the reasoning mind. No one can demonstrate a proposition of Euclid without the perspicuous use of deductive reasoning, otherwise called the syllogism ; and every one can

perform a few of the simpler demonstrations in plane geometry. It is only when processes are gone through which have been elaborated by others, with methods and terms and formulas to be applied according to definite set rules, that mathematics loses its character of a true science, at least for pedagogical purposes, and becomes a mere art. Thus, arithmetic, as learnt and practised, thus algebra, and all the higher forms of geometry are applied as technical arts. A few principles underlying them are more or less understood; a formula, which issues forth at the end, is "interpreted"; but all between the beginning and the end is a matter of practice, adroitness and patience.

These are also called "exact" sciences, because they deal with abstract relations which the various notions of quantity include in themselves, without application to any subject-matter. The moment a relation of quantity is mixed, or applied, that is, considered in some definite matter—as by astronomy in the stars and planets; by physics, in the attributes of matter, such as heat and light; by chemistry, in the combination of elements that go to make up bodies—the mathematical calculation is liable to error since there is introduced a question of fact. And fact depends upon fallible observation. Still, astronomy and physics generally are sufficiently accurate to merit the title of exact sciences. But chemistry is scarcely a science at all; it has no general principles to fall back upon, either deductive or inductive; that is to say, it never deduces anything from a general principle set down; and it never discovers by induction from facts any premises which it can use as principles, except in the partial, limited processes, by which it finds out the definite proportions of some particular element; and, having tabulated them, thenceforth uses its

table as blankly as a clerk turns over the leaves of his ready-reckoner.

To be sure, scientific chemists try to cure the radical vice of their craft by going behind what they observe, and talking about the ultimate constituents of matter —atoms and forces. But in this they are no longer chemists ; they are playing at metaphysics, and a sorry figure they make of it. "Physics, beware of metaphysics!" cried Newton. But all in vain! There would be only a moderate amount of chemistry in the world to-day, there would be little biology, and absolutely no theory of evolution, were it not for the unquenchable thirst of mankind to drink at the springs of metaphysics, and satisfy a burning desire regarding their own origin and destiny, in a certain philosophical way of their own.

As to all the forms of biology, they are utterly unscientific, outside of some mathematical calculations and some other chemical processes, which are so far scientific as chemistry itself is, and no more. Biologists understand nothing whatever about life in the organic body or life in the organic cell. Chemistry itself enters into a cloud of enigma when it mixes with life in the protoplasm. The biological-chemist falls back on explanations which do not belong to his specialty ; he becomes, as usual, a metaphysician ; and neither metaphysics nor biology derives profit from the performance.

When economical or social science is touched there is still a minute point of contact with science, properly so called. It is because all things material—even men who have material bodies—present a side of their being to the calculations of the mathematician. They can be counted, weighed, measured. Their births and their deaths, their external acts and vicissitudes, all lend themselves to calculation ; and, since

men are uniform in their nature, if conditions also are uniform, or are reduced in any given social problem to some common denomination, which may furnish a basis for a mathematical calculation, of course an arithmetical or algebraic reckoning can be set up. Thus, a life-insurance company exploits the statistical tables of mortality, and reckons its chances. And all the science that is to be found in political or social economy is just the amount which serves the purposes of the calculating clerks in an insurance office, or a secretary in the Civil Service.

For drawing out the minds of the young, and enabling them to put two and two together with logical accuracy, the science of plane geometry, according to the method of Euclid, has always held a place of high honour. As we have said, that method uses no technical formulas nor algebraic processes, but argues from plain principles, by plain steps, to logical conclusions. It is the perfect logical method of the demonstrative syllogism, and it avails itself of other forms of logical argument which are reducible to the syllogism. Hence, for the sake of the admirable discipline which it furnishes, in the way of accurate thought, no pupils of either sex need be dispensed from performing a few of the simpler demonstrations. The train of reasoning here is called " deductive," because it advances from premises which implicitly contain the inference, to the inference which stands out distinct from the premises. And the principles or premises themselves are already in a child's mind, as, for instance, the notion of a line, an angle, a triangle. So that this form of mathematics satisfies the requirements of education, which means " drawing out " the faculties by the strength which is native to them, and on the subject-matter which is more or less domesticated with them.

Carried too far, it is notorious that the mathematical methods exert a cramping influence on the mind. They do not include any element of positive fact, and they are apt to engender a contempt for the slow and uncertain observation or "induction" of facts. Facts are extremely variable; where the factor of life intervenes, as in all biology, their outline is dim, and if free will interposes, as in all sciences pertaining to ethical and social life, the facts themselves are dim or positively uncertain. Still, these same ethical and social phenomena are the most interesting and important affairs in the universe. Here the mathematical bent plays havoc with all problems. It must needs lay down its axioms and its definitions, its postulates and its principles; it must construct its geometrical plans, and if any mortal men or methods, any histories of human kind or political forms of government do not fit into the plan, so much the worse for them. Pascal himself, an eminent mathematician remarks: "It is rare that mathematicians are observant, or that observant minds are mathematical, because mathematicians would treat matters of observation by rule of mathematics, and they make themselves ridiculous by attempting to commence with definitions and principles."

To this is added another inconvenience, which has much to do with bringing about the present disorganized state of society, moral and political. Entering with his mathematical qualifications into the field of philosophical, social and political problems, the mathematician will adopt some positive premises or other, on which his mathematical mill is to work. Now, it is a matter of the veriest chance what premises or principle he will adopt; since he is lacking in the acumen, which other studies impart to the mind, for discerning the value of complicated phenomena,

historical data, philosophical truths, religious principles, or, as in the case before us, the factors of true education. In his helplessness he accepts passively the principles floating about in the air, or the suggestions whispered to him by the passions. As Dugald Stuart has observed: "In the course of my own experience, I have not met with a mere mathematician who was not credulous to a fault; credulous not only with respect to human testimony, but credulous also in matters of opinion, and prone, on all subjects which he had not properly studied, to repose too much faith in illustrations and consecrated names." [1] Then, his premises being taken, though at haphazard, his mill begins to work. Never does it grind more pitilessly than when the mathematical faculty has been highly cultivated by the sublime form of analysis. And it grinds exquisitely. A scientific author, M. Moutier, tells us with some complacency that "mathematical analysis is often compared to a mill; throw in the wheat and you will get flour; granaries might groan with the richest harvests without helping much the stomachs of men, if the grain could not be turned into flour."

Now, we have just remarked that this mathematical bent had much to do with bringing about the revolutionary state of society which marks the present century. Given the principles of the Revolution, the geometrical spirit accorded perfectly with the tendencies of men who delighted in abstract generalities, and in figures without substance; and who wanted nothing less than the substance of things that were, the facts which constituted society as it was, the traditions which had built it up, and the forms of education that had been handed down by Christian practice and antecedent. The ascendancy of mathematical philosophers over the movements preparatory

[1] Youmans, *loc. cit.*, p. 12, note

to the great Revolution is an unquestioned fact in history. Voltairian encyclopædists took their philosophy from the times, and repaid it by bringing their geometry into everything. Mathematical chemists, in particular, seem to have been irrepressible then as they are dominant now. D'Alembert would have it that "if geometry were taught to children betimes, he doubted not that prodigies and precocious talents of this kind [*that is, of his own kind*] would be more frequent." The mathematical chemists, who posed as statesmen in the *Corps Legislatif*, proposed that the young generations, now belonging to the Revolution, should be brought up on problems of algebra and the nomenclature of plants and animals. For this advance, however, the times were not ripe, and the inventors of the new pedagogics themselves dropped the project for a while. Chaptal, who was put in charge of the new device, called Public Instruction, by the Consul Napoleon, laid it down that "anatomy and physiology ought to be the basis of all education; and if such had been the line of march in the ages which have gone before us, we should never have seen unbridled imagination create imaginary worlds [*of religion and God*] and substitute phantoms for realities. . . . The resemblance between our physical structure and the greater part of the beings of nature marks well enough our place [*the same as Professor Huxley's conception of 'Man's Place in Nature'*]; and shows us what we ought to think of those prerogatives [*of spirituality, immortality, and morality*], which the delirium of ignorant pride has attributed to the human species," etc.[1]

It is not the true scientific spirit that is irreligious. All the great founders of modern science have been

[1] *Documents concernant la Compagnie de Jésus*, III, p. 25. See *supra* here, p. 128, *seqq.*, "Jansenism and Secularism."

most religiously-minded, in their own way. Galileo, the founder of modern mechanics; Copernicus, Kepler and Newton, the prominent figures in the development of astronomy; Boyle and Pascal, the active spirits in developing hydrostatics, have all been led, by their search for God's laws impressed on nature, to bow down with increased reverence before the Divine wisdom which invented and impressed such laws.[1] These were inductive minds, invested with the talent for finding out nature. And had Darwin set himself to find out nature in truth there is little reason to fear that he would have died an atheist. But he set himself to find out a falsehood, and he got it, because he put it there.

Other minds, which are not inductive in their bent and which have not been refreshed, after a struggle through the twilight of their weak conceptions, with the sudden revelation, like broad sunlight, of God's evident providence and His palpable presence, may rehearse the same inductive processes, as children can do, and feel none of that overpowering grasp of the Mightier Mind which lifted up original discoverers to catch a glimpse of the infinite. And as to deductive processes, those which start with principles or formulas, and thenceforward merely turn them inside out and upside down, and create sciences of perfect truth, but all in the abstract, their effect seems to be to create a craving for the formula everywhere, whether it can be had or not. Formulas that know nothing of shades and tints, of conditions, persons and times, must forsooth be made to comprehend the science of life, society, politics, in all their varied and manifold relations; as if everything were on a plane of only two dimensions, or on a line of only one direction, or

[1] Cf. W. Whewell, *Astronomy and General Physics*, etc., Part III.

on a point that has neither length, nor direction, nor magnitude.

We have seen that the mathematical or "scientific" bent is, of itself, a narrow and mechanical turn of mind; it disqualifies for liberal views of life, and for the sciences that treat of human affairs. We have added the important consideration that, as it takes its principles somewhere and then does only rigidly apply them and deduces consequences from them, if the principles be wrong and involve infidelity, socialism, revolution or anything similarly perverse, it is only a question of time and opportunity for all kinds of perverse conclusions to establish themselves in the mind and to propagate themselves around in the mass of society. We add here one further consideration, as bearing, in particular, upon the subject of theoretic education or pedagogics. It is that among the false principles thus assumed one stands conspicuous. It is the idea of utility, which aims at ready results, at products ready-made like manufactured articles; which fights shy of thorough mental discipline, because that takes time and produces its fruit only at a remote period in the training of developed faculties; and which, in a spirit of envy at the splendid results of a truly developing or liberal education, does not scruple to appropriate the name of "liberal" to itself, and so gloss over the narrow, belittling, and slipshod processes of its own utilitarian instruction.

We could quote instances, at length, of this utilitarian fallacy from the Introduction of Professor Youmans. He says: "In the world of business, where results become quickly apparent and wrong policy works speedy disaster, the notion of discipline *for* a special activity, and not *through* it, could not be entertained, and it only lingers in the world of education because the effects are more remote, complex and

indefinite." This means that every child should be worked as an apprentice, from the first, in the line of activity which he is to follow in after-life—" discipline *through* a special activity " ; he need not have his faculties developed all round to make him a qualified man for whatever his future line of life may happen to be—this he calls " discipline *for* a special activity." The reason he gives is worthy of his school. It is that, when a man is already a man and has his business in hand, there is no question any longer of developing his faculties all round ; he had better mind his business. Therefore the child, who is yet in the formative stage whence are to issue certain results for the future, " more remote, complex and indefinite," should also mind some business—though he has none yet—and should drop education, as if he had got it already. He is to be put up quickly like a ready-made article, duly packed and addressed. He is on the same footing as the ten-year-old boy working in a coal mine, and using up a constitution which he has not yet acquired—wasting the future. That is the utilitarian principle of education.

We may also give an illustration of the infidel tendency in this chemical professor's mind. Mathematician as he is, he decries pure mathematics in the same breath with which he berates literature and grammar. Both mathematics and grammar, he says, " begin with the unquestioning acceptance of data—axioms, definitions, rules ; both reason deductively from foregone assumptions, and therefore both habituate to the passive acceptance of authority—the highest mental desideratum in the theological ages and establishments, which gave rise to the traditional curriculum." This is very interesting. A scientific man runs down the purest form of science, because the scientific habit of mind, which it induces, is

precisely in accordance with theology, religion and faith!

III

Eleven years later than the publication of Professor Youman's pretentious claims, President Eliot of Harvard came forward to examine the results. His verdict is sufficiently intimated in the title of his article, "Wherein Popular Education has Failed."[1] According to his presentation, it seems to have failed utterly. And this is the more noteworthy, as coming from one who by the weight of his authority and the activity of his pen has been a power for many years in the cause of utilitarian education. Yet, not to be too sombre in his view of the situation, he sets it off with a couple of relieving features. One is the possibility that certain agreeable facts in our present state of society may be in part due to popular education as now carried on. The other is the conviction which he expresses, that if the means are adopted, which he suggests for the improvement of such education, an amelioration may follow in the results. It so happens that the means which he suggests are not substantially different from the methods in actual operation. Still, he concludes hopefully in the usual style: "Such are some of the measures, which, we may reasonably hope, will make popular education in the future more successful than it has been in the past in developing universal reasonableness." Universal reasonableness! The claim is certainly modest. It is no longer a glorious sunshine of intellectual results, but a bit of common reasonableness that will be thankfully received.

The eminent president, himself a chemist, reviews

[1] *The Forum*, New York, December, 1892.

in several gloomy pages the expectations that had been entertained regarding the fruit of popular education; all of which have been frustrated. He says: "Public education should mean the systematic training of all children for the duties of life; and it seems as if this systematic training could work almost a revolution in human society in two or three generations, if wisely and faithfully conducted. Why has it not? It seems to provide directly for a general increase of power to reason, and therefore of actual reasonableness in the conduct of life. Why is it possible to doubt whether any appreciable gain has thus far been made in these respects?" "Disquieting questions!" he calls them.

Still he claims that the "indictments against universal education, as a cure for ancient wrongs and evils, leave out of sight great improvements in social conditions which the last two generations have seen." Accordingly, he tabulates a number of "beneficent changes" regarding the mitigation of human miseries in prisons and elsewhere; the formation of habits of industry by savings-banks and the like; improvement in the condition of wage-earners, touching their income, lodging, food, clothing, and the "means of education for their children." By the way, it is hard to see how the last has undergone a "beneficent change," if "popular education has failed." He notes how superstitions have been abolished and civil order extended over regions once desolate or dangerous; how family and school discipline have been mitigated within two generations; and how "all sorts of abuses and cruelties are checked and prevented [!] by the publicity of modern life, a publicity which depends on the universal capacity to read." He recalls that all business, nowadays, is conducted on trust and mutual confidence, which is protected by the "publicity" of the Press; that the United States

have spread across a continent; that Italy has been made one nation, etc.; that the different classes of society and the different nations have lately made some approach towards realizing the truth of the Old Testament saying: "We are members of one another.' He adds conscientiously: "It would not be just to contend that popular education has brought to pass all these improvements and ameliorations." Still, he goes on apologetically: "It has undoubtedly contributed to them all." That we should like to see proved, not assumed; for some perverse minds might assume the very opposite, and prove it.

So far, there is nothing that has a real bearing on the science of education. But at last, after these weary platitudes, we light on two sentences that touch education—that prove, as he says, "increased intelligence in the large masses of the people." This is what we want, and thus it reads: "If wars have not ceased, soldiers are certainly more intelligent than they used to be, else they could not use the arms of precision with which armies are now supplied. The same is true of industry and trade—they require more intelligence than formerly in all the work-people."

Not being gifted with a chemical mind ourselves, we find this astounding. To sight a rifle and pull a trigger argues greater intelligence, *because* the rifle is more precise than it used to be, and its maker, no doubt, must have been more intelligent. To work a crank or grease a rod for ten mortal hours a day, and to become a living automaton in some big machine shows greater intelligence than formerly, though it is always the same identical pin-head, or ground-button, or bit of some other machine that the two automata, the living and the dead one, are turning out by the thousand per week! As this passes our own intelligence, we refer for light to a great authority. And we

find that a just principle is stated. "The perfection of the mechanical and other arts among us," says Whewell, "proves the advanced condition of our sciences, only in as far as these arts have been perfected by the application of some great truth with a clear insight into its nature. . . . But what distinct theoretical principle is illustrated by the beautiful manufactures of porcelain or steel or glass? A chemical view of these compounds, which would explain the conditions of success or failure in their manufacture, would be of great value in art; and it would also be a novelty in chemical theory; so little is the present condition of these sciences a triumph of science, shedding intellectual glory on our age." [1] It is indeed notorious that the advance of science, even in those who advance it, has little to do with science, but a great deal to do with a happy knack of invention or manipulation. What, then, have the poor work-people to do with science or scientific "general intelligence," when they only work the blow-pipes and trim the products? And, if invention and manipulation do manifest "general intelligence," what shall we say of former times which had none of the mechanical contrivances of our own, not even coal? Whewell sums up some proofs of Middle-Age intelligence: "Parchment and paper, printing and engraving, improved glass and steel, gunpowder, clocks, telescopes, the mariner's compass, the reformed calendar, the decimal notation, algebra, trigonometry, chemistry, counterpoint—an invention equal to a new creation of music—these are all possessions which we inherit from that which has been so disparagingly termed the Stationary Period. Above all, let us look at the monuments of architecture of this period; the admiration and despair of modern architects, not only

[1] Whewell, *History of the Inductive Sciences*, I, 242.

for their beauty, but for the skill displayed in their construction." [1]

Hence, President Eliot has not succeeded in pointing to a single beneficent result of popular education. So, making the best of the case as it stands, he " thinks he perceives in popular education, as generally conducted until recently, an inadequacy and misdirection which partially supply an answer to these disquieting questions "—why popular education has failed. His critical strictures fall chiefly on the new system of education—that advocated so gloriously by Professor Youmans—only the system has not been properly worked. Therefore, he suggests improvements, and the principles he starts from are almost identical with those of the professor, while his " improvements " are identical with the measures which have actually failed. Of course, it cannot be otherwise, when principles and measures are astray. We need not rehearse his somewhat lengthy arraignment of the present system and his decidedly hackneyed improvements. Still, there are some good things in what he says. Speaking of the higher class of schools, he remarks : " Among the subjects other than languages, there will generally be found several which seem to be taught for the purpose of giving information rather than of imparting power. Such are the common high-school and academy topics in history, natural history, psychology, astronomy, political economy, civil government, mechanics, constitutional law and commercial law. These subjects, as they are now taught, seldom train any power but that of memory. As a rule, the feebler a high-school or academy is, the more these information-subjects figure in its programme and, when a strong school offers several distinct courses, the shorter and weaker courses are sure to exhibit an undue number of

[1] Whewell, *History of the Inductive Sciences*, I, 242, p. 239.

these subjects. . . . The pupil is practically required to commit to memory a primer or a small elementary manual for the sake of the information it contains. There can be no training of the reason in such a process." This is perfectly true, and if educational authorities would ponder over this reflection, they would make two applications of the wisdom it contains. First, they would take notice that all scientific education, as actually carried on, goes precisely on these lines, all mere information of facts heaped in from without; and that it cannot ever be otherwise, as a means of education for the young; that it does not educate or draw out the faculties, but sets up a show-window to catch the eye of examiners, and, like a show-window, it is for no other use but to catch the eye. Secondly, our Catholic pedagogical authorities would take note of the uniform simplicity which has characterized all Catholic systems of education up to late years. They would note that, whether in primary schools or academies or colleges, there has been uniformly a straight line of studies to follow—straight, thorough and complete—to which other studies were merely secondary and subsidiary; and that the central line has not been a flimsy tissue of so-called science. Such is still the system in Catholic institutions where traditional wisdom survives, and where the profound knowledge of a child's needs, so well apprehended by Catholic wisdom and instincts, has not been spirited out of sight by the phantom or nightmare of competition with other schools.

The president discerns the same unsatisfactory results in the lowest grades of schools, with their reading, writing and spelling, their geography and arithmetic; but he does not commit the intellectual absurdity of implying that such practical arts can be held up as in any sense an intellectual culture of mankind.

Thus, the lowest stratum of studies being quite incompetent to develop mental capacities, and the middle stage being out of order, he mounts to the highest series and "finds the same condition of things in most American institutions. The cultivation of memory predominates: that of the observing, inferring and reasoning faculties is subordinated." Yet, as we may remember, this power of observation, inference and reason is the very fruit so fondly anticipated of scientific education. He continues: "No amount of *memoriter* study of languages, or of the natural sciences, and no attainment in arithmetic will protect a man or woman, except imperfectly through a general cultivation of intelligence, from succumbing to the first plausible delusion or sophism he or she may encounter." He then gives examples of the delusions that run riot in our time and in this country. They are instructive, as indicating the trend of thought which these pedagogical authorities are indulging in, while we suppose them and they suppose themselves to be treating of education for the young. He adduces the sophisms of astrology, theosophy, free silver, strikes, boycotts, persecutions of Jews and Mormons, the violent exclusion of non-union men from employment. He refers to paper money and national wealth, to American wages and English wages, to Bessemer steel and public debts. He says: "The publication by the Commissioner of Labour at Washington, concerning the cost of producing iron and steel, is the first real attempt to determine the facts upon which the theory of a single group of important items in our tariff might have been based. This admirable production is a volume of fourteen hundred pages, mostly statistical tables." But what has all this rambling to do with the subject of education? This is the kind of journalistic atmosphere in which the thought of our

educational authorities moves, when they do not confine themselves, as true mathematicians and chemists should do, to their own province of algebraic formulas and biological analysis. From this unreal and hazy mist of thought they descend to legislate for education. However, the admissions of a candid mind like the president's are useful; he says: "There are many educated people who have little better protection against delusions and sophisms than the uneducated, for the simple reason that their education, though prolonged and elaborated, was still not of a kind to train their judgment and reasoning powers."

To quote one sentence more from the president of Harvard: "In the higher part of the system of public instruction, two difficult subjects deserve a much larger share of attention than they now obtain—political economy and sociology. They should be studied, however, not as information subjects, but as training or disciplinary subjects," etc. On which we remark that matters pertaining to politics and statesmanship are subjects for mature, educated minds, and can neither train, nor drill, nor discipline, nor draw out any faculties whatever of a young mind, but can only fill it with odds and ends of numbers from census-reports, as foreign to education as the fourteen hundred pages of the "admirable publication of the Commissioner of Labour at Washington, on the cost of producing iron and steel." And further, we remark, quoting the profound reflection of the same eminent gentleman of Harvard: "These subjects seldom train any power but that of memory. As a rule, the feebler the system is, the more information-subjects figure in its programme." This "scientific" system labours under a feebleness which belongs to the last degree of atrophy—feeble in reason, feeble in logic, feeble in its intuition of the young mind and

character, and therefore abounding in subjects for its programmes, in programmes for its theories, and in theories that shoot up like the weeds of spring, under the glorious sun of scientific enlightenment.

IV

Leo XIII, in his encyclical on the study of Sacred Scriptures, has these words: "Since there are those who, besides having the grace of the Catholic faith, are gifted by a benign Providence with a happy talent [*for the pursuit of science external to the Holy Scriptures*], and so can lend much help to the cause of religion, every one should chose for himself a suitable line of research amid the studies which are brought to bear, with such animosity, on Scriptural interpretation; so that, each one attaining a degree of excellence in his own line, they may turn the arms of a perverted science into weapons of defence, not without glory to themselves."

It might be expected, after our critical and somewhat negative analysis of scientific methods, that we should present a constructive view of sound education, and lead up steadily from first principles and first stages in the instruction of the young to that ideal of scientific excellence which Leo XIII desires to see conspicuous and effective in the ranks of Christ's faithful. But the science he proposes for our attainment has literature for its basis, which we will discuss on another occasion.[1] On this issue of literature we can find no contributions whatever to either pedagogical principle or pedagogical practice from the scientific school. All that we can glean from them, on the subject of literary formation, amounts to this: Language is necessary; use it

[1] *Infra*, pp. 228, *seqq.*, "What is a Liberal Education."

therefore. Style to be perfect requires a power of observation such as Tennyson shows; write therefore like Tennyson. Scientific conscientiousness, the scrupulously accurate statement of facts observed, is as good a training of the conscience, says Eliot, as secular education can furnish; therefore vivid and accurate records of all things observed, seen, felt, done, suffered should be made by the child, and this for the benefit of the community, as well as for its own benefit when the time comes for it to be a scientist. But, as no power of description is of use without the reasoning faculty, this faculty, as exercised in "argumentative composition," is to be cultivated assiduously. For the rest, in "cultivating any field of knowledge, this power of expression can be won if the right means are used; and if these means are neglected it will not be won in any field."

This is no doubt a singularly profound treatment of the literary question in liberal education. But a writer of the University of Wisconsin takes the palm for literary acumen and criticism. He says that the mental processes involved in translating a page of Cicero correctly "are hardly more numerous or important from a practical point of view, than those used in putting together a *Chinese puzzle*"! In the hands of this volunteer the whole science and art of education becomes a most curious tissue of kindergarten practices, debating-club methods, magazine references, and thumbing of census reports, of the back record of law courts, of Whewell's *History of the Inductive Sciences* and of theories on the "Niebelungenlied." This course of his would "take its place in the school and college curriculum, by the side of the natural and the mental sciences, history, literature and the languages. It would not crowd the others out." Why not? First, because it is indispensable.

Secondly, because it is supplementary. Thirdly, because it develops "other functions of the mind equally important in their way, for instance, the power of observation, and above all, the emotions." But especially it would not crowd the others out because "whatever else might have to be neglected or dropped from the curriculum, for want of time, its claims should be honoured to their full extent," that is, *because it should crowd the others out*! And this contributor to the *Educational Review*[1] entitles his lucubration, "Teaching Reasoning as a Fine Art." Surely it has become a fine art, if by fine we mean rare!

We have nothing to learn from such a system except to avoid it. Avoiding it, we hold fast to our traditional solidity, and, where nature has been benign, we develop youthful brilliancy. In the higher institutions of learning, which prepare the mind in a liberal way for all subsequent studies and special careers, the teaching of the sciences must remain within the limits of what is essential to them, so far as their processes are intelligent and liberalizing, not so far as to become technical and specializing. "Initiation into scientific methods, in which consists the educating value of the sciences, does not demand all the sciences; it can be effected by a few well-chosen specimens; it depends much more on its quality than on the amount of matter conveyed. In the sciences, as in letters, the amassing of knowledge is not an end in itself; it is the means of education." Such are the words of a government professor of mathematics, drawing up the report of a scientific committee of studies appointed by the French Republic. The initiation into scientific methods, as the French commissioner expressed himself, prepares

[1] *Educational Review*, December, 1893, p. 494.

the young mind, thus liberally treated, for the special studies that are to follow in practical and professional life. And thus, at the end, we reach the conception of Leo XIII, which we have quoted: "Those who are gifted with a happy talent for science can lend much assistance to religion, and turn the arms of perverted knowledge into weapons of defence."

Youmans, E. L., editor of *Popular Science Monthly*, *The Culture Demanded by Modern Life; a Series of Addresses and Arguments on the claims of Scientific Education; with an Introduction on Mental Discipline in Education*, 1881.—Eliot, C. W., president of Harvard University, "Wherein Popular Education has Failed"; *The Forum*, December, 1892.—Moutier, *La Thermodynamique*, *Revue des Questions Scientifiques*, XX, p. 188: "*L'Application de l'Analyse Mathématique aux autres Sciences*," *par* Franc. Iniguez.—*Documents concernant la Compagnie de Jésus*, III, p. 25; "*De l'Université Nouvelle*, *Fille Ainée de la Révolution*"; 1828 (on the French Encyclopædists, etc.).—Cahour, Arsène, S.J., "*Des Etudes Classiques et des Etudes Professionelles*"; 1853.—Whewell, W., *Astronomy and General Physics compared*, *with Reference to Natural Theology*; part III, "Religious Views." The same, *History of the Inductive Sciences*, I, "Physical Science in the Middle Ages," ch. v.—Gerard, John, S.J., "Education and School," *The Month*, LVI, pp. 163, 353, 360.—*Educational Review* (N.Y.), "Teaching Reasoning as a Fine Art"; December, 1893.—Barnard, H., *American Journal of Education*, "The Jesuits and their Schools"; V, p. 228 (June, 1858).—Gabriac, de, S.J., "*Réformes Scolaires*"; *Etudes*, April, 1890, p. 582 (on the report of the French Government committee).

XII

WHAT IS A LIBERAL EDUCATION?[1]

I

THERE has been lively discussion of late. The subject of dispute has been liberal education, what it means and how it works. If its working effects were clearer, its meaning might be plain. Accordingly, the debate has taken throughout this practical everyday shape: What is the good of a liberal education? What does it do? In the event of its doing less than it assumes, the proposal is made, not to modify the name, but to change the course of studies which the name has thus far denoted. It is urged that the study of the classics, which hitherto have formed the staple of a liberal education, might be judiciously abridged, if not entirely excluded; while a number of practical studies, which have been steadily asserting their claim to recognition, might henceforth be honoured with the title of liberal studies, and take rank as elements in a polite education.

If we may be allowed to advance our views on the subject of a liberal education, we shall naturally choose to begin with the essential idea conveyed in the term itself. The word education, taken here to refer only to what is intellectual—although in its fullest sense it should take in all that is ethical—covers two things. These, although quite distinct in themselves, undergo

[1] From *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January, 1885 (vol. X), pp. 19–35; abridged.

an absolute fusion into one whenever the "scientific" school uses the term. There is either general education or special education; either general formative studies or specializing professional studies. There is either the root and stem of a mind's complete formation or the ramifications of specific energies; finally, either the bringing out of essential faculties in a boy's mind or, letting essential faculties take care of themselves, merely the shaping of his thoughts and actions into a certain groove. In the one case—the former—we have a general result, a strengthening of fundamental qualities, a solid substructure of the mind for any superstructure of complementary knowledge; in the other we have a definite constraining, once for all, towards the purposes of a narrow object. A thousand fitnesses are conceived and developed in the former case, for all thought, labour and life; in the latter, all the potency of the mind is fastened on and fixed before being rightly unfolded:

> The spring is past, and yet it has not sprung;
> The fruit is dead and yet the leaves are green.

These two ideas are, we think, fairly distinct, and a clear discernment of them goes far towards settling the question. One is the general education which sensitizes the mind for anything; the other is the special training that fixes it for life. The anti-classical school of scientists have heard of this distinction over and over again; that is clear from the manner of their defence. But it is just as clear that they fail to comprehend it. They appear to think that specializing studies might be made to do the work of general studies; that the defining work of a particular science might be made to do service for an enlarging general education; and that, in the case of a boy, the same

work could be done by the same process as in the case of a man who, being already mature, may at the same time study special subjects and develop further his general powers. But a boy, being immature, must do either one or the other at a time ; he cannot do both. If he attempts both he forfeits at least the general education for life.

In the spirit of this confusion, the following passage of a certain lecture [1] was conceived : "We may be sure," said the lecturer, "that the controlling intellectual forces of the actual world, century by century, penetrate intellectual processes, and that languages, literatures, philosophies or sciences which show themselves fruitful and powerful, must win recognition as liberal arts and proper means of mental discipline." The meaning of this, as determined by the context, is that, because a language, literature, philosophy or science becomes fruitful and powerful, that is, professionally useful as a special branch, it has a right to win recognition as a true liberal study, a proper means of mental discipline, a genuine course of general education.

This is just the principle underlying the whole plea for admitting political economy, science, modern tongues and other such subjects into the place and station thus far held by the classics. It is assumed that the classics, on one side, and such subjects, on the other, as political economy, are all on the same level, so that one set of scenes can be shifted off and another set moved on without the least modification of the educational scaffolding, without the least fundamental difference to the boy's mind. The lecturer went on to say with emphasis : "To my mind, the only justification of any kind of discipline, training or drill,

[1] Lecture by Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard, before the members of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.

is the attainment of the appropriate end of that discipline. It is a waste for society, and an outrage on the individual, to make a boy spend the years when he is most teachable in a discipline the end of which he can never reach; when he might have spent them in a different discipline which would have been rewarded with achievement." What does this mean? It means simply that general education does not reach the end and yield the result of some special studies, and that, if you wish to have professional success, you must have professional training. He ignores any other end except professional, partial, special success; and, because general education, liberal formation, and universal culture does not lead to such a partial end, the classics are put down as "a discipline the end of which a boy can never reach." Here we do not know what to repudiate, whether to object to such a definition of the classics or to deprecate such a confusion of the two methods of training. Perhaps we had better do both, and proceed forthwith to set both points in their true and proper light.

We say, then, that the needs existing in a boy's mind call for general education and not for special training. His powers, unfolding in all directions, demand an instrument of development in all directions. If this general unfolding be first secured, and the special training follow after, you will enjoy the fruits of both; and, what is more, the results of the special training will be intensified in value, while the time and patience expended on it will be notably abridged, as the experience in the German universities has abundantly proved. But if the special training comes instead of the general culture and not after it, you will enjoy only the special results, and these stunted, dwarfed, with no amplitude of organic growth. There will be no fair-seeming symmetry of

branches and foliage ; no spreading-out of roots under a broad trunk ; no fine tree to ramify as its vitality prompts and its surroundings invite. In such a growth of a boy's mind, unfairly mutilated, there is no suppleness of general powers—we might almost say there are no general powers worth speaking of ; no memory cultivated throughout its field and made capable of every kind of yield ; no imagination cultured with all the life and sentiments of humanity in thought, action and history. A compression is exerted on the growing mind, a coercion put on it. Its future is shipped on the track of a railway, from which it may never more be stirred, except at the cost of some catastrophe—that kind of catastrophe which now we witness every eay, when minds attempt to reason outside of their own little specialty, and, passing over from chemistry, cut singular figures in philosophy ; or, taking a holiday from veterinary surgery, utter pronouncements in Christian divinity ; or, finally, looking up from political statistics, deliver an opinion upon classics and belles-lettres.

Using the fine comparison of Père Cahour, we may say that in the edifice of the sciences, as in physical construction, the foundation is the same for all orders of architecture. The special form of palace and temple, of fortress and church, although intended from the first, does not appear in effect until the edifice rises ; and the higher it is intended to rise the slower is the laying of the foundation. Thus it is that amplitude of knowledge does not develop its characteristics of specialty, save as the result of advancing years. Neither in childhood nor in impressionable boyhood should the mind be constrained, by anticipation, to what may yet be the spontaneous outgrowth of its further development. Nor, on the other hand, when nature and art are allowed to have their way,

should this amplitude be expected too soon, for then it would have failed to be spontaneous and healthy. D'Alembert and the encyclopædists fell into this latter error of forcing on the young an encyclopædic vastness; the scientists run into the former error of sacrificing the whole body to their fancy about some limb.

Matthew Arnold doubted whether his best impression of history would have been notably improved by learning from some distinguished scientist that his ancestors were of the biped kind, probably arboreal in their habits. Even Professor Huxley, the eminent President of the Royal Society, in spite of his fixed views on the physical basis of life and on protoplasmic theories generally, betrays that he is not dead to the æstheticism of a boy's life and to the true meaning of culture and general education. He says: "If the classics were taught as they might be taught, if boys and girls were instructed in Latin and Greek, not merely as languages but as illustrations of philological science; if a vivid picture of life on the shores of the Mediterranean two thousand years ago were imprinted on the minds of scholars; if ancient history were taught, not as a weary series of feuds and fights, but traced to its causes in such men under such conditions; if, lastly, the study of the classical books were followed in such a manner as to impress boys with their beauties and with the grand simplicity of their statement of the everlasting problems of human life, as well as with their grammatical peculiarities . . ." This, no doubt, is a vivid description from so declared an opponent as Professor Huxley; its shortcomings on the subject of philology and grammar we may touch on hereafter. But even were his own conditions as to the teaching of the classics fulfilled, he still thinks they should not form the basis of a liberal education. What, then,

should? Here the professor is not distinct. He leaves it, however, to be understood from the context that commercial statistics and engineering interests would fulfil all the requirements of a liberal education.

With a truer appreciation of the question on its own proper merits, M. Taine discerns in classical studies some of the genuine elements which constitute their vitality, and their power over the mind of youth. In the reading of a Greek tragedy, he considers that frame of mind will do justice to it which realizes vividly the men and the things, the place and the time —those men who lived under a glowing sky, face to face with the most noble landscape, within sight of the Mediterranean, blue and lustrous as a silken tunic, with islands rising from it like masses of marble. Add to this, he says, twenty select passages from Plato and Aristophanes. This, as far as it goes, is a correct literary estimate of certain elements in the study of Greek; but we may take, as well, the exalted appreciation which a philosophical spirit forms of Grecian literature. Mr. Allies could tell us why that little body of States covering the ground of a modern county or two, described and analysed in a few books of Thucydides and a few speeches of Demosthenes, has been found adequate to furnish future ages with a philosophy of society and of politics, about broad enough to guide a modern Premier. But, this not being the point before us, we shall pass on from the clear distinction between a general education and a special training; and we take up the discussion next in order. That shall be about the proper instrument with which to give a liberal education; whether such instrument is to be a literature or a science; and if a literature, whether it is to be any other than the Grecian and the Roman.

II

Some words of M. Taine may do us the service of introducing the question. He says: "Literary works are instructive because they are beautiful; their utility grows with their perfection; and, if they furnish documents, it is because they are monuments. The more a book represents visible sentiments the more it is a work of literature, for the office of literature is to take note of sentiments. The more a book represents important sentiments the higher is its place in literature. . . . This is why, amid the writings that set before our eyes the sentiments of preceding generations, a literature and notably a grand literature is incomparably the best."

For the sake of simplicity we shall establish the two propositions together: that only a literature is the adequate instrument for general or liberal education, and that the classic literatures, notably the Greek, are the choicest among all.

A literature is to be distinguished from a language. If the description which is attributed to Proudhon is correct, the language of a people is the sum total of its native ideas, the encyclopædia which Providence reveals to it from the first. We say now that a literature is more than a language. To speak precisely, it means not only the language and all the native ways of it, its turns of thought, idioms, and the like, but also the whole product of thought and sentiment that has been gathered up in the course of time, and vested in the garb of that tongue. To test the reality of this distinction we have only to translate from one tongue to another. What remains of the language out of which the translation is made? Nothing whatever. But still a large amount of the literature does remain. We say only a large amount, and not all. For that

which is finest and most delicate, that which is most individual in the features, shape, complexion of the thoughts expressed is unavoidably lost in stripping them of their native garb. Slight as these elements are, they resemble master-touches in a painting, most difficult to impart, most easy to lose. They are not to be copied. To be enjoyed they must be seized in the original. But, notwithstanding this loss, the literature is preserved in all that is solid. The process of translating hands over into another tongue all the solid contents of positive truth, proposition, proof. The translation of a fine piece of literature may be as good as the copy of a masterpiece; but no more.

The consul Mummius, when shipping the statues of Corinth to Rome, is said to have stipulated with the merchantmen that if any of the statues were disfigured on the way they should be replaced by others just as good; and succeeding generations have laughed at the consul. Perhaps, in future ages, there will be laughter at a scientific school which now gravely informs us that "the English literature is beyond all comparison the amplest, most various and splendid literature the world has ever seen"; because "to the original creations of English genius are to be added *translations* into English of all the masterpieces of other literatures, sacred and profane." That is one reason assigned. The other two are interesting: the next being that the English literature is immense; but this argument applies with still more force to the newspaper, which is superlatively immense. The third reason is that which has a right to cap any climax, a national and utilitarian argument: "It is the native tongue of nations which are pre-eminent in the world by force of character, influence and wealth."

Discarding English as the great lever for elevating

youthful minds, unless it has something more to say for itself than this, we beg to say a word now for Latin and Greek. It is a presumption in their favour that prejudice should so clearly be operating against them; and for any chemist or palæontologist, at this stage of the world's history, lightly to ignore the verdict of the ages in so essential a matter is dangerous for his literary credit.

The ancient tongues of Greece and Italy come down to us charged with all the historic memories of antiquity, sacred as well as profane; with all the masterpieces of eloquence and poetry belonging to three great epochs—those of Pericles, Augustus, and the founding of Christianity; with all philosophy, from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle down to St. Thomas Aquinas, and further still, down to Leibnitz and Newton, both of them men of classical letters; in fine, these tongues come down to us with all the traditions, all the beliefs, all the divinity of Christendom. Under a literary aspect, the eloquence and poetry of Greece were the mistress of Latin excellence. Under a philological aspect, the Latin tongue has been the principal base of our modern languages as formed in the history of Christendom.

Now, what does education mean? Let us recall what we said above. If it consists in bringing out the undeveloped nature of a boy, in bringing him into contact with various elements of richest thought, in favouring his inquiring eyes with glimpses of human life, individual, social and political; if it is to make him feel the finest springs of human sentiment as touched by the greatest masters of expression, and that in a language the most delicately organized and the most perfectly elaborated of all tongues, living and dead—if this is education, endeavouring to unfold the little capacities of the boy's soul to the measure of

mighty minds, and to feed his curious genius with the best products of great thinkers, who will tell us of an instrument for the purpose to be compared with the classic literature of Greece? Or where will an arbiter of the boy's future be found to compare with the master directing and controlling, correcting and supplementing the entire process?

Whether the literature be Latin or Greek, the deadness of the language is a distinct advantage. Even if it be spoken as if it were living, yet the advantage remains, for everything has to be learned by rule and formula. It is not the language of the nursery and of common life, and therefore it is not picked up without reflection, by dint of mere instinct. The relations of grammar and of logic must be attended to with deliberation. Thought and judgment are constantly exercised in assigning exact equivalents in the vernacular for every phrase in the original. The coincidence of construction is too little, and the community of thought too remote, for the boy's mind to catch at the idea by force of a pre-established harmony. Only the laws of logic guide him, with a competent teacher to reassure his developing sense. Thus far and farther still, the mere page of a dead language affords a distinct advantage. But to have the dead language spoken is not to lessen the advantage; it is to expedite the work. It is not to make the dead tongue a living one, but to study the dead after the manner of the living, and to retain the advantages of the former without the drawbacks of the latter. This is to be thorough and expeditious together.

With grammar thus understood, you may hope to have philologists. With the principles of great minds thus deliberately unearthed, you may hope to have philosophers. With so much rational labour expended, you may count on intellectual nerve and sinew. With

the rays of all the fine arts streaming in through all the avenues of the finest literatures, you may hope to accomplish a liberal education.

From all this two consequences follow relative to statements made by the anti-classical school; one with regard to the amount of labour expended, the other with regard to the permanence of any system adopted for conducting a liberal education.

In the first place it is said: "If a language is to be learned, I would teach it in the easiest known method, and at an age when it can be most easily learned." To this remark of President Eliot we return, by way of answer, an equally general observation of Père Daniel: "Easy methods ruin us. If we do not re-establish the ancient system of teaching in its integrity, at all events do not let us open the door to a general do-as-you-like; let us not content ourselves in grammatical studies with results just so-so—results inevitable if we deprive these studies of their classical character." In the second place, it is thought that no system of liberal studies can be permanent or fitted for all times, because, observes the president, "the educational value of any established study, far from being permanently fixed, is constantly changing as new knowledge accumulates and new sciences come into being." And he considers those who differ from him to be "thoughtless and ignorant people," even the former Master of Trinity, W. Whewell, who "did not hesitate to apply to these three studies [*Latin and Greek and the old mathematics*] the word *permanent*." But, we reply, if the problem is always the same, the answer must be the same; if the one is permanent, so is the other. The problem is how to develop a human mind. If the human mind is constant and if its development has a fixed meaning, there must be, morally speaking, some best way or

some approximately best way of developing that human mind.

III

Having vindicated our own principles, we can now afford to review the special pleadings of the scientists. This we shall do; but it is worth while first to see their peculiar method of pleading. The style of logic which they use is an important element, and we may criticize it first. Then we shall take up the special subjects for which they plead.

Their style of logic is reduced to one set of principles —utility, money, convenience. Thus, when Whewell condemns for many reasons the modern analytical mathematics, and denies its claim to be a permanent study by which the reason of man is to be educated, and insists that the old geometrical form of mathematics must be especially preserved and maintained as essentially requisite for this office, the following brief answer is returned: "The modern analytical mathematics, thus condemned by Whewell, is practically the only mathematics now in use in the United States." This answer is singularly wide of the mark. What we want is something different—a rational account, a philosophical reason, an explanation from the "inwardness" of things, why analytical mathematics, if they hold a place, have a right to hold it. But the answer is—they hold it, and that is all. Such a method of logic explains why we meet with no very troublesome arguments to analyse in the opposition to the classics, nothing but assertion, repetition and "practical utility." We distinguish practical from liberal utility, special and professional from general and fundamental utility which, as we have tried to show above, true liberal education subserves

The president admits that to use such a staple of argument as mere practical utilitarianism is derogatory to the dignity of such a discussion. Thus, when arguing for French and German, he says: "This claim rests, not on the *usefulness* of these languages to couriers, tourists and commercial travellers; but on the magnitude and worth of the literatures and on the unquestionable fact that facility in reading these languages is absolutely *indispensable* to a scholar, whatever may be his department of study." He dwells at length on the manifold uses of French and German, and their "indispensableness" to "philologists, archæologists, metaphysicians, physicians, physicists, naturalists, chemists, economists, engineers, architects, artists, and musicians." He protests: "I urge no utilitarian argument, but rest the claims of French and German, for admission to complete academic equality, on the copiousness and merit of the literatures, and the *indispensableness* of the languages to all scholars." In short, the eminent chemist urges no utilitarian argument, but he urges the argument of utilitarianism. For, as to the copiousness and merit of the literatures, he says not another word on either.

Farther on he argues for the introduction into a liberal education of political economy. He describes it as being related to three distinct sciences, which, singularly enough, he seems to rank as co-ordinate—history, the accumulation of wealth, and ethics. This new science of political economy had better, he thinks, be called the science of the health of nations; it includes industrial, social and political problems; and it is by far the most complex and difficult of the sciences of which modern education has to take account. Indeed he goes on to say, it requires such exactness of statement, such accurate weighing of

premises, and such closeness of reasoning, that many young men of twenty who have been disciplined by the study of Greek, Latin, and mathematics for six or eight years find that it tasks their utmost powers. After this forcible description the president continues : "Neither can it be justly called a material or utilitarian subject, for it is full of grave moral problems, and deals with many questions of public honour and duty." To this remark the most obvious rejoinder is : Neither can it be called anything else but a material and utilitarian subject, for it deals directly with wealth, health, population, industry and the like. If it touches on anything else, such as public honour and duty, it is for the same reason that whatever deals with anything human remotely touches all things human ; for human nature is one. But that does not make all sciences one, nor raise a utilitarian statistician to the dignity of an ethical philosopher.

Having exhibited their style of argumentation, we may consider now what pleas the members of this anti-classical school advance for their new and special branches. Analytical mathematics comes first. This exact science is, as we have seen, already in possession of the ground ; it is found in the curriculum of polite studies. But that need not prevent us from analysing its merits, and seeing what claim it has to an educational value. We say, then, that a professor of the exact sciences, taken in general, need not be a man who educates. He may be eminent in his own science ; but, whether eminent or not, he does not therefore educate. If he is eminent, he has a special genius. If he is an ordinarily good professor, for instance in mathematics, he must have a certain sum of natural talents and acquired knowledge. But this sum of qualities, says Père Cahour, is not equal to the sum which makes a good professor of belles-lettres.

Eloquence and poetry demand a spirit accomplished in point of intelligence, sensibility and imagination, and, besides, they call for literary, historical and philosophical knowledge of no small extent. Algebra and geometry, in their ordinary courses, require on the side of the professor, and impart to the pupil, only penetration and justness of perception; and whatever collateral knowledge is involved may be found within the limits of certain formulas and demonstrations which are contained, cut and dried, in the pages of mathematical books. This one fact shows the value of all that vaunted exactness, which as far as it is exactness is an excellence; but as far as it is nothing else, and has nothing to do with anything else, with probabilities, for example—and what is human life but largely a mass of probabilities and uncertainties?—is nothing but a narrowness, tending to beget a narrow and stiff habit of thought amid the ever-changing circumstances of life. Only the eternal laws of essential morality and virtue are rigid in the anatomy of life. But the stereotyped exactness imparted and learnt in scientific demonstration would make everything rigid—lines, minds, men and all existence. There is no development of a boy's humanity about it. The gamut of a peal of bells might as well be taken to represent the thousand tones and inflections of a human voice as that a mathematical training should be supposed to represent or effect the education of a human soul. We are prone to compare it with the study of law, and we could imagine Cicero saying to a mathematician what he said to the lawyer Sulpicius, that, if he were provoked any more, he would go and learn the whole of that science in three days!

And, to speak more particularly of analytical mathematics, it may be that great minds understand the

subject, and are helped, educationally, by its use. But, candidly, we doubt whether, educationally speaking, the minds of ordinary mortals are much assisted that way. For they can follow the processes, intellectually, only a few paces from the shore, through a few coefficients, a power or two, one or other factor, and then—they are beyond their depth in a sea of manipulation, among high powers, multifarious factors, involved in some larger brackets, the whole wrapped up in a cube radical, with an imaginary or surd sparkling somewhere in the trappings. What can save a man the credit of any intelligence, or the hope of coming to anything intelligible, but fidelity to a blind mechanical manipulation? And only among the last results may light begin to beam again, when heaving within sight of land, and within reach of some simplified and plain formulas, we just find breath enough left us to interpret them. It is capital work in its results. But, as a process, and as an educational performance, it reminds us only of those dull-looking compositions which, when rightly tipped and mounted, manage on the application of a spark to shoot forth light, colour and brilliancy into the darksome skies of the night. The firmament itself can stand revealed in the final illumination of Kepler's laws. Only the manufacture up to that point was anything but an illumination for the intelligence; it was a piece of factory work. Now, is this an education for the young? Either, therefore, as Whewell rightly observes, apply the geometry of Euclid, which, step by step, the boy understands; or let us at least have none of your modern mathematics mounted as an educational power. It is a mechanism for making machines.

Whence it comes that anything like breadth or depth of view, such as mark profundity and genius, are very much out of place in the ordinary chairs of

mathematics; and those only are effective men for preparing students to pass examinations who are methodical men, in the sense of being men who prefer to repeat the science of others, and are strictly devoted to accepted demonstrations and formulas. They are more successful in their teaching, according as they are simple in their set of expressions; more unchanging in the proofs commonly employed; more circumscribed in keeping to the stereotyped propositions.

We proceed to consider the natural sciences. The plea put forward for them is on the ground that natural-science investigation spreads abroad the only spirit in which any kind of knowledge can be prosecuted to a result of lasting intellectual value. This is the "patient, cautious, sincere, self-directing spirit of natural science." We do not venture to deny this. We imagine that every branch of knowledge has something to recommend it, not only in its product but in its method. And, however much personally we might be enamoured of a chorus in Æschylus or a speech in Thucydides, we are willing to admit that the patient, cautious, sincere, self-directing spirit necessary to guide one through the chorus or the speech, might quite possibly be improved still more by turning to the natural sciences, and exercising the same virtues on the back of a diatom under the microscope. But, in this educational question, we are inquiring whether natural science has anything to recommend it, and whether boys have the time desirable for it. There are grave writers who commend it as a recreation to rest the minds of hard students; but we are here discussing education not relaxation.

This is the place to cite the results of experience acquired on the subject in the German universities. After ten years' trials of "scientific" as an alternative to classical education, the philosophical faculty of the

Frederick-William University issued a report which has been called " the most powerful plea ever made on behalf of the classics." The professors of mathematics, languages, philosophy, and even of science itself, are unanimous in asserting that the non-classical student at the university is, throughout, at a serious disadvantage when competing with the classicist, even in subjects upon which this latter has spent comparatively little time during the school course. Our own experience fully corroborates the above. The students of commercial courses are intellectually inferior to their compeers in the classical courses, though all other conditions may be equally favourable.[1]

We have no time to dwell upon other subjects for which the scientists plead. We do but mention them. With regard to the English language, we say briefly that classical scholars are known, as a rule, to be better masters of their own tongue. With respect to English literature, if that is viewed on its utilitarian merits, it does not enter into the question ; if it is taken on its educational and literary merits, we have already seen that no claim is put forward on its behalf that would rank it anywhere near the classics. As to French and German and other modern languages, they are of such a formation and have such a bearing on the classical tongues as to place them altogether within easy reach of any classical scholar. Political economy is, as the scientists have shown, ruled out of court. Finally, history is an everyday element in the classics. Nor should a certain amount of all that is useful be omitted from the course. But this belongs to the practical aspect of the question, and with that we are not concerned here.

[1] See the original essay for the analysis of reports from German Universities (1880) ; also for the discussion of other branches ummarily sketched here.

In the last words of the lecture with which we have been dealing we read: "If history proves that the staples of education have changed, reason says, still more clearly, that they must change." To this historical and philosophical appeal of the scientific mind, confident in the integrity of its motives, we answer, confident in the integrity of our demonstration, that, as we might go on to show, history can prove the staples of education never to have changed, and, as we have already shown, reason says more clearly still that they never can change.

All the sciences are sisters, and there is among them a community of parentage and a community of resources. If justice is to be done to the sciences as the means of ulterior progress, let a liberal education first do justice to the great literatures as a means of fundamental progress. It will, thereby, do justice to the powers of the opening mind; in order that, its sensibility and imagination, its reason and intelligence being well cultivated in the time of youth, it may expand early to the beauty of the ideal world, and breathe in the atmosphere of the infinite; that, in the early freshness which develops only in the sunshine of beautiful thoughts, the plastic soul may be formed to live from early years the life of truth. The noblest geometry and the sublimest astronomy will find a congenial home in such a mind; for the true science of the exact mind is not divorced from the æsthetic beauties of the liberal mind. This is the permanent law of human development, as the nature of the mind is permanent, as truth is permanent, and religion and morality—all staples permanent. They are no functions of the passing hour. Nor is liberal education any function of the latest passing scheme.

XIII

PSYCHOLOGY, PHYSIOLOGY AND PEDAGOGICS [1]

The three words which we have inscribed as our title may be taken to express the most important ideas of the day in that field of thought which is called science. The term biology covers perhaps a wider extent of ground than psychology and physiology: it is made to include both. And the science called anthropology is the most comprehensive of all, because it not only embraces all, but comprises also a formal treatment of those materialistic attractions which make biology, physiology, psychology and other partial sciences so very dear to the modern mind. Taking, however, the three departments which we have named—psychology, physiology and pedagogics—we shall find that, by the due interlacing of interests and the mutual bearings of all parts of modern science, they express, in their own way, the dominant ideas of materialism. And, as doing so, we propose to consider them, in the light of very urgent and live interests which attach at present to the names.

Let us state, first, what has been the traditional meaning of these names up to our day.

Psychology means the science about the soul, which in Greek is called *psyche*. It is a science eminently philosophical and metaphysical, because it considers the ultimate causes or constituents of one of the beings

[1] From *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, October, 1894 (vol. XIX), pp. 790–812; abridged.

of nature, and that noblest being in all nature—man. It treats of man's soul, which is the ultimate constituent principle in him. Now, all such ultimate causes lie beyond the vision, observation and experimentation of natural science, of physics, biology and all the rest; because ultimate causes are behind and prior to those phenomena with which natural science begins. Phenomena are already constructed as effects produced by their intrinsic causes, before natural science can begin its operations with the microscope, with the electric current, with chemical reagents, or any other of the numberless resources for investigation which are now at hand.

Least of all could the human soul be subjected to such experimental investigation. Its nature exempts it. The nature of every subject proper to physical science excludes it. For it is simple, spiritual and endowed with all the attributes which appertain to a spiritual substance. It has powers of intellect, memory and will, which know intellectually, are conscious, remember, desire, hope, love, all in the intellectual and spiritual order of existence and activity. Its world and atmosphere are, in the first instance, spiritual and abstract essences, and individual beings like itself, remote from matter and immortal. The nature, besides, of every subject proper to physical science endorses the right, which the human soul enjoys, of being exempted from the application of the compass, the measure, the balance. For every such subject pertains to this world of composite matter; it is extended, divisible, measurable, ponderable; as is also the body of man, who, taken as a whole, is constituted what he is by the union of soul with a body of material substance. The question of the soul itself, therefore, is altogether philosophical, or, as Aristotle put it, is "metaphysical," that is, "after

physics," behind it, beyond it, belonging to the ultimate causes of things.

Physiology is a science quite within the scope and circle of natural sciences, which proceed by way of observation and experiment. It observes the living body, actuated as it is by the soul. It takes for its proper subject the functions of the living body; it considers the tissues and organs which are constructed by the soul in matter for the discharge of all the functions characteristic of a vital compound. It inspects the processes by which the body develops and grows to maturity; the structures by which it sees, feels, tastes, hears, etc. To anatomy it abandons the dead structure, as considered apart from the living functions. To a preliminary part of psychology it leaves the consideration of sensitive knowledge, or the nature of that relation which a sensitive organism maintains with the outer world, by what we call sensitive knowledge—sensation, perception, through sight, hearing, taste, sensitive memory, sensitive consciousness, instincts, imagination and fancy. Physiology merely regards the subject as exercising living functions; and this in the vegetable world as well as in the animal. Rising above mere physical science, it avails itself of the data and conclusions supplied by physics. And so it borrows thence all the principles which go to explain extended and ponderable matter. If it speaks of heat, light, electricity, it does so only as deriving its data from the inferior science of physics or natural philosophy.

Pedagogics or pedagogy is the name given to a scientific elaboration of those principles on which the education of man rests. The final object of all education belongs to the sphere of pure psychology; it is the cultivation of the spiritual and immortal soul. Catholics understand this well enough. So well,

indeed, do they understand it, made known to them, as it is, by the light of natural good sense, and still more as revealed to them by the light of divine faith, which is in them, that they sit by, uninterested and apathetic, while the world is agitated with a fever of "educational thinking," of "pedagogic inquiry," of investigation, groping for what children of the Church possess by a divine birthright. And, just as in fields of religious inquiry, so in this matter too, Catholics are considered to be backward, to be behind the times and indolent and unenterprising; because, forsooth, they do not go about with a candle looking for some bits of truth, when they have the whole of it to look at, in the light of noonday.

The final object of all education is the culture of the soul. It is to develop the spiritual intellect and train the free will of man. However, as in this life the soul is not reached save through the body, nor the intellect except through sense, it is the whole human person, made up of soul and body, that is the direct subject of education; and most worthy it is of culture. One thing is not the subject of pedagogical culture—the human body taken by itself. That can be trained, made fat, strong and agile, as any mute animal can be; it can be brought up as a splendid animal by athletics, games, calisthenics; but, apart from the main object, these things have nothing more to do with human education than the art of a veterinary surgeon or that of a breeder of pigeons; indeed, they can be much more prejudicial than the innocent arts of curing a horse or breeding a fowl.

Chief and most beautiful, among all beings in this visible universe, is the human person, a marvel of divine wisdom, with powers which sum up in brief all that is effective, exquisite and harmonious in the world beside. Animated, as his bodily structure is,

by the spiritual soul, man comprises every perfection which is distributed at large about him, all that is material, vegetative and sensitive. This is so because, in the right of his intellectual and spiritual life, he is destined to carry all, linked together by a substantial union, into the regions of pure spirituality, where the soul itself properly lives, and in which its destiny is fulfilled. When he reaches his final term in beatitude he takes with him, by the gift of a bodily resurrection, this same material compendium of the great material universe; he introduces it into the company of purely spiritual substances; and farther still does he carry it, into the family life and glorious existence of the Godhead, where the soul enters on its inheritance, by the title of divine grace—that grace itself being a participation of the divine nature. It is in the light of this sublime Providence that the whole world, otherwise so fair, looks so vile beside the consummation of all things accomplished in the person of man, though he does seem so small: *O quam sordet mihi terra, cum cœlum aspicio!* Now education has for its object the final working out of this destiny. Therefore it takes for its immediate subject the microcosm of the human person, soul and body, faculties and senses, all efficient for their purposes, and clamouring for culture in time, that they may bear their fruit in eternity.

Such is the field covered by the three names at the head of this article. This whole field is now explored by a new school, which gives us with its scientific results quite a number of new conceptions. We can scarcely style their explorations, thus joined with their novel conceptions, by any name hitherto known in the subject-matter treated. The school is aware of the fact. Hence its psychology, in particular, it designates as "*modern* psychology."

Really, to understand the new psychology, there is

need of nothing more than physiology and physics. All the psychology that might seem to be about it is certainly no more than that which deals with mere knowledge, acquired by sensation and terminating in sensation. But even that ceases to be psychological in its hands. Sensation becomes a question of mere molecular physics, a form of motion, vibration, extension.

I

There is some excuse for this. The matter which goes to build up our living body has not put off any of its necessary qualities in doing so. It is extended, ponderable, divisible, movable. There are vibrations in the cells and nerves ; there is a mechanical response to external action in the reaction of the mass of matter which constitutes the body. Aristotle repeatedly teaches that there is no production of anything without movement. But, evidently, it is one thing that a living body should not be found without mechanical movement or other physical qualities ; it is quite another thing that itself or its sensitive life should consist only of mechanical motion or the manifestation of physical attributes. As Sylvester Maurus observes : " It is one thing that an animal should not walk without having feet ; it is altogether another matter that walking should consist in having feet. So, sensations are not produced without motions, impulses and excitations of the sensitive organs ; but sensation itself does not consist in having sensitive organs moved or excited." And the same holds good for all other functions in the live subject of physiology.

These functions are of two classes. One is that which regards the nourishment, growth and reproduction of the body ; in the light of these, there is a

physiology of plants which, as compared with the vegetative powers in man, rank under comparative physiology. Another class of functions is that which regards the life of relation, whereby a living organism apprehends other objects outside of it, and feels, sees, tastes them. These are the functions of sensitive or animal life, in virtue of which, as St. Thomas remarks, both animals and men avoid what is hurtful and seek what is useful for the sustenance of the body. To this the power of locomotion is referred, as being a necessary consequence and appanage of the relativity in a life of sense. In the case of man, who has a sensitive organism pertaining to the animal world, sensation is specially elevated to its highest degree of perfectibility, as being the channel or door through which the facts of the outer sensible world, as well as of the living organism itself, are brought within the cognizance of the spiritual intellect.[1]

It is the same soul which, acting spiritually in its own conscious intellect, will and memory, actuates also the animal body as a principle of life united with matter. "The Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth; and breathed into his face the breath of life; and man became a living soul." The soul elevates the matter of the living body in every order of sensitive knowledge, as far as matter is capable of elevation. The body sees, hears, feels outer things; it has a sensitive consciousness of its own sensations, a sensitive memory, and animal appetite. Highest of all is the wonderfully plastic power of imagination which, deriving its images from without, can frame any combination of images or parts of things imagined, according as the free spiritual will chooses to arrange.

[1] Compare the author's sketch of this internal construction and equipment, in *Talks on Truth*, ch. xvii, "Imagination," by T. Hughes, S.J., 1923.

This is that "fancy," the unique and highest effort of sensitive knowledge, which is ordained to serve most adequately the intellectual ideas of the spiritual intellect; and for the proper discharge of which the remarkable organization of the human brain seems to be designed. Thus St. Thomas remarks, in the same place which we quoted before: "sensitive knowledge is specially ordained in man for the service of intellectual knowledge, either speculative or practical." [1]

In all this department of philosophy we owe to modern physiology a debt or two. We have learnt from it not a little about the subjective conditions of sensitive organs, and of their functions in every respect. Nor do we fail to acknowledge a debt to natural physics, which has added to our stores of information —how, for instance, the activity and the qualities of external things are applied to our organs, in some instances, by means of vibrations or oscillations, communicated first to intervening media, which transfer the same to our organs and begin to excite the sense. But no amount of experimentation on the things of nature, or on ourselves, need make us mere experimentalists or empiricists, who will accept only that which is tested by physical experiment or is observed by the physiologist's eye. Because there is no sensation of light without vibrations in the ether, nor in a nerve without stimulation, it does not follow that the sensation of light is only vibration in the ether or stimulation in the nerve. We might as well run to the other extreme, where idealists are stranded, and infer that, because there are representations within us which vibrations can never explain, therefore such representations must be gratuitous forms of our own "consciousness," forms fastened on—we had almost said, clapped on—the moment an excitation comes

[1] Summa Theol., 2.2ae, q. 167, a. 2.

from without; and that what we know is only the manufacture of an internal idealistic factory.

It is this materialistic empiricism on the one side, just like vain idealism on the other, which, adopting the terms consecrated by good sense and philosophy to most definite ideas and data, applies them with utter recklessness to things altogether different, to the world of nature and man, as these erroneous theories conceive both to be. Materialism even apologizes in its gentler moods, and says: "Other meanings are attached to mental phenomena, and other relations pointed out, which necessitate a change in the psychological problem." In other words, it coolly uses old terms in altogether new meanings! Terms entirely proper to things strictly spiritual and intellectual are applied most unconscionably to things merely physiological and physical. Phrases like "mind," "consciousness," "memory," "intelligence," "will," dance about in these pages, one might say in gorgeous confusion; were it not that, after much agony on the part of a reader's logical mind, the grim discovery is made that there is no such thing as spiritual faculties of any kind; that by "mind" is meant sense; by "will" is meant sensitive appetite; nay, that sense and sensitive appetites themselves, and all other functions of a vital organism, are, after all, only physical movements, oscillations in cell-substance, excitations in neural fibres, chemical reactions, and the like.

It is in truth a "new" psychology, served up by the school of empirical physiology. It lends itself as a new ally to the whole brood of philosophical systems which do away with the realities of the objective world. Its own conception is that we produce, by physiological functions within us, all that we seem to perceive by sense without us. It lands us by the way

of mere titillations in the nerves just where idealists, like Herbart, set us down by the way of transcendental realities or forms. As Père Bonniot remarks,[1] we become dancing marionettes, pulled by the wires of the objective world, if there is any. The machinery is worked in this wise, according to Dr. Luys: "The divers processes of activity in the brain sum themselves up, in the last analysis, in a circular movement of absorption and of restoration of forces. It is the external world with all its solicitations that enters into us by the way of the senses, under the form of sense excitation; and it is the same external world which, modified, rebuffed by its interior conflict with the living tissues that it has traversed, issues from the organism, and reflects itself outside in the varied manifestations of voluntary locomotion." As far as this grandiose verbiage means anything about the realities of life, it signifies simply that we see, hear, feel, etc., and we go and come accordingly. Aristotle and St. Thomas said this in much clearer terms; and common sense is always saying it in a creditably plain way.

The modern psychology explains "attention" in this characteristic fashion: "Of the sensations, perceptions, thoughts or feelings, that enter at a given moment into the mental content, but one is at the focus of attention; the rest are stationed in the outlying area of consciousness. By what means," it asks, "is this mental fixation brought about? Under what conditions does it veer around from one image to another? The answers, both qualitative and quantitative, that experiment has given to these questions, are among the best contributions to our knowledge of mind." The Abbé Farges gives in so

[1] *L'Ame et la Physiologie*, liv. II, § 2; *Déterminisme Physiologique*, p. 292.

far to the seductions of this materialistic physiology, that he finds the sensitive perception of light, sound, etc., to be only an image in the brain, which image consists of vibrations; and these vibrations, persisting in the cerebral fibres or cells, constitute *memory*. The memory-vibrations are silent vibrations. They are a kind of phosphorescence.[1]

II

Here someone interposes. He expounds modern psychology. He first intimates that, in spite of Kant's prediction to the contrary, psychology has become an "exact" science, that is to say, involving mathematical measurements; for physiological research has become exact and mathematical, "quantitative as well as qualitative"; physical research has analysed light-waves and sound-waves; what is more, physics and physiology involve psychological problems, because the experimenter in each has a psychological principle in him, for the action of which allowance must be made in the mechanical accuracy of his observations; and again, numerous phenomena of physiology receive their final interpretation from psychology. Therefore psychology has become a mathematically exact science. But this is only a preliminary appetiser for our logical appetite. Let us take up *les pièces de résistance*.

We can enumerate no less than three great proofs which are offered us to establish a conviction in our minds that experimental psychology has grown, has followed methods of its own and has achieved much. First, there is Weber's law; secondly, Fechner's measures for psychical phenomena; thirdly, Wundt's

[1] Cf. Dr. Surbled, *Les Explications Physiques de la Mémoire; Revue des Questions Scientifiques*, April, 1894, p. 365.

foundation of a psychological laboratory. Besides these great proofs there are several subordinate ones, which we add in order: fourthly, the general harmony of the new psychology with evolution; fifthly, the need of emancipation on the part of psychology, or its right to "autonomy"; sixthly, the perfectly obvious fact that the old Peripatetic or Scholastic philosophy about the soul passed out of existence somewhere in the sixteenth century!

These six heads of argument are so perspicuous that it will take us scarcely any time to formulate them, and pay them our due respects.

First proof.—E. H. Weber observed, that we do not apprehend different sensations as separate, but that we fuse them into one, unless a certain space of time intervenes. Thus, two sounds or two lights seem to be one, if not sufficiently apart. Again, he observed that the two sounds, two lights, two weights, may be different in their intensity or measure, but they are not perceived by the sense as different, on the basis of their absolute quantity, but only as they compare with one another. We are told, that "E. H. Weber was the *first* to observe these facts of perception," from which he deduced a remarkable conclusion, "that, in comparing external impressions, we are able to determine their relations but not their absolute value." This acute inference means, that when we compare, we compare; that we feel one impression, say of heat, to be stronger than another; but we do not forthwith know that the hotter object is precisely 95° F., and the cooler object just 70° F. This discovery was made in 1834.

The estimate we form of this profound conclusion is: What has it to do with psychology, except to insist upon a circumstance of sense which was perfectly well known?

Second proof.—A great man, a physicist, philosopher and mathematician, came on the stage some thirteen years later, and "gathered together many loose-lying data, gave them their true significance, and made them the starting-point of a more complete and more systematic investigation. This man was Gustav Theodor Fechner." He spent forty years of a valuable life in psychological research; and he was finally enabled to formulate Weber's law with accuracy, yea, and mathematically. For those readers who have a turn that way, we record Weber's law, thus reformed: "Equal absolute increments of sensation correspond to equal relative increments of the stimulus; or, as it has been expressed, the stimulus-strength must increase in a geometrical ratio, if the strength of the sensation is to increase in an arithmetical ratio." From the lowest "threshold of discrimination," where sensation is first excited, and then mounts proportionately with the stimulus outside, Fechner constructs a scale upwards, the stimulation advancing geometrically, the strength of sensation arithmetically. To establish this law, all kinds of measurements were necessary; and thus were introduced the "psycho-physical methods."

Here we have novelties. To begin to understand what all these methods mean, we have to take our stand in the formalism of Kant, or in the idealistic realism of Herbart, or in some go-between system, compounded of Kant's transcendentalism and Hegel's logico-metaphysics, such as Wundt has devised. We must be prepared to hear of mental "structure," like Herbart's or Beneke's, one of whom makes what he calls the soul construct its mental "representations" into the faculties of sense, appetites, volition, while the other puts no soul at all in man, but makes him acquire it, in the shape of many intellects, reasons,

wills; for the soul is produced by education and the artificial suggestion of fitting irritations, particularly in school. If anyone will take his stand with proper docility in the midst of this world of German *Vorstellungen*, and will exercise, moreover, a portentous amount of patience, he may begin to understand what the new psychology is talking about when, bringing physiology and physics into the field, with its "psycho-physical methods," it expounds the "analysis of sense-perceptions," "the study of attention," "the succession of mental states," "the time-sense," "the measure of feelings and emotions"; when it tries to measure hunger, thirst and fatigue; or, becoming sublimely mathematical, endorses Herbart's conception, that "states of consciousness have two dimensions." Why? Because they are long and they are broad. They are broad, since they vary in intensity; they are long, because "*they follow one another in time!*"

Our estimate of Fechner's great psychological discovery is suggested by the circumstances of its development. It is only the law of Weber, supposed to have fermented into clarity, under a forty years' process of physical and psychological treatment. However, clear or not, 'tis a pity, but it is not true. The soul it is—a real soul—that animates sense; and, as Kant divined, it will not tolerate the millimetre or centimetre scale, as if it were an electrical current or a candle-light. A number of what are quietly called "disturbing elements" are found to intrude and to upset the psychometrical calculations. Hence new laws are being invoked to bolster up Weber's; there is the law of the degradation of sensation and the law of tension. And, if these people go on bravely, they will soon have as many laws to invoke as Darwinism invented to sew together the descent of

species. But we need not dwell on the matter. The exposition which we are considering tells us expressly that Weber's law is found to possess only an approximate value; that there are "deviations from the law, to be explained in each sense-organ by psychological conditions"; that there is an unfortunate power of self-adaptation in the senses, and there are after-images, and sensations subjective in their origin. Fechner himself protested frequently that further investigation was needed "to elucidate *fully* the problems in hand"; and, in fact, "it is generally thought that he overrated the importance of Weber's researches, and imputed to Weber's law a value which subsequent tests do not confirm," etc. But these drawbacks notwithstanding, let it be noted well that, "whatever may be the verdict of posterity upon the contents of Fechner's '*Psychophysik*,' its *suggestiveness* can never be called in question!" We hasten to disclaim all intention of impugning its suggestiveness. We voluntarily proclaim that it is suggestive of materialism; it is rank with it; it reeks with it.

Third proof.—William Wundt entered the philosophical arena, and in 1874 he gratified the world by publishing his sketch of "Physiological Psychology." He undertook to treat psychology expressly on physiological data, and explain the spiritual soul by the nerves. His system is that of physiological determinism; all mental operations take place mechanically the moment certain organic conditions are placed. Accordingly, he sets about experimenting on the neural substance, the nerves, the organs; and, in the ever-memorable year 1879, he founds a laboratory at Leipzig. Eloquence fails his admirers in their endeavour to express all that they owe him for the psychological laboratory. Mr. G. Stanley Hall, who

was one of the earliest members of the Leipzig institute for examining soul in a laboratory, came over and established one at the Johns Hopkins University in the year of grace 1888. Other laboratories followed; periodicals and several associations have come into existence. And so the argument proceeds. "Experiment has succeeded to mere introspection, and psychology is as much at home in the laboratory as it was in the library."

To this argument, overwhelming for its length if not for its cogency, we have really nothing special to say. If these authorities mean by their psychometry to measure physical motion or vibrations in the nerves we wish them well. But if they or anyone else shall pretend to measure physiological functions, as though sensation consisted of motions running up to the brain and down again, we beg to submit that the notion is a philosophical absurdity. And if they really mean to subject psychological activity to laboratory investigations, as though the soul could in any way be measured or weighed, we do not scruple to call the whole enterprise a theological impiety. We candidly believe, however, that here is precisely the reason why psychometry has such vogue.

Fourth proof.—The new psychology is in harmony with the general theory of evolution—that is to say, it falls into line with biology as handled by the school of Darwin. We are told that, "in a wide and philosophical sense, biological research for a century past has been guided by principles which could not but modify the study of mind. Underlying every theory of evolution is the idea of a continuous development, resulting in gradual differentiation. To trace this process back to its earliest stages, a comparison of structure and function all along the series of organisms was required. Hence the genetic method [*i.e. Haeckel's*

biogenesis [1]] and, as essential to it, the comparative method." Mr. Herbert Spencer's work on the *Principles of Psychology* is cited as evidence that the scheme of biogenesis, showing the evolution of mind out of a brute's sense, and that the comparison of brutes with men "can be applied to the investigation of mental phenomena."

This is all well said. It simply means that a man must be an evolutionist in biology to endorse modern psychology. We are of that opinion. In fact, a remark is expressly thrown out as if it were a matter of perfect indifference, "whether we hold with one school that there is a difference of kind between the lowest and highest mental functions [i.e. *between sense and intellect*], or with another school that there is merely a difference of degree in complexity [*intellect being only a more complex sense*]." A man has to forswear his belief in a truth of Christian faith, and must be willing to admit that his soul is no more spiritual than his eye, if he wishes to have anything to do with the "new psychology." He must commit a formal dogmatic error in his Christian faith. As to the crass materialism and gross philosophy which postulates this, we have discussed both when treating of Dr. G. Romanes' *Mental Evolution of Man*.[2]

Fifth proof.—The new psychology advances steadily towards autonomy, though it by no means discards wholesale the acquisitions of the past. That steady differentiation, which has given to the various empirical branches of science a certain independence, has affected philosophy as well. Logic, psychology and ethics tend more and more towards autonomy or emancipation.

[1] Cf. *supra*, here, pp. 152, *seqq.*; 184.

[2] See *supra*, pp. 154, *seqq*, "A Baby's Footprint and Other Vestiges."

That is true. But the new psychology was never otherwise than emancipated. It has never regarded either the principles of other sciences or those of Christian faith. It is emancipated from logic, from ethics, from biology, from anthropology and from everything else. There was no need of advancing this as an argument for its correctness.

Sixth proof.—The Aristotelian, Scholastic and Thomistic systems of philosophy are long effete; therefore, this may take their place.

We deny the antecedent. Till better reasons are given, we deny the consequence. And, in all cases, we deny the sequence between antecedent and consequence.

We do not know whether we should reckon as a proof the usual advertising qualifications which accompany these *jeux d'esprit* of the modern scientific mind—these excursions of what Dr. Surbled styles "a vagabond imagination." All these systems flutter their own eulogies in the breeze and call themselves "stimulating," "inspiring," "suggestive in the last degree"; they declare that they furnish "the best contributions to our knowledge," that the "discoveries they have made are as important as they were hitherto unsuspected," etc.

We ought to leave modern psychology some shreds to cover itself with. So we will leave it these.

III

What becomes of pedagogics, or the science of education, in a philosophical system which knows no ideas, no intellect, no spiritual emotions of a higher will, not even sense; which admits only sound-waves or light-waves as coming from without and

playing on nerves; which understands nothing but the stimulation of ganglia, chiefly that which is called the brain, and considers the irritations of tissue from some undefined activities without to be the whole contribution of knowledge to what it denominates "consciousness" within? What becomes of the science of education in such a system?

We are assured, with a perfect air of confidence, that a new and practical aspect appears in this psychology when it is applied in the class-room. "In whatever fashion the teacher performs his task, he is, consciously or unconsciously, applying psychological notions. Is there any reason why these should be wrong rather than right, vague and tentative, when they might be precise and methodical?" To be sure, it is added confidentially that "modern psychology has not, as yet, rendered to pedagogics the full share of usefulness which the relations of the two sciences would lead us to expect."

We are not at all of this opinion. We consider it has already gone a great way, and very much too far, in rendering to pedagogics what is pleasantly styled its "share of usefulness." And therefore, desiring with our whole soul to eschew all possibility of resemblance to this school of psychologists, who never define their meaning, who never deliver themselves of an important utterance except when wrapt up in a cloud of verbiage, who never make themselves understood—perhaps for a very obvious reason—we beg to state clearly, first, what degree of utility attaches to this psychology from the teacher's point of view; secondly, what this psychology looks like when it gets into the teacher's mouth—for it can never get into his brain; and thirdly, what are some of its practical fruits.

First, as to its utility, we will express our mind in the terms of Mr. W. T. Harris, Commissioner of

Education. "I do not mean," he says, "to disparage or discourage physiological psychology; for it is certainly the best part of physiology, and will bring with it stores of important knowledge useful in hygiene and the pathology of education." [1]

Hygiene and Pathology—the health of children and their diseases! This is the full share of usefulness which the new psychology may lend to education, or, as Mr. Harris politely puts it, "will" lend to pedagogics. We hope it will.

But is it not useful for a teacher to study, that he may learn what kind of being a child is, whether it comes from the sky or from the nether earth, whether it is fish, flesh or fowl, and by what imaginable process it may get an idea into its head? Let Mr. Harris answer for us.[2] He is a devoted student of German philosophy himself, being of the school of Hegel.

He premises that educational psychology is studied in order to find the grounds of prevailing educational theories. Three classes of works on psychology are before the public. The first class contains the works written from the so-called standpoint of common sense. It is best represented by Victor Cousin, who propounded this "common-sense" doctrine as against the materialism of Locke. The second class comprises works written by the physiologists and physiological psychologists whom we are considering at present. The third class embraces works on rational psychology from the school of Aristotle or of Kant.

He delivers his opinion on the second class, that of the physiological psychologists. He says their treatises

[1] *Educational Review*, January, 1891, p. 13; "Investigation in Psychology."

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

include two sub-classes: "First, those which make the senses the source of all our knowledge, and secondly, those that seek in the study of the brain and nervous system the explanation of the phenomena of mind. Both of these sub-classes agree in making mental action something organic—a function of the physical organism—instead of placing it in a soul transcending the physical body and controlling the same. The materialistic theory, in other words, seeks to explain the mind through the functions of matter, instead of explaining the functions of matter, that is, the organization of the body and all life-processes as having their origin in the self-activity of souls. Locke and his widespread school of psychology, together with the physiological-psychologists from Gall and Spurzheim to Broca and the school of Wundt and Ferrier, belong to this second class. Although their writings contain many hints for pedagogics as regards hygiene and pathology, the entire drift of their thought is negative to the aggregate of ethical and religious convictions which the age holds in its 'common sense.'" Then Mr. Harris goes on to explain that this "common sense" considers man as made up of "an immortal soul, transcendent of matter and charged with the ethical mandate to subdue the body and use it only as an instrument for transcendent purpose, namely, for the knowing and willing of what is divine"; and that "all our laws, manners and customs, our literature and our art as well as our institutions, are based on this spiritual presupposition." Whereupon he proceeds to argue with respect to pedagogics: "Now, since education is simply the means of initiating youth into the forms and convictions of our civilization, we can see how negative is the attitude of all forms of materialism. Its study by the teacher, unless he is able to escape its implications, will be injurious. The

only cure is to hold firmly to the dogmatic basis [*of common sense and Christianity*], or to move forward to the psychology founded on philosophical insight. Without this resort to the first or third basis, agnosticism is the only result of studying physiological-psychology or materialism."

Mr. Harris is not a Catholic in either religion or philosophy; hence the strangeness of some of his phrases. Yet, in his "first basis" of common sense, he refers implicitly to the "dogmatic basis" of the catechism when he speaks of the "forms and convictions of our [*Christian*] civilization"; and he alludes to the Catholic philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas when he speaks of the "third basis," that of the rational psychology derived from Aristotle. Now were Catholics to indulge in such references and allusions, when treating of modern psychology, they would simply be dubbed obscurantists, who neglect research, whose original sin it is never to be foremost in new movements, who take the catechism and the name of St. Thomas Aquinas as a plea for indolence.

Secondly, we propose to show what this new psychology looks like, or sounds like, when it gets into a teacher's mouth, and issues from pedagogic lips. And, in order to preserve that serenity of mind which becomes the inspector of a school, we shall listen to the exposition of a lady. The duty of courtesy will put less of a strain on our moral endurance when we gather wisdom from the lips of one who surely must love the children she writes of as well as we, and may know them perhaps better:

> And what delights can equal those
> That stir the spirit's inner deeps,
> When one that loves, but knows not, reaps
> A truth from one that loves and knows!

Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi has written in the *Educational Review* on "Applications of Psychology in Education." [1] Omitting the editorial eulogies on her, we note that she is a psychological "naturalist" of the materialistic school. Still, she is somewhat eclectic, and so she borrows an idea or two from Herbart's idealistic school. For she speaks of "adjusting internal ideas, or those existing in the mind, to external ideas, or those existing in the social mind or imposed by the constitution of things." She says: "Each mind selects, creates, the world in which it is to live. And, conversely, all the events which have transpired in the history of the world are but the outward realization of ideas which have been associated with brains like these. Despotisms, wars, revolutions, pyramids, crusades, inquisitions, cathedrals, dynasties, religions, sciences—all are only projected thoughts. Of what fearful importance is it then to know what thoughts shall spring up in the growing brain, and if possible, how to modify their nature and their sequence?"—Truly, this is fearful!

She then proposes a number of profound questions, as to how four little pieces of information might, on the same day, be presented to the child's mind; one point is about a wooden cube in geometry, a second is about the lie of a shore in geography, the third is about a date in history, and the fourth is about the subjunctive mood in grammar. She observes: "The answer to these questions implies some theory of the nature of the mind, and some doctrine of the generation of ideas." Here, then, we see the open door by which psychology got into the class-room. It never

[1] *Educational Review*, June, 1897 (vol. II), pp. 1, *seqq.* Cf. *ibid.*, November, p. 331, W. H. Maxwell on the "tremendous importance" of what she and the other physiological psychologists (and himself) are propounding.

occurred to anyone before that children might possibly get into their heads four little pieces of information, on geometry, geography, history and grammar, all on the same day. She proceeds forthwith: "Is the mind a product of the brain, and can we excite ideas in the mind by direct action on the brain? Or is the brain the organ of the mind, and can we influence the processes in the brain by means of ideas?" She slips over a third question: Whether perhaps the mind (to use the phraseology of Mr. Harris) is the faculty of a self-activity called the immortal soul, which merely uses the sensitive faculties, distributed through the body and connected with the brain, to obtain its ideas and use them in perfect freedom? This last question is altogether beyond her ken, and that animal, called a child, is simply a kind of piano, which discourses its mental music according as you set the wires a-vibrating by proper impacts on the outer keys.

Now, following Professor James, Hume, Spencer and others of the same category, she posits the fundamental problem of education: "One way of stating the fundamental problem of education is the following: Education aims at enlarging the periphery of consciousness in proportion to the central nucleus; it aims at making disinterested ideas predominate over central egotisms. The peripheric rim of consciousness is enlarged by multiplying the number of thoughts in it, by increasing their recurrences, by suffusing them with feeling, and by quickening them with volition."

Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi favours us with illustrations of what she means; and she makes everything so clear. The first pictorial illustration is that of a series of wavy lines, whereof the lower part, more darkly shaded than the upper, "may be taken," she says, "for the physical activities; the upper, the lighter

part, for the psychic or mental activities." They are all the same lines, however; matter is just a little thicker and fatter than spirit. A second picture represents with graphic precision Hume's wonderful definition of mind, that "it is the sum of its thoughts." Here the lady shows us "a succession of waves endlessly following each other in a stream of thought, whose sum taken together makes up the totality of consciousness"—of course, there is no mind there to be conscious, nor any intellect to do the thinking. Two other pictures go to explain Professor James, longitudinally and in section. They exhibit a cylinder of "instincts," which run on as isolated lines in cylindrical form, without resting on one another or on anything else. Another diagram represents the truly metaphysical idea of our acquaintance, Herbert Spencer, that "the mind is a circumscribed aggregate of activities; and the cohesion of these activities, one with another, compels the postulate of something of which they are the activities." Now, if we were less on intimate terms with Mr. Herbert Spencer, we might suppose that he was actually postulating here something like an underlying soul. But we do him no such injustice. Nor does Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi. She presents the illustrative pictorial diagram of Spencer's idea in the shape of what looks very much like the contents of a dust-pan thrown recklessly in the air. That is the mind!

Then comes a storage-battery and a generating-battery of galvanic cells. She considers this diagram quite "useful for educational thinking." It is intended to illustrate a definition given by Professor James, to wit: "The mind is the medium upon which the manifold processes in the brain combine their effects"; that is to say, the brain is the generating-battery and the mind the storage-battery. And thus,

the lady gravely observes, "the second fundamental aim of education, how to secure an abundant generation of force," and how "to unify it in the brain of the child" is brought home—you have only to set the batteries a-going. These are all "facts"; for she says: "Upon the basis of the *facts* above mentioned, the following proposition may be constructed: When the brain-processes involved in visual perceptions—as of a wooden cube—have been frequently repeated; when they have been associated with brain-processes involved in tactual perceptions of the same cube; when these perceptions and processes excited by the cube have co-existed with perceptions and processes excited by other objects, and revived by memory in consciousness for comparison, then a state of consciousness is aroused which may be called a perception. This is a single pulse of thought, but it embraces, as objects, the multiple details of previous states. They may be said to be unified in it." Here we have an "Application of Psychology in Education"; and, this new psychology being so necessary an adjunct of modern teaching, we discern one reason out of many why modern teaching is what it is.[1]

The lady, reverting to her own native good sense, rebukes teachers for "a much prevailing custom. Habitually," she says, "a dozen fragments of knowledge are presented to the child in as many text-books, and are liable to remain in his mind as isolated, fragmentary, and lifeless as the scattered bones in the valley of Jehosophat. How often is a child expected to study separately reading, writing, spelling, composition, definitions, elocution, synonyms, rhetoric, etymology, Latin, French, and English grammar, mythology, history and geography! The essentials of these subjects—indeed for many of them, all that the child needs

[1] For further illustrations, see the original article.

to know—might be obtained from the penetrating study of Livy or of Cornelius Nepos. In such a study these different subjects would fall into place as the naturally related parts of a complex whole, the whole being the narrative given by the Latin author." Here, by the road of her own good sense, the lady is reverting to the genuine idea of a liberal education, as we explained it above.[1] She appends a foot-note: "While these pages are passing through the press, I am informed that the suggestion in the text is very similar to a fundamental principle of the Herbartian school of pedagogics. Never having had an opportunity to study this system, the fact that the same idea has occurred to me independently shows how naturally it arises from the unbiassed consideration of things." Here the editors omitted to inform the lady that the same is a fundamental idea of the *Ratio Studiorum* of the Jesuits; and long before them it was a fundamental idea of all education. It is at the basis of classical education.

In the third and last place, we promised to give some positive results of this laboratory psychology. But let us pause a moment.

IV

Really, has the child never been known up to this? And teachers, themselves, have they never been children, in all the cycle of secular revolutions until now? "In certain recent pedagogical works I observe," says Père Burnichon,[2] "a phraseology to which we have not been accustomed, a vocabulary

[1] See *supra*, here, pp. 221, 222, *seqq.*, "What is a Liberal Education."

[2] *Etudes*, October, 1893, t. 60, p. 179; "*L'Education dans l'Université.*"

pretentious in the extreme ; there is much talk about the psychology of childhood, where our ancestors wrote only : Study of its qualities and defects. Or again, I read ' solidarity ' in place of ' charity.' Quite lately I perused in the *Revue Bleue* a very profound study, in which, with great parade of scientific language, the writer concluded after many a long and laborious winding, that education ought to have for its object the development of ' altruistic sentiments.' They tell us that all that modern science has done for rheum in the brain is to call it ' coryza.' I fear that it has been no happier in its pedagogical research." Again, the same excellent writer remarks on a work of this kind by a M. Maillet : [1] " M. Maillet writes in all kinds of letters : ' The psychology of childhood is a science altogether new. We can only be astonished at the fact. . . . People knew not, they had no idea of the baby, *On ne connaissait pas, on ne soupçonnait pas le ' baby '.*" Burnichon confesses that St. Augustine, St. Chrysostom, St. Basil, St. Anselm and Gerson and all the other educational writers down to Bossuet, Fénélon, and Blessed J. B. de la Salle, as well as the great religious bodies devoted to education, and so successful in it, did not make much of scientific parade in the matter, seeing " that all the sublimity of metaphysics consists sometimes in saying what every one knows, but in words which no one understands." [2] In fact, " Christian teachers cannot help wondering at the expenditure of so much genius and of so many methods for the discovery of what good sense alone had made known to themselves. For, after all, ' the principles of education pertain to the

[1] *Etudes*, 1891, t. 52, p. 329 ; *Eléments de Psychologie de l'Homme et de l'Enfant, par M. F. Maillet.*

[2] P. Girard, " *Rapport sur l'Institut de M. Pestalozzi*," 1810, p. 90.

province of good sense—to that good sense which is old, not to science, which is young.' " [1]

Now let us see some results as exhibited in the United States. The gentleman who was praised above, Dr. G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark University in Massachusetts, has contributed to *The Forum* a report on " Child Study, the Basis of Exact Education." [2] This is precisely the subject before us.

He begins by telling us that the American Republic shows some signs of making up its arrears by advancing several branches of the great science of man ; that such a condition of things " is a fact well befitting a republic, new and without tradition, which most needs to take a fresh, free look at every aspect of human nature." He notes that work has been going on in various lines ; but all investigators, doctors, anthropologists, psychologists, parents and teachers should now co-operate. First, there have been studies on the human embryo, such as Preyer and others have done. Secondly, there have been studies of infancy up to the age of three and four years. " Here belongs the work of Preyer, Perez, Compayré, Tracy, Shinn and many earlier observers. For this work the term Psychogenesis [*evolution of the soul*] is often used, on the often-denied assumption that the fundamental elements of the soul are here being developed." Dr. Stanley Hall himself does not deny this assumption. Thirdly, there have been studies on the early years of school life, especially the first year, for which Mr. Chrisman has suggested the term Paidology. " Lastly, come the studies of youth and adolescent years, beginning at the age of thirteen or fourteen and

[1] Girard, " *Rapport sur l'Institut de M. Pestalozzi*," 1810, p. 90.

[2] *The Forum* (N.Y.), December, 1893, pp. 429, *seqq.*

lasting perhaps ten years to full maturity or nubility. Here the term Ephebics might do duty till a better one appears."

We will give here some of the representative methods and some of the characteristic results of this Child Study.

In the first years of school life, special studies are generally averages of tests on large numbers of children. "The method is simple; if children are to be measured or questioned, they are taken two or three at a time into the dressing-room of the school, where the calipers are applied for the diameter of head and body, the tape for lengths and circumference, scales for weighing, dynamometers for testing strength, and many more especial devices; teeth, eyes, lungs, nose, throat, hearing, accuracy and rapidity of movement, etc., are tested with every precaution for uniformity and for the avoidance of error." "The value of Galton's method of percentile grades, of equations estimating the thickness of shoes and clothing, the interpretation of unexpected results, the value of exceptions, involve technical expertness."—It is well to recall that we are following the methods of the new *psychology*—they are not the methods of a mere recruiting sergeant or of a veterinary surgeon.

There is no kind of data which is spurned, "without however offending the child's delicacy of consciousness." It is affirmed that "the collection of such data has had excellent effect upon teachers. They tend to focus effort upon individual children rather than upon 'the pedagogic phantom called the Child.' Like all such studies made by teachers or parents, the best result is for them [*not for the child*]." Stanley Hall continues: "Mr. Russell adopts the statement that the practice of child-study is directly for the sake of the teacher, indirectly for the sake of the child, and

incidentally for the sake of science." Poor child of the current century!

The president passes forthwith to results: "We will begin with measurements"—24,500 Boston pupils weighed and measured; 10,000 Milwaukee children; 30,000 St. Louis children. Studies on motor ability; medical studies on the diseases incident to growing youth. Here the writer breaks off into some pious reflections: "The juvenile world now goes to school and has its brain titillated and tattooed, and we have entirely forgotten that men have been not only good citizens but great, who were in idyllic ignorance of even the belauded invention of Cadmus [*the alphabet*]. Now, if this tremendous school engine, in which everybody believes now with a catholic consensus of belief perhaps never before attained, is in the least degree tending to deteriorate mankind physically, it is bad. Knowledge bought at the expense of health, which is wholeness or holiness itself in the higher aspect [!], is not worth what it costs. Health conditions all the highest joys of life, means full maturity, national prosperity. May we not reverently ask, What shall it profit a child if he gain the whole world of knowledge and lose his health? or, what shall he give in exchange for his health?"—Here we get a peep at the theoretical holiness and practical profanity of psychological infidelity.

Then come studies on the contents of children's minds, on their theological and religious life, and the president closes with prospecting "a new field and method, which might be called the higher anthropology."

Need more be said about this modern psychology as applied in the school-room, in connection with which it is said so sententiously that "to train the mind without a knowledge of the mind is absurd"? If so,

this pedagogical-psychology must be extravagantly absurd. For it "titillates and tattooes" a ganglion called the brain, and, as to mind, it neither knows of that nor cares to use it.

For our part, we prefer a psychology that includes mind and soul. And if, thanks to the beneficence of Him Who hath given wisdom to mankind, such psychology is old, we do not object to it on that account. Oftentimes the old wine is best.

Pesch, Tilman, *Philosophia Naturalis*, n. 181; *Institutiones Logicales*, II, i, nn. 602–606, 657.—Bonniot, *L'Ame et la Physiologie*, II, § 2; "*Déterminisme Physique*."—Surbled, Dr., *Les Explications Physiques de la Mémoire; Revue des Questions Scientifiques*, avril, 1894, p. 365.—Jacobi, Dr. M. P., "Applications of Psychology in Education"; *Educational Review* (N.Y.), June, 1891. Cf. W. H. Maxwell, "The Literature of Education," *ibid.*, November, 1891, p. 331.—Père Burnichon, "*L'Education dans l'Université*; *Etudes*, t. 60, p. 179, octobre, 1893. The same on the following: Maillet, M. F., "*L'Eléments de Psychologie de l'Homme et de l'Enfant*"; *Etudes*, t. 52, p. 329, 1891.—Hall, Stanley, "Child Study, the Basis of Exact Education," *Forum* (N.Y.), December, 1893.—Harris, W. T., "Investigation in Psychology"; *Educational Review*, January, 1891, pp. 9, 13, *seqq.*

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